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party pl~ffs in 
action) 
1. SUMMARY: 
Cert to CAll (Fay, Anderson, 
Gibso [scj]) (per curiam) 
Federal/Civil Timely 
that the CAll's affirmance of the 
DC's imposition of a temporary one-black-for-one-white promotion -~uota) was in error under Title VII and under the Equal Protection 
Clause. 
2. FACTS AND DECISION BELOW: In 1972, the NAACP brought 
this class action suit against the Alabama Department of Public ~ 
~ tvc- w'(~~'*, No.8'f-r;lto I {_ou-Q.. zs, ('.)o. S4-lhs~, ~ L.o~43, 
~;(.':.£ (\lo, 9£-t- {~q'1 
.. 
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t Safety and the Alabama Personnel Department, ~lleging violations 
of the Equal Protection Clause and 42 u.s.c. §§1981 and 1983. 
These allegations centered around the alleged systematic failure 
-·-----------~ 
of the Department to hire blacks to serve on the Alabama state 
trooper force. Petr was made a party plaintiff, as were resps 
(resp Paradise individually and on behalf of the similarly 
situated class of black plaintiffs). 
v-
The DC found that the ~·~~~ 
. -;;:c. 
Department had engaged in a "blatant and cont1nuous pattern and 
~ 
practice of discrimination in hiring," noting that in the 37-year 
history of the state patrol there had been no black troopers. --The DC concluded that a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment had 
been shown and entered comprehensive injunctive relief. 
Specifically, the DC enjoined the Department from engaging in 
discriminatory hiring and promotion practices and ordered it to 
hire one black trooper for each white trooper until the 
percentage of blacks on the force reached about 25%. 
On appeal to the old CA5, the Department did not challenge 
the finding of a constitutional violation but contended that the 
quota hiring relief unconstitutionally discriminated against 
whites. The CA5 held that white applicants who had higher 
eligibility than blacks were not denied equal protection because 
the selection procedures had not been shown to be accurate 
predictors of successful job performance. The CAS also upheld 
the temporary racial hiring quotas as the only rational means to 
eliminate the current effects of past racial discrimination. 
Having rejected the constitutional arguments, the CAS also held 
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that the DC had not abused its discretion because the violation 
was so clear and the Department's record so dismal. 
In 1974, the plaintiffs moved in DC for further relief, 
alleging that the Department had restricted the size of the 
trooper force so as to frustrate the 1972 hiring order and that a 
disproportionate number of blacks hired under the order failed to 
attain permanent trooper status. In 1975, the DC found that the 
Department had manipulated the size of the force to frustrate the 
relief gained by the plaintiffs and that the high black attrition 
rate was caused by the Department's failure to hire the best-
qualified black applicants and official discrimination in various 
forms against blacks on the force. The DC enjoined the 
Department from limiting the force size to frustrate the 25% 
hiring goal. 
In 1977, the plaintiffs moved in the DC for supplemental 
relief. After extensive discovery, the parties entered into a 
consent decree in 1979. This decree explicitly recognized the 
continuing effect of the 1972 and 1975 orders. In the decree, 
the Department agreed not to engage in any discriminatory act or 
practice and to develop a nondiscriminatory procedure for 
promotions to corporal. The Department obligated itself to 
develop this procedure within one year from the decree. Once the 
corporal promotion procedure had been validated, the Department 
was to start on the promotion procedures for higher offices. The 
decree also provided that the plaintiffs could apply to the DC 
for orders enforcing its terms or for other appropriate relief. 
A few days after the signing of the 1979 decree, the Department 
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moved for clarification of the 1972 order's hiring quota 
requirement and supplemental relief. The DC declined to modify 
the quota requirement. 
In 1981, more than two years after the 1979 decree was 
entered, the Department requested the DC to approve a new 
examination to be used for promotions to corporal. All the 
plaintiffs, including petr, objected to such approval, 
maintaining that the examination had not been validated and that 
its use would not be justified if it had an adverse impact on 
blacks. Before a hearing on this issue could be held, however, 
the parties entered into another consent decree. In this 1981 
decree, the parties agreed that the Department would use a 
promotion procedure that had no adverse effects on blacks. To 
avoid unnecessary litigation, the Department would administer its 
proposed test (for corporal) and then review it to see if it had 
a prohibited adverse impact. If it had no such adverse impact, 
promotions would be made according to the ranking resulting from 
the test. If it did, however, promotions were to be made in 
another, nondiscriminatory manner. If the parties could not 
agree, the matter was to be submitted to the DC. 
In accordance with the 1981 decree, the Department 
administered its written corporal exam. This resulted in a rank-
ordering that would have had an adverse impact on black 
applicants for promotion. Petr suggested that the Department 
abide by the 1981 decree and formulate a nondiscriminatory 
promotion scheme. The Department had indicated that it needed to 
promote 16-20 persons to corporal, and petr objected to these 
-5-
promotions being made in rank order from the list resulting from 
the test. 
In 1983, resps moved in DC for an order enforcing the 1979 
and 1981 decrees. They sought an order requiring the Department 
to promote blacks and whites to corporal at the same rate until 
such time as the Department implemented a valid and 
nondiscriminatory promotion procedure. Resps noted that even 
though blacks had been employed in the Department for 11 years, 
only four had advanced beyond the lowest rank. According to 
resps, the relief requested was necessary to enforce the promises 
made in the earlier decrees. 
Petr opposed the imposition of the 1-for-1 promotional 
quota, contending that such relief was inconsistent with the 1981 
decree, exceeded the DC's remedial authority under ~itle VII, and 
was unconstitutional. Petr did agree, however, that some 
nondiscriminatory promotions should be ordered so as to enforce 
the earlier decrees. 
The Department agreed with petr that imposition of a 
promotion quota was unconstitutional but argued that it should be 
given the chance to show that its proposed promotion procedure 
was valid and did not adversely affect blacks. The Department 
was joined by four white applicants for promotion to corporal 
(representing those white applicants who ranked above the 
highest-ranked black applicant) who intervened, claiming that the 
decrees were illegal and unconstitutional. 
The DC allowed the white applicants to intervene--
prospectively only. The DC then determined that the Department's 
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proposed promotion procedure adversely affected blacks. Thus, 
the DC enjoined use of that procedure. The DC also ordered the 
Department to submit a plan to promote 15 persons to corporal 
that would not have a discriminatory effect. 
A few weeks later, the Department submitted to the DC a 
proposal to promote 15 troopers to corporal--4 of whom would be 
black. (This percentage reflected the percentage of those taking 
the corporal's test who were black.) The Department also 
requested a period of time to submit a non-discriminatory 
corporal promotion plan to submit for prior court approval. 
Resps opposed this plan, noting that it failed to account 
for their injury due to the Department's delay in implementing 
the 1979 decree's nondiscriminatory promotion requirements. This 
delay had not only disadvantaged blacks trying to be promoted to 
corporal but those seeking to be promoted from corporal to higher 
ranks as well. Resps again requested a 1-for-1 promotion plan 
until such time as a valid procedure was put in place. Petr, on 
the other hand, did not oppose the Department's 15 and 4 
promotion plan. Petr did oppose the suggestion that a test be 
approved by the court before its use on the ground that this 
would violate the 1981 decree's requirement that a plan be 
administered to see if it adversely affected blacks. The white 
interventors opposed any quota and contended that the promotions 
should be by rank order from the 1981 corporal promotion exam. 
The DC granted resps motion to enforce the 1979 and 1981 
decrees, noted the striking lingering effects of the Department's 
past discrimination in the absence of blacks in the higher ranks, 
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and agreed that a 1-for-1 promotion plan should be imposed for 
promotions to all ranks until either (1) about 25% of the rank 
was black or (2) the Department formulated a nondiscriminatory 
promotion procedure. The DC also ordered the Department to 
submit a schedule for development of nondiscriminatory promotion 
procedures for all ranks. The entry of quotas was appropriate, 
the DC believed, because it was temporary, it did not require the 
discharge of any white troopers, it did not require the promotion 
of any unqualified black troopers, it did not unnecessarily 
trammel the interests of white troopers, and it was specifically 
tailored to redress the present effects of past discrimination. 
The DC noted that the Department could end the quota at any time 
simply by adopting acceptable promotion procedures. 
In 1984, eight black troopers and eight white troopers were 
promoted to corporal. Following these promotions, the Department 
developed and implemented a plan for promotions to corporal, 
which the DC allowed the Department to use. All parties but 
resps appealed to the CAll from the 1-for-1 order. Only the 
white intervenors appealed from the second order of the DC 
allowing the Department to use the new corporal promotion plan. 
On appeal, the CAll first addressed the objections to the 1-
for-1 order. The CAll turned first to the question whether the 
DC's order was a proper enforcement of the earlier decrees or 
whether it was an improper modification. The CAll determined 
that the order was proper enforcement of those decrees. The 1979 
decree specifically allowed the plaintiffs to move for 
enforcement of the decree or for other appropriate relief. 
-8-
Further, since the parties were unable to agree on whether the 
examination adversely affected blacks, the DC was required, under 
the 1981 decree, the resolve that issue. The DC's remedial order 
was specifically stated to be in accordance with the 1981 
decree's provision that the DC fashion a remedy if the parties 
could not agree. The CAll, having held that the procedures were 
in accord with the decrees, went on to hold that the substantive 
relief was as well. The decrees were aimed at eliminating 
discrimination based on race and, although isolated provisions 
could be taken as forbidding adverse effects because of race 
generally, the clear motivating objective of these decrees was to 
forbid adverse effects on blacks rather than on whites. Thus, 
the DC's order was authorized by the decrees and within their 
; scope. 
The CAll then turned to the issue of the order's compliance 
with Title VII. The CAll rejected the argument that Firefighters 
Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 104 S.Ct. 2576 (1984), precluded 
the award of relief to those who had never been found to be the 
actual victims of discrimination. (Here, there had never been a 
finding of discrimination in promotions.) Although agreeing that 
"a superficial reading of Stotts" might support this position, 
the CAll distinguished it on its facts. First, it noted that the 
issue there involved the DC's authority to override a bona fide 
seniority system to require the layoff of more senior whites. 
Here, the issue was promotions rather than layoffs, and §703(h) 
of Title VII was thus not a controlling factor. Second, the 
defendant in Stotts never admitted to intentional discrimination. 
-9-
Here, however, there were judicial findings of entrenched 
intentional discrimination. Third, Stotts was primarily a Title 
VII action. Here, the case was brought under the Fourteenth 
Amendment. And fourth, (even assuming that this case could 
properly be viewed as a Title VII case), Stotts did not involve 
the enforcement of a voluntary consent decree. There, the DC had 
modified the decree over the objection of the parties. Here, 
however, the DC simply took appropriate action to enforce the 
consent decrees. The CAll noted further that this voluntary 
action would be easier to justify than a similar order imposed by 
the DC in its remedial capacity. 
Finally, the CAll addressed the intervenors' equal 
protection claim. Noting the absence of a definitive ruling by 
this Court on a ffirmative action programs, the CAll noted various 
tests enunciated by various courts and finally concluded that the 
order was not violative of equal protection. First, there was a 
long history of discrimination on the part of the Department. 
And the quota was clearly designed to remedy the present effects 
of this past discrimination. The 25% goal was also appropriate 
as it reflected the 25% hiring goal in the 1972 order, which was 
affirmed on appeal. Further, the 1975 order had made clear that 
this goal applied to all ranks. In addition, the C~ll found that 
the quota was substantially related to the objective of 
eradicating the present effects of past discrimination and that 
it did not exceed what was necessary to remedy the longstanding 
racial imbalance in the upper ranks of the Department. The quota 
was also temporary, within the power of the Department to 
-10-
eliminate (by complying with the prior orders and decrees), did 
not require that any white trooper be discharged, demoted, or 
replaced, and provided that only qualified black troopers would 
be promoted. 
The CAll also concluded that the plan did not violate Title 
VII, see United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443 u.s. 193 
(1979), and that the DC had had a sufficient factual record 
before it to properly reach that conclusion. 
In response to the intervenors' claim that the more recent 
Department promotion program was improper, the CAll also affirmed 
the DC's approval of that program. (That ruling is not at issue 
in this petition.) 
3. CONTENTIONS: Petr first contends that the CAll erred in 
concluding that the DC order here was simply an enforcement 
order. Rather, petr asserts that it was a modification of the 
consent decrees. This is so because the earlier decrees did not 
provide for a 1-for-1 promotion quota. In any case, if this is 
not a modification, it presents the same issue as Local 93 v. 
City of Cleveland, No. 84-1999, and should be held for that case. 
(In Local 93, the issue is a racial preference incorporated in a 
consent judgment.) In any case, even if this was not a 
modification, it presents issues similar to those in Local 28 v. 
EEOC, No. 84-1656, and Wygant v. Jackson County Board of 
Education, No. 84-1340. In Local 28, the racial preference was 
awarded by the court and is challenged under Title VII; in 
Wygant, the racial preference was incorporated in a collective 
bargaining agreement and is challenged under the Equal Protection 
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Clause. The decisions in those three cases are likely to afford 
substantial guidance in this case, and this case should be held 
pending their disposition. 
On the merits, petr adopts the arguments made in the SG's 
briefs in those three cases (which I will not repeat here except 
to note that petr is opposed to the use of racial quotas in the 
affirmative action context). Petr does, however, add a few 
comments about this particular case. First, the CAll incorrectly 
distinguished this case from Stotts. Stotts does not apply only 
where seniority rights are abridged. Further, Stotts cannot be 
satisfactorily distinguished as not involving a consent decree. 
In addition, that the DC predicated its order on findings of past 
intentional discrimination is beside the point. Further, the 
fact that these quotas were premised on a constitutional 
violation is incorrect (petr argues that they were based on Title 
VII although the CAll said they weren't) and in any case these 
quotas are no more acceptable because of that. (Petr cites to 
pertinent passages in its briefs on the merits of the various 
cases in support of these summary arguments.) 
Petr also questions the CAll's holding that the relief 
awarded is consistent with the Fourteenth Amendment. A federal 
court is also subject to the constraints of the Equal Protection 
Clause, and its action here violated those protections. 
Resps review the factual history of this litigation in some 
detail and then agree with petr that the Court should grant cert. 
This case presents questions substantially similar to those 
presented in Local 28 and Local 93, but it presents those 
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questions in a slightly different context: the enforcement of a 
consent decree where intentional discrimination has been found. 
The decisions in those cases will provide only "substantial 
clarification" of the issues here, and thus this case should be 
consolidated and heard with them. Resps then argue that only 
numerical race-conscious relief could remedy the discrimination 
here. In egregious cases such as this, only this type of relief 
will remedy past discrimination. 
4. DISCUSSION: The first issue, whether the DC's actions 
were properly within the scope of the prior consent decrees or 
constituted a modification of those decrees, seems clearly 
factbound and not certworthy. Further, as a preliminary question 
that might affect the resolution of the underlying substantive 
issues presented in this case, it might well render this entire 
case inappropriate for review by this Court. Nevertheless, petr 
is correct that Local 28, Local 93, and Wygant should shed some 
light on the issues presented by this case. 
5. RECOMMENDATION: I recommend a HOLD for Wygant, No. 84-
1340, Local 28, No. 84-1656, and Local 93, No. 84-1999. 
There is a response. 
January 28, 1986 Strand Opinion in petn 
·~ 
February 21, 1986 
Court ................... . 'Voted on .................. , 19 .. . 
Argued .................. . , 19 .. . Assigned .................. , 19 . . . 
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/ I 
The procedural history of this c~ is somewhat com licaft:: . 
The essential facts are as follows. ~19~, the NAACP broug t a 
class action against the Alabama state trooper force alleging 
that the force had engaged in discriminatory hiring and promotion 
practices in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment and 42 u.s.c. 
SS1981 and 1983. The United States was made a party plaintiff 
p nd Mr. Paradise was permi~ed to intervene on behalf of a class 
f) C- 1-v~ black plaintiffs. The "f>istr ict Court (then Chief Judge Frank 
Q-1 .. ~-- Johnson) found that the trooper force had engaged in a blatant 
f'~-~nd continuous attern and ractice of discrimination in hiring. 
He oun a 1n the years o e n1s ory e patrol that 
~ there had never been a black _trooper. Pet. 3a. The court 
concluded t ha t oefen~ad viol ated the Fourteenth Amendment 
and enjoined them from engaging in discriminating on the basis of 
race and ordered them, inter alia, to hire one_ black troog er for 
eac~ hired until blacks C:ompr fSed 25 % o f t he force. 
The defendants appealed and CAS affirmed. 
In 1975, the District Court found that defendants had 
artificially restricted the size of the trooper force in order to 
frustrate the 1972 order. Based on this finding, the court 
enjoined the defendants from artificially restricting the size of 
the force for the purpose of delaying or frustrating achievement 
of the goal of having blacks comprise 25% of the trooper force. 
In 1977, plaintiffs returned to the District Court seeking 
supplemental relief in the face of defendants' recalcitrance. In 
1979, the parties entered into a partial consent decree in which 
they explicitly recognized the continuing effect of the courts 
1972 and 1975 orders. Pet. 9a. The defendants also agreed, with 
respect to iDr~motion~ to develop within one year a promotion 
procedure th'a wouia e fair to all applicants and that would 
have little or no adverse impact on blacks seeking promotion to 
corporal. Id. 
In 1979, one year after the deadline contained in the 
consent decree, defendants moved the District Court for approval 
G l! 
P ~f (_a_,;_1os:=~ pr;;tio{ ~:_ : ~s J a::t A W (J'" ~o-g4-/,~b 
the United States objected to this proposed unfair 
to blacks. Before a hearin could be held n this issue, the 
parties entered into another consent deere • In that decree, the 
parties agreed that de en an s proposed examination would be 
administered and scored. Thereafter, the promotion register 
(rank listing of individuals who took the exam) would be reviewed 
to determine whether it had an adverse impact on blacks. If the 
procedure would have little or no adverse impact on blacks, it 
would be implemented. If, however, the parties agreed or the 
court found that the procedure did have an adverse impact, 
promotions were to be made in a way that does not result in such 
an impact. Specifically, defendants were to submit an 
alternative proposal. If the parties then failed to agree on a 
method for making proposals, the matter was to be submitted to 
the court for resolution. 
n.,_~ 
In accordance with the 1981 decree, ~defendants administered 
the exam. Upon reviewing the examination results, the United 
States objected to the use of the procedure on that ground that 
it would have a substantial adverse impact on black applicants 
for promotion to corporal. Pet. 14a-15a. 
Nothing more seems to have transpired until 1983, when the 
plaintiffs moved the District Court for an order enforcing the 
terms of the 1979 and 1982 decrees. They requested an order 
requiring defendants to promote one black to corporal for each 
white promoted until the defendants implement a valid promotional 
procedure. The u.s. agreed that that the decrees should be 
enforced by ordering some promotions but without ordering a one-
~ for-one quota. Shortly after the motion to enforce was filed, 
four white applicants intervened on behalf of a class of white 
~~roopers. ~ trf ~-? 
--/ The District Court ultimate! granted plaintiffs' motion to 
enforce and- or:stma 'the trooper f rce to ''promote'" one black for 
ever* ~bite ~t~l 25% of the ra~k 's composed of black troopers 
or t e derenaants have developed and implemented a promotion plan 
for the rank conforming with all the prior orders and decrees. 
The court observed that almost 12 years had passed since the 
t"'l- r inception of the litigation and E'fie eFfects of the prior 
discriminatory hiring practice were still being felt. The court 
noted that: 
•of the 6 majors, there is still not one black. 
Of the 25 captains, there is still not one black. Of 
the 35 lieutenants, there is still not one black. Of 
the 65 sergeants, there is still not one black. And of 
the 66 corporals, only four are black. • • • Moreover, 
the department is still without acceptable procedures 
for advancement of black troopers into this structure, 
and it does not appear that any procedures will be in 
place within the near future." Pet. 20a (emphasis in 
original). 
The trooper force, the United States, and the intervenors 
all appealed the District Courts judgment to CAll. Three of the 
issues before CAll are the issues raised by the United States in 
this petition for cert. They are: 
1) Whether the District Court's order impermissibly modified 
the consent decrees of 1979 and 1981. 
2) Whether the District Court exceeded its remedial 
authority under S706(g) in awarding relief that benefits 
individuals who are not proven to have been the ' victims of past 
discrimination. ,, 
- /1 
3) Whether the one-for-one quota violates the Equal 
Protection Clause. 
'{ CAll held first that the District Court's order merely cA 1t implemented rather than modified the consent decree, noting that 
~ 1~< the parties expressly contemplated that in a situation where they 
~ ._ could not agree the District Court would formulate a promotion 
~ plan. Second, the court observed that the instant suit was 
~ ~-~ brought under the Fourteenth Amendment, not Title VII, and that 
~- thus Stotts (and by extension S706(g)) had no relevance here. 
~· The court went on to state, though, that even assuming that this 
~ /P case is properly v i ewed as a Title VII case, Stotts is 
~ distinguishable and S706(g) does not limit the authority of 
~ courts to enter consent decrees. Pet. 32a-33a. Finally, the 
A~~~ court held that the District Court's order is substantially 
~ '~:- vJ1 related to the objective of eradicating the present effects of 
f ~/ past discrimination and extends no further than necessary to v -~ . ~ remedy the egregious and longstanding discriminatory practices of 
~~ defendants. The court noted t~t it is a temporary measure, 
~~ which will cease to exist whenJihe percentage f 1gure 1s met or 
(~~~~when the~per rorce ~ aevelops a valid promotion procedure. The 
L/7court also found significant the facts that the ~rder does not 
require the discharge or demotion of whites or the replacement of 
a wh 1~r wifE a D!aaK one. The court concluded that ' ~ _ ,_ 
absent the order, the trooper force would not cease its ~J • 
: . ~· 
discriminatory practices. Id., at 4la. 
Only the United States has petitioned for certiorari, 
rais i ng the issues listed above. Because the plaintiffs in this 
case litigated it as a Fourteenth Amendment case, rather than as 
a Title VII case, S706(g) and our decisions explicating S706(g) 
in 1 93 and Local 28 are inapposite. I will therefore vote 
to eny on questions 1 and 2. And, since the parties whose equal 
p o ion rights are implicated by the District Court's order, 
t e class of white troopers who intervened below, have apparently 
decided to live with the order and ~ petitioned for 
certiorari, I believe that we shoul n question 3 as well. 
Court ................... . rated on .................. , 19.~86 
Argued .................. . , 19 .. . Assigned .................. , 19 . . . 
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ABSEN'r NO'r VO'riNG 
October 20, 1986 
PARADISE GINA-POW 
85-999 UNITED STATES v. PARADISE(CAll) 
MEMO TO BOB: 
This is a brief memo to you, Bob, as you mentioned 
that this was your case and you found it difficult. This 
case has a 14-year hi story, from which it is clear that 
the Alabama State Department of Public Safety (the 
Department) "egregiously discriminated" against Blacks in 
both employment and promotion for many years. The case is 
complicated by the prolonged litigation, including 
particularly the entry by the DC of two "consent decrees" 
that are complicated both as to their meaning and as to 
the extent of violations. If I understand the promotion 
procedure included in the consent decree of 1981, when it 
was followed by the Department (as I believe it was, but 
am not sure), no blacks would have been promoted even to 
the rank of corporal. In an order entered October 28, 
1983, the DC agreed that the 1981 promotion procedure was 
unacceptable because it had an "adverse impact" on black 
applicants. On December 15, 1983, the case now before us, 
the DC granted Paradise's motion to enforce the consent 
decrees (I assume, except with respect to the promotion 
4[.. 
procedure that had failed to attain its purpose). The DC 
imposed a fixed quota requiring the Department: 
"To promote from this day forward, for each 
white trooper promoted to a higher rank, one 
black trooper to the same rank, if there is a 
black trooper objectively qualified to be 
promoted to that rank." 
The court found that this quota was necessary to cure 
"racial imbalances in the upper rank". It is to be noted 
that the earlier dissent decrees had been limited, as I 
recall, to promotions to corporal. The DC's latest order 
applies to promotions to all ranks. The Court of Appeals 
first rejected the contention that the DC, in ordering the 
"one black for one white promotion quota" had 
"modified, rather than enforce, the 1979 and 1981 dissent 
decrees. The DC reached this conclusion by construing the 
consent decrees to bar any "adverse impact" only against 
blacks, and not against whites, who sought promotion. 
After agreeing that there was no improper modification of 
the consent decrees, CAll held that the promotion quota 
violated neither Title VII (a question not before us on 
this appeal), nor the Equal Protection Clause. The Court 
of Appeals sustained the quota because of "the long 
history of discrimination in the Department, and because 
3. 
the "relief was designed to remedy the present effects of 
past discrimination". Moreover, and of considerable 
importance at least for me, is the fact that CAll 
concluded that the quota did not require promotion of 
unqualified black troopers, did not absolutely bar 
qualified white troopers "from advancement through the 
ranks", and did not "require the discharge or demotion of 
a white trooper or the replacement of a white trooper with 
a black trooper." 
As the SG argues 
of the courts below 
"less intrusive or 
in its well-written brief, neither 
considered whether there were any 
more narrowly tailored means of 
enforcing the Department's compliance with its obligations 
under the consent decrees." I note here that the SG' s 
brief, P. 13, n. 6, states that the one on one promotion 
quota has been applied in actual practice only once, that 
8 blacks have been promoted since the DC' s decree, and 
that the constitutionality now has "limited retrospective 
importance since its invalidation could not lead to 
demotion of the 8 blacks promoted under it." Of course 
the quota could have significant future effects if it 
should be strictly followed. The principle adverse effect 
on whites would be that less well-qualified blacks would 
't • 
be promoted over better-qualified whites. I would assume 
this would have an adverse effect on the morale of the 
white officers, and also could have an adverse effect on 
recruitment by the State Department. 
As would be expected, petitioners - and particularly 
the SG rely on Justice 0' Connor's and my opinions in 
Wyga~ . Respondents understandably prefer to rely 
primarily on our decisions last Term in Local 93 and Local 
28, particularly the latter. To be sure, both of those 
were Title VII cases, but it can be argued that the 
rationale is relevant particularly in view here - as was 
true in Local 28 of a decade or more of grossly 
discrimatory conduct by the State. 
I have spent relevantly little time on the briefs, 
and certainly am not at rest. This is a more difficult 
case for me than the three cases we decided last Term. I 
will adhere to the reasoning of my Wyga~ opinion unless I 
am persuaded to compromise to some extent on the facts of 
this case by Justice O'Connor's views. My guess is that 
we will decide this case if we are together, although I 
did not understand Justice White's reasoning last Term. 
Nor, of course, do I know how Justice Scalia may think 
Jo 
about the extremely perplexing questions that arise under 
affirmative action programs. 
I therefore will welcome particularly your views, 
Bob, and please feel free to express them with candor. I 
add only that I am sympathetic to the grave problem of 
blacks seeking upward mobility in competition with whites. 
This is a problem that is experienced in education and 
particularly in the professional schools. For example, in 
the several hundred law clerks here since I became a 
Justice I can recall only three who were black and one of 
these was from one of the African countries. Despite 
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S_.u_ A~~ 
To: Justice Powell October 25, 1986 
From: Bob 
No. 85-999, United States v. Paradise 
Cert. to CAll (Fay, Anderson, Gibson) (per curiam) 
Wednesday, November 12, 1986 (1st case) 
Question Presented ~ E/fJ c~- Td4 V7T 
orbid imposition of~ 'f-
 
s a remedy for past 
Does the Equal 
one-black-for-one-white promotion 
discrimination against blacks? 
2. 
I. BACKGROUND 
The history of this litigation is a long, sad story. This 
class action began in 1972, when the NAACP sued the Alabama 
Department of Public Safety (Department) for discriminating 
against blacks in hiring. The United States joined the action as 
a plaintiff, and Phillip Paradise, ~r. intervened on behalf of a 
class of black plaintiffs. In~Judge Frank Johnson, then a 
District Judge, held that the Department had "engaged in a 
v blatant and continuous pattern of discrimination in hiring." 
NAACP v. Allen, 340 F. Supp. 703, 705 (MD Ala.), J.A. 25. Judge 
Johnson based his holding on the "unexplained and unexplainable" 
fact that "[i]n the thirty-seven year history of the patrol there 
has never been a black trooper." Id. the 
'-....- -- ____....______ 
~ ,, 
~' . Department to adopt a one-black-for-one-whit ntil 
,, ~uch time as blacks made up approximately 25 
~~~-~ trooper fo/T\ 
•t In ~ the DC found that the Department, "for the 
purpose of frustrating or delaying full relief to the plaintiff 
class, artificially restricted the size of the trooper force and 
the number of new troopers hired." J.A. 34. The DC enjoined the 
Department's conduct and ordered the Department to file progress 
reports w6 - the DC. 
In 197 , the Department returned to the DC to determine 
whether t 25 percent goal applied to the entire trooper force 
(i.e., sergeants, lieutenants, etc.) or only to entry-level 
troopers. Because the Department prori\otes only from its own 
ranks, the Department argued, blacks would make up 25 percent of 
; 
3. 
the entire force only if they filled 37.5 percent of the entry-
level positions. The DC, held that the 25 percent figure applies 
Itt.: 9 
to the entire force. "[A]s of November 1, 1978," the DC noted, - ----
"out of 232 state troopers at the rank of corporal or above, ,n....~ 
there still is not one black. . To focus only on entry-level 
positions would be to ignore that past discrimination by the 
Department was pervasive, that its effects persist, and that they 
are manifest." Paradise v. Shoemaker, 470 F. Supp. 439, 442 {MD 
Ala. 1979), J.A. 63. 
Also in 1979, the parties entered in~o the first of two ~ 
1/~ 
consent agreements. The Department agreed to "have as an~.. \ 
objective • [a] promotion system that is racially 
and "to have as an objective the utilization of a 
- a,_ neutral " 
' -v-~ 
promotion~
procedure which is fair to all applicants and which promotion~~ 
~y~ 
procedure when used either for screening or ranking will have 
little or no adverse impact upon blacks seeking promotion to 
corporal." J.A. 37, 40. The Department further agreed "to 
utilize a promotion procedure which is in conformity with the ~ 
1978 Uniform Guidelines [on Employee] Selection Procedures, J.A. Ao 
40. (The Uniform Guidelines, 29 C.F.R. 1607, are a joint product 
' •· 
of the EEOC, the Departments of Justice and Labor, and the Civil 
Service Commission.) The Department agreed to submit a procedure 
for promoting entry-level troopers to corporal by February 16, 
1980. J.S. 40, 45. Once the procedure for making promotions to 
corporal was approved, the Department agreed to develop and 
validate procedures for making promotions to the ranks of 
sergeant, lieutenant, captain, and major. 
'·' ' 
In the interim, the 
4. 
parties agreed to use the state merit system to make promotions 
to corporal. In February, 1980, four blacks and six whites were 1 f j'tJ : 
'I ::a-~ 
~~~ promoted to corporal un -er the interim agreement. 
In April, than a year late, the Department ~l-ui. 
procedure for promoting troopers to to the ~ submitted to the 
rank of corporal. The Department proposed to weigh four factors: 
a written examination (60 percent); a supervisor's evaluation (20 
percent); length of service (10 percent); and service ratings (10 
percent). The United States and Paradise initially objected to 
the proposal because the written examination had not been 
validated as job-related in accordance w h- the---Un1f 
Guidelines. The parties entered into consent 
however, under which the Department tered the 
examination, evaluated the results in other~ 
three factors, and ranked the applicants for corporal on a 
1t promotion register : \ The parties agreed that the procedure would 
be considered to have an adverse impact if it failed the "four-
fifths" test set out in the Uniform Guidelines (that is, if the 
selection rate for black applicants was less than 80 percent of 
the selection rate for white applicants). If the procedure did 
have an adverse impact, the Department agreed to propose an 
alternative procedure. If the parties were unable to agree on an 
alternative procedure, the matter would be "submitted to the [DCl 
for resolution." J.A. 53. No further promotions to corporal 
were to be made until a satisfactory procedure was in place. Id. 
The promotion register compiled on the basis of the -------written examination and the other factors ranked 260 applicants, 
5. 
of whom 60 (23 percent) were black. Only five blacks were listed 
in the top half of the register; the highest-ranking black was 
ranked ~ightieth. The Department proposed to make no more than 
20 prom~tions from the list. Thus, no blacks would have been 
promoted to corporal under the Department 1 s proposed procedure. 
The Department submitted no alternative proposal, and made no / 
promotions, for the f lowing nine months. 
In April aradise asked the DC to enforce the 
consent decrees by imposing a one-black-to-one-white quota for 
promotions to corporal "until such time as the defendants 
implement a valid promotional procedure." J .A. 62. The UnitErl U . ~. 
States agreed that the DC should order promotion of some blacks, 
but opposed a one-for-one quota. The DC agreed that the 
Department 1 s 1981 procedures would have an adverse impact on 
blacks, and that the Department "needs additional corporals and • 
. • needs at least 15 of them as soon as possible." Paradise v. 
Prescott, 580 F. Supp. 171 (M. D. Ala.), J.A. 119. The DC 
ordered the Department to submit, by November 10, 1983, a plan to 
promote at least fifteen troopers to corporal that would not have 
an adverse impact on blac 
~~~ 
Ch November 10, the Department submitted a proposal to 
promote 11 whites and 4 blacks to corporal. This proposal met 
the four-fifths test because 27 percent of the new corporals 
would have been black, while only 23 percent of the applicants 
were black. The Department promised to develop a permanent 
procedure for promotion to corporal "as soon as possible." J.A. 
126. The United States did not oppose the proposal, but Paradise 
/ 
6. 
continued to insist on a one-to-one quota. On 
'$3 
15, the 
DC imposed a one-black-to-one-white promotion 
above the entry level rank, "if there is a black trooper 
objectively o be promoted to the rank," "until either 
approximately 25 percent of the rank is black or the [Department 
has] developed and implemented a [valid] promotion plan for the 
rank." J.A. 128. The DC ordered the Department to submit "a 
schedule for the development of promotion procedures for all 
ranks" within 35 days. J.A. 129. In February, 1984, the 
Department promoted 8 blacks and 8 whites to the rank of 
corporal. 
) ttf 
On June 19, the Department submitted a new proposal for 
/ \ 
making promotions to corporal. On July 27, the DC suspended the ~ 
one-for-one promotion quota and ruled that the Department could ---- --_.______ ____  
promote up to 13 troopers to corporal under its proposed 
procedure. The DC ordered the parties to proceed with 
determining whether the procedure could be validated under the 
Uniform Guidelines. Under the new procedure, ten white troopers 
and three black troopers were promoted to corporal. The 
Department has also proposed procedures for making promotions to ~ ~ ~ 
sergeant. Because no blacks are yet eligible for promotion to \ ';:~ 
ranks above sergeant, the one-to-one quota is not effect for w.-
fX' those ranks either. 
C \\ > ~l consolidated the various appeals from the DC' s orders 
~d affirmed in all respects. CAll rejected the argument that 
~ the one-for-one quota was an improper modification of the 1979 
and 1981 Consent Decrees. Those decrees barred procedures having 
7. 
an adverse impact on blacks, but did not bar procedures having an 
adverse impact on whites. CAll held that the one-for-one 
promotion quota was constitutional in light of "the long history 
of discrimination in the Department" and because the quota "was 
designed to remedy the present effects of past discrimination." 
II. DISCUSSION ~~ 
A. Standing. ~lthough the issue is not raised by any of 
~e parties, some of the law clerks have questioned whether the 
United States has standing to litigate the equal protection 
claim. You will recall that the United States, the only party to 
,a_ fe.•H d-e~ 
petition for cert., asked the Court to consider whether the one- ~k ~
for-one quota violates Title VII. The United States clearly has ~~~ ~. 
7k.t.. u.~. 
standing to raise the Title VII question. The Court' however I .. a l 
d . 1 h .. 1 . ~~ grante review on y on t e consti tutiona question. k  'Tl.JL' 
The government was a party below, and so was entitled to ~ · i'$J 
~~~ 
petition for cert. under 28 u.s.c. §1254 (1). Under Supreme Court  l.h"-
Rule 19.6, "[a]ll parties other than petitioners shall be E/t1 . 
respondents " The Department and the white troopers thus 
are "respondents supporting the petitioner." Although the 
government not have Article III standing to litigate the -may 
/,}.- )... ',R.A4f( 
constitutional claim, 
ttl~ 
and the white troopers the Department 
"' clearly do have Article III standing. In an identical situation, 
the ' Court held that the presence of a respondent with 
constitutional standing "assures that an admittedly justiciable 
controversy is now before the Court." Director, OWCP v. Perini 
North River Associates, 459 u.s. 297, 305 (1983). There now 
seems to be general agreement, 
Perini disposes of the standing problem. 
B. Mootness and Ripeness. It seems quite possible that a 
decision by this Court will have no practical effect in this 
case. The one-for-one quota has been suspended as to all ranks, 
and will not be re-imposed unless the current procedures re 
shown to have an adverse effect on blacks. The eigh blacks 
promoted to corporal while the quota was in effec apparently 
would not be demoted even if 
unconstitutional. Memphis Firefighters 
5 79 n. 11 ( 1984) ("Lower courts 
for actual victims does not extend 
the were held 
561, 
y held that relief 
bumping employees 
previously occupying jobs.") The SG concedes that the Court's 
ruling will have "limited retrospective importance." SG brf., at 
- ~ --13 n. 5. At oral argument, the Court should ask the SG to ~ -
concede that a decision in this case will have no retrospective 
effect, or, in the alternative, to specify the "limited" 
retrospective effects that a decision will have. 
The SG argues that the one-for-one promotion requirement 
"has continuing prospective effects," because the quota may be 
re-imposed for promotions to corporal and sergeant if the 
selection procedures now in use are shown to have an adverse 
effect on blacks, and because the quota will be imposed for 
higher ranks if the Department fails to develop acceptable 
promotion criteria at those levels. Id. The fact remains that ~tA-t.. 
],.----- ____::J rt..L. 
the ~-for-one requirement may never be re-im sed. The SG also 
-
views the one-for-one requirement as an unconstitutional "in 
9. 
terrorem" threat. SG brf. 24. I am far from certain that a mere 
"threat" by a DC to re-impose the quota makes the 
constitutionality of the quota ripe for review. The DC might, 
after all, alter its order at any time in response to changed 
circumstances. Moreover, the DC is not trying to "coerce" the 
Department into doing anything more than is constitutionally 
required--that is, to eliminate the continuing effects of the J 
Department's past racial discrimination. 
In short, I am inclined to think that a challenge to the /3oi-
promotion of the 8 blacks is moot, and that the challenge to the ~ 
continuing effects of the one-for-one quota is unripe. The issue 
is not well briefed, however, and discussion at oral argument may ~ 
alter my view. 
c. The Merits. Although this is by no means an easy case, 
your prior opinions establish a ramework for analysi~. "Racial 
. distinctions of any sort are inherently suspect and thus 
call for the most exacting judicial examination." Regents of A 1-rr.<-1--
/2 ~/..."7'4t 
University of California v. Bakke, 438 u.s. 265, 291 (opinion of 
POWELL, J., joined by WHITE, J.). "[T]he level of scrutiny does 
not change merely because the challenged classification operates 
against a group that historically has not been subject to 
governmental discrimination." Wygant v. Jackson Board of 
Education, slip op. at 5 (May 19, 1986) (plurality opinion). Any 
classification based on race is subject to a two-pronged 
______..., 
examination. ~' any racial classification 'must be 
justified by a compelling governmental interest.'" Id., quoting 
Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 u.s. 429, 432 (1984). "Second, the means 
10. 
chosen •.. to effectuate [the] purpose must must be 'narrowly 
tailored to the achievement of that goal.'" Wygant, slip op. at 
5, guoting Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 u.s. 448, 480 (1980}. 
1. Compelling interest. The parties agree that the ~ 
a..--t.- k 
government has a compelling interest in remedying past 
~
discrimination by a public employer. The DC found a pattern of 11--f:ii:l.t 
racial discrimination in hiring and promotion, and there is ~~t 
overwhelming evj~~ pport those findings. In this respect ~ 
~ the case i ,r;;;;-;ike ~lip op. at 8-10, a d sirnila to Local ~ 
~ 28 of the ~tal Workers' International Association v. EEOC 
~ (July 2, 1986}. In Sheet Metal Workers, you wrote: 
The finding by the District Court and the Court of 
Appeals that petitioners have engaged in egregious 
violations of Title VII establishes, without doubt, a 
compelling governmental interest sufficient to justify 
the imposition of a racially classified remedy. It 
would be difficult to find defendants more determined 
to discriminate against minorities. My inquiry, 
therefore, focuses on whether the District Court's 
remedy is 'narrowly tailored. ' to the goal of 
eradicating the discrimination engaged in by 
petitioners" 
Slip op. at 3 (citation omitted}. To be sure, the 50 percent 
quota is a court-ordered remedy rather than a voluntary program 
of affirmative action. CAll, however, held that the quota is 
within the terms of the consent decrees, and the Court declined 
to grant 
moreover, 
cert. on this issue. As 
the Department's appalling 
in Sheet Metal Workers, c;~f­
record of obstructionism~ .. 
compliance with the judgments of federal courts." Slip op. at 3. 
I thus have no difficulty concluding that the order is supported 
by a compelling government interest. -----
11. 
2. Narrowly-tailored remedy. In evaluating the 29 
percent non-white membership goal goal in Sheet Metal Workers, 
and the 10 percent minority business set-aside in Fullilove, you 
considered five factors tlthe efficacy of alternative remedies: 
~he planned ~f the remedy~he relationship between the 
percentage of minority workers to be employed and the percentage 
" (!f) 
of minority group members in the relevant population: the 
I . . 
availability of waiver provisions if the hiring plan could not be 
met: a:& e effect of the remedy upon innocent third parties • ......__....., 
~ the analysis that follows, it seemed most useful to break the 
into two parts: ( 1) the one-time order to hire 15 
(2) the "continuing" order to @ ne black for 
acceptable promotion procedures are put in place. 
corporals: and 
white until 
a. alternative remedies. As to the E e-time ~r§ , the 
Department concedes that it had an "immediate" need for at least 
fifteen new corporals. The Department's record of inactivity 
strongly suggests that no remedy short of a direct order to make 
some promotions would have resolved the short-term crisis. 
'---
Indeed, the United States agreed "that the consent decrees should 
be enforced by ordering some promotions." SG brf. 9. 
The availability of alternative remedies in the longer 
term is somewhat more problematic. As in Sheet Metal Workers, 
the DC had the parties before it for a considerable time, and was 
in the best position to judge whether an alternative remedy, such 
as a simple injunction, would have been effective. The DC, 
unlike the DC in Sheet Metal Workers, did not resort to contempt 
sanctions. In light of the Department's record of intransigence, 
·-' 
12. 
however, contempt sanctions may not have worked. The SG argues 
that the DC should have appointed a trustee to manage trooper 
promotions, or awarded competitive seniority to blacks once they 
were promoted. But the first remedy would have been highly 
intrusive, and the second would not have addressed the 
Department's inexcusable delay, the root of the problem. I am ~ 
inclined to think that "the District Court may have been b-~ 
..,.,.~~-~r ~--
powerless to provide an effective remedy" short of some form of .1.4Ju4 !Lc -----------promotion goal. ____ --.......__---- k~ 
______--r 
b. planned duration. The one-time promotion order was an 
-----· --·- --... 
immediate response to an immediate crisis. The quota was to 
remain in effect only until the Department adopted promotion 
procedures that did not have an adverse impact on blacks, or 
until the percentage of corporals reached about 25 percent. Like 
the goal in Sheet Metal Workers, therefore, the quota was of 
limited duration. 
c. relationship to relevant population. The ultimate 25 
percent "incumbency" goal is based on th~ percentage of blacks in 
the general population in Alabama. No one suggests that this 
goal is inappropriate. The debate is over the rate at which the 
Department should approach the 25 percent goal. I have found it 
difficult to consider this question within the framework of 
whether the is "narrowly tailored." My best effort 
follows. 
It seems clear that extremely low or extremely high rates 
of promotion would be unacceptable. For example, if fewer than 
25 percent of the new corporals were black, the total percentage 
13. 
of black corporals never would reach 25 percent. At the other 
extreme, requiring all new corporals to be black would reach the 
25 percent goal quickly, but at great cost to innocent white 
troopers. (An even more extreme "remedy," of course, would be to 
demote or lay off some white corporals and replace them with 
black troopers.) Between these extremes, however, I see no 
obvious criterion for determining whether a particular promotion 
ratio is constitutional. 
The SG argues that the DC should have adopted the 
Department's plan to promote 11 whites and 4 blacks, rather than 
requiring that half of the new corporals be blacks. There is a 
trade-off between the two plans: the 11-4 plan takes longer to 
~ 
remedy the harm, but causes more harm to whites, while the 8-8 
plan remedies the harm to blacks in less time, but at greater 
cost to whites. Under the Department's plan, 26 percent of the 
new corporals would have been black. If the Department continued 
promoting blacks at this rate, it would not achieve the overall 
25 percent goal until all the current corporals were promoted or 
retired. The Department's proposal thus is near the "low end" of 
the range of effective ,plans. In this sense, the 11-4 
promotion order is more / "narrowly tailored" than an 8-8 promotion 
order. The SG seems to argue that the Constitution requires the 
DC to choose the 11-4 plan for this reason. I think this line of 
reasoning proves too much. Any affirmative action plan 
greater costs on whites than no affirmative action plan 
imposes J 
at all. 
To be sure, some blacks may not be able to escape the present 
effects of past discrimination without some affirmative action on 
I~ 
14. 
the part of government or private employers. Yet, in the long 
run, most of the effects of past discrimination are likely to 
disappear. The SG's argument, if accepted, would undermine the 
constitutionality of all affirmative action plans. The better 
approach, it seems to me, is to balance the costs to whites of a 
------~-~--------------------
Cburt seemed to approve this type of approach in Sheet Metal 
W)rkers, where the union had a 29.23 percent minority membership 
goal but was voluntarily inducting new minority members at a 45 
percent rate. (In Sheet Metal Workers, the CA set aside as 
unnecessary a mandatory 50 percent induction quota. In this 
case, however, the Department's only "voluntary" plan, the 11-4 
plan, would have taken a much longer time to remedy the past 
discrimination.) 
d. flexibility. The order to fill the 15 immediate 
·~~~~~~~~>-·~~--~~~-
vacancies with at least 8 blacks is inflexible of necessity. The 
vacancies had to be filled at once, either with blacks or whites. 
Thus, the distinction between a goal and a quota breaks down when 
the court is required to order a fixed number of promotions 
immediately. 
The inflexibilit_y of the "continuing" order is 
...... ~--... a much more I~ 
serious problem. The DC did not provide for 
~lZr·-....., 
waiver of the ~
promotion quota. Indeed, its choice of the word "quota" rather 
than "goal" indicates an absence of flexibility. The DC's order 
is not completely inflexible. First, the one-to-one ratio 
ap s only if "qualified" blacks are available for promotion. 
Second, the quota remains in effect on y until the Department 
15. 
adopts acceptable promotion procedures, or until the percentage 
of troopers of a particular rank reaches about 25 percent. 
Although the DC's order thus has some flexibility, I have 
concluded, tentatively, that it is not flexible enough. If the 
Department changes its ways, and undertakes good faith efforts to 
adopt procedures that do not have an adverse effect on blacks, it 
is still possible that the procedures will be found wanting. If 
this situation should occur, reimposing the one-for-one quota 
without regard to the particular circumstances would be quite 
inflexible. 
e. effect on innocent third parties. Denial or ~ 
deferral of a promotion generally causes less harm to innocent 
~------------------------~ employees than being laid off. At least the employee still has a 





order does not require that any whites be demoted or laid off. ~ 
 
It also permits some whites to be promoted immediately. On the 
d?,..,'P-~ 
J 
other hand, denial of a promotion probably causes more harm ~ 
~ to whites than not being hired in the first place. In this case, 
however, it is not obvious that any of the white applicants has a 
/Jt.J--
reasonable expectation of promotion to corporal. Apparently~~ 
promotions had never been made exclusively on the basis of ~f ~ 
seniority, so no one reaf? .. onably counted on promotion simply on ~ 
the basis of years of service. Those who did well on the writte~
examination knew that they would be entitled to a promotion only 
if the procedure did not have an adverse effect on blacks. 
Therefore, I would e3oncl that the effects on innocent third ~ ,. 




Subject to additional enlightenment from the oral 
argument, I recommend that yo~ispose of this case on grounds of 
mootness and ripeness. If it is necessary to reach the merits, I 
recommend ~hat you~f~irm the on$ -time _eromotion order, ~t 




To: Justice Powell 
From: Leslie 
/~w_ 
l .) .. ~ i t1 k. .. 5. 
~.P~ 
MEMORANDUM 
October 31, 1986 ,1 
··~ 
No. 85-1129, Johnson 
/'~~ 
v. Tr anspor tat ion Agency ...-- ~ 
You asked for a supplemental memorandum suggesting a 
standard of review under the Equal Protection Clause for the af-
----------~--~------~~ ----firmative action plan at issue that would be consistent with your 
previous writings in Bakke, Fullilove, and Wygant. 
In Wygant, you stated that the test for examining a race-
-----based affirmative action plan has two prongs. Fir , any racial 
C)• 
classification must be justified by a compel! ing governmental 
interest. Second, 
its purpose must 
goal. 
~ chosen by the State to effectuate 





The first important point is that th~ case at issue in-
volve~ not race, discrimination. In Wygant, you stated that 
"the level of scrutiny does not change merely because the chal-
lenged classification operates against a group that historically 
has not been subject to governmental discrimination," 106 s. Ct. 
at 1846, and you cited Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan, 
458 U.S. 718, 724 n. 9 {1982). The standard articulated in Hogan 
for sex-based classifications under the Equal Protection Clause 
is that "the party seeking to uphold a statute that classifies 
individuals on the basis of their gender must carry the burden of 
showing an 'exceedingly persuasive justification' for the classi-
fication." 458 U.S. at 724 {citing Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 
u.s. 455, 461 {1981); Personnel Administrator of Mass. v. 
Feeney, 442 u.s. 256, 273 {1979)). "The burden is met only by 
showing at least that the classification serves 'important gov-
ernmental objectives and that the discriminatory means employed' 
are 'substantially related to the achievement of those objec-
tives. '" 458 u.s. at 724 {citing Wengler v. Druggists Mutual 
Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142, 150 {1980)). This lesser scrutiny for 
sex-based classifications is consistent with your o injon in 
--~---------------~----------~-
Bakke, 438 u.s. at 303 {"[T]he Court has never viewed such clas-
sification as inherently suspect or as comparable to racial or 
ethnic classifications for the purpose of equal protection analy-
sis."). 
Admittedly, applying the standard that has been articu-
7 
vt.-
lated as to sex-based classifications to affirmative action plans ~r 
will have the anomalous result that a State will find it more ~ 
~~-





difficult to justify a race-based affirmative action plan than _to 
justify a sex-based plan. The anomaly is that the stricter scru-
tiny standard evolved for race because of the perception that 
individuals suffered greater discrimination because of race than 
because of sex. It then might be argued that the State should 
have greater latitude to remedy the greater past discrimination. 
The anomaly is lessened, however, if the standards of scrutiny 
-------~ fl._ "\\--------------------
are viewed in terms of classifications. This Court has articu-
lated a strong constitutional policy of achieving a society that 
does not employ racial classifications. The constitutional poli-
cy regarding sex-based classifications is less strong. Viewed 
this way, it makes sense for the Court to treat all racial clas~ 
sifications and all sex-based classifications consistently. 
Moreover, it is unlikely in practice that the difference in se-
mantics will lead to different evaluations of affirmative action 
plans based on the type of classification. The difference be-
tween "exceeding persuasive" and "compelling", and between "sub-
stantially related" and "narrowly tailored", does not appear sub-
stantial. 
In sum, to justify a sex-based affirmative action plan, a 
State must show that it has an "exceedingly persuasive" govern-
mental objective, and that the means employed are "substantially 
related" to the achievement of the objective. Once the slightly 
different standard of scrutiny is articulated, then the standards 
in the race-based affirmative action cases are relevant to deter-
mine what constitutes a permissible governmental objective and 
what means are permissible to achieve that objective. 
page 4. 
The governmental objective must be remedial and must be u, .......... _f: 
6.. 
directly at past discrimination by the governmental entity. A~M -- ------
purpose to remedy the effects of general societal discrimination ~ 
is not sufficient. The primary enresol~d gu~ is what typ~~ 
of evidence a governmental entity must have to justify an affirm- -~ 
I 
ative action plan. Ypu stated in Bakke and Fullilove that find-
ings of past discrimination are required. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 307 
I 
("We have never approved a classification that aids persons per-
ceived as members of relatively victimized groups at the expense 
of other innocent individuals in the absence of judicial, legis-
lative, or administrative findings of constitutional viola-
tions."); Fullilove, 448 u.s. at 498 ("[T]he governmental body 
must make findings that demonstrate the existence of illegal dis-
crimination."). It appears in Wygant that a determination by a 
trial court that the state employer "had a strong basis in evi-
dence for its conclusion that remedial action was necessary" is 
sufficient to meet the "findings" requirement. That is, the 
state employer itself need not make explicit findings that it had 
engaged in prior illegal discrimination. Justices Marshall, 
Brennan, and Blackmun in dissent read this to be the meaning of 
the Court opinion in Wygant, as does Justice O'Connor in her con-
currence. 106 S. Ct. at 1853 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("The 
,. 
remedial purpose need not be accompanied by contemporaneous find- 7 ? 
ings of actual discrimination to be accepted as legitimate as 
( 
long as the public actor has a firm basis for believing that re-
medial action is required."). 
( 
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Assuming tha~ contemporaneous findings are not required, 
the next question is ~at type of evidence provides an employer 
with a "strong basis in evidence" or a "firm basis for believing" 
that remedial action is required. Under Equal Protection princi-
ples, statistics should be sufficient if they can lead to an in-
ference of prior discrimination. Gross underrepresentation of a 
particular class in the work force should be enough. Other evi-
dence of prior exclusion from the work force could supper t the 
statistics where the statistics alone might not lead ~an infe~ ~ ~ 
ence of discrimination. Any statistics should be "meaningf in ~ 
that they represent a correlation between the population in the 
work force and the qualified working population of the relevant 
( area. 
( 
Once the "exceedingly persuasive" justification of prior 
discrimination in the work force found, the next question is 
whether the means are "substantially related" to the remedial 
~ objective. In Wygant, you found that l~fs could never be con-l~ 
sidered narrowly tailored to meet a remedial objective. Presum-
ably they also can never be "substantially related" to a remedial 
objective. In determining what other means can be "substantially 
related" to as remedial objective, the standards articulated in 
Fullilove regarding the scope of a race-conscious affirmative 
action plan are instructive. The relevant considerations are: 
(1) the efficacy of alternative remedies: (2) the planned dura-
tion of the remedy: (3) the relationship between the percentage 
of minority workers to be benefited and the percentage of minor-
ity group members in the relevant population or work force: and 
MA-4-( 
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(4) the availability of waiver provisions if · the plan's objec-
tives could not be met. 448 U.S. at 510. A fifth consideration 
articulated in Wygant is the relative burden on nonminority em-
ployees. The last two considerations can incorporate the princi-
ple that "goals" are permissible because they allow for variance 
to ameliorate the potentially harsh impact on innocent 
nonminorities in certain circumstances. 
Applying the above considerations depends on the facts of 
the case. In this case, the affirmative action plan appears to 
------' 
be justified by a persuasive remedial objective. Its means also 
appear substantially related to the objectives. 
not appear to be alternatives that could meet the remedial need 
in a reasonable time frame. ~, the plan appears to be tem-
porary and intended only to remedy past imbalances, not maintain 
---------a work force balance. L~' the goals set appear reasonable in 
light of the number of women in the work force and the popula-
tion. ~ the plan employs "goals" as opposed to "quotas." 
Thus, all employees can compete for every available slot. Final-
ly, the burden on nonminorities does not appear severe. Promo-
tion goals, at least where promotions are based on merit, appear 
to be like hiring goals where their effect can be diffused among 
a wide range of workers. 
As the above standards indicate, the inquiry under the 
Equal Protection -Clause is not that much different from the Title 
VII standards for affirmative action plans articulated in Weber. 
The only real difference appears to be in the "fit" required be-
tween the ends and the means. Under Title VII, Congress has ex-
I' f·~ 
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pressed a policy favoring voluntary employer action. Consequent-
ly, the Court may accord employers greater latitude in choosing 
the means to meet a remedial purpose whereas with public employ-
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ral 11/13/86 
To: Justice Powell 
From: Bob 
No. 85-999, United States v. Paradise 
The DC's order of December 15, 1983, imposes a one-black-
for-one-white promotion quota for each trooper rank above the 
entry-level rank, "if there is a blaC'T<"troope t o bj ectively quali-
fied to be promoted to the rank," until either "approximately 25 
percent of the rank is black" or the Department has "developed 
and implemented a promotion plan for the rank." J.A. 128. 
I. Did the DC's one-time order to promote at least 15 troopers 
to corporal on a one-black-for-one-white basis violate the Equal 
Protection Clause? 
(Pursuant to this order, 8 blacks and 8 whites were promoted to t' f-'r8 
corporal in February, 1984. These are the only actua l promot ions ~~ 
that have been made on a one-for-one basis.) 
A. The issue may be moot. The 8 blacks promoted to corporal 
will not be demoted. Stotts, 467 u.s. 579 n. 11. The SG stated 
at oral argument that the whites who otherwise would have been 
promoted are seeking promotions, backpay, and seniority. This 
does not appear in the troopers' brief. 
B. There is a compelling government interest in remedying 
egregious past discrimination. The DC made extensive findinss of 
past discrimination. There is also a compelling "societa l Int er-
es~with the judgments of federal courts." Sheet 
Metal Workers (POWELL, J.). 
C. The one-time promotion order was "narrowly tailored." 
1. No alternative remedy (e.g., fines, contempt sanctions, 
etc.) would have met the ' immediate need ~}or at least 15 new cor-
porals. The Department's record of intransigence suggests that a 
direct promotion order was necessary. 
2. The one-time order had a very brief duration. 
3. In one sense, the Department's proposal to promote 4 
blacks (26 percent) and 11 whites was more closely related to the 
pool of applicants for corporal (which was 23 percent black). 
The ultimate goal, however, is a 25 percent black trooper force. 
The question is how rapidly that goal should be achei ved. The 
11-4 proposal would approach the goal very slowly. The 8-8 order 
approached the goal somewhat more rapidly. I would reject the 
SG' s suggestion that the Equal Protection Clause requires the ~ 
slowest possible remedy for proven discrimination. 
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4. A one-time promotion order necessarily is inflexible. 
There is no distinct'on w e " oal" and a "quota," because 
the order ta es Immediate and fu 1 e ect. - ...._ _, 
5. The effects on innocent white troopers were ~latively 
diffuse. The troopers still have jobs, and chances for =yater 
----:'"" . promotions. Moreover, no trooper had a settled expectation of 
promotions. Promotions never were based soelly on seniority or 
an "objective" measure of merit. Those troopers who scored high-
est on a written exam knew the exam results would be counted only 
if they did not have an adverse effect on blacks. 
/·*~1-
II. Does the DC' s "threat" to re-impose the one-for-one quota if z-y {-
the Department does not adopt acceptable promotion procedures for 
all ranks violate the Equal Protection Clause? ~ 
~-
A. The issue is not ripe. First, the one-for-one quota may  
never be re-imposed. SecoHd, the DC has been willing to allow 
the Department time to develop acceptable promotion procedures. 
For example, the one-for-one uota is not in effect right now, 
even though the Departmen has not yet succee ed in va ida ing 
its procedures for ~rank. Therefore, the Court cannot predict 
the exact circumstances in which the quota would be re-imposed. 
The Department is not harmed by the "threat" that the order will 
be re-imposed, because it is required to develop valid promotion 
procedures in any event. 
B. There is a compelling interest in remedying past discrimi-
nation. 
~I ~ 
C. The continuing order is not a narrowly tailored remedy. 
1. As circumstances change, less drastic alternatives may 
be efficacious. If the Department ends its obstructi /c)nism, for 
example, a simple injunction may be enough. 
2. The order would not be lifted until 25 percent of each 
rank was black, or until promotion procedures could be validated 
for each rank. Apparently validation becomes increasingly diffi-
cult at the higher ranks, because there a fewer vacancies and 
because the qualifications are more subjective. 
3. The population of applicants for promotion usually will 
be less than 30 percent black. Sometimes it will be much less 
than that, if only a few blacks have been promoted to the rank 
below. A 50 percent promotion quota is not closely related to 
the relevant population. (In terms of the analysis above, it 
would approach the ultimate 25 percent goal too fast, at too 
great a cost to innocent whites.) 
4. The order has some elements of flexibility: It does 
not apply unless the Department ai a o ptable promo-
tion procedures. It does not apply unless qualified blacks are 
page 3. 
available for promotion. One the quota is imposed, however, it 
is quite inflexible. If the Department is making good faith ef-
forts to develop acceptable procedures, the DC should adjust its 
order accordingly. 
5. Because a continuing one-for-one promotion quota is too 
"fast" a remedy in the long run, it will have too great an ad-
verse effect on innocent whites. For example, i the quota were 
impo e on pro o 1ons to ieutenant after the first few blacks 
had been promoted to sergeant, almost every black sergeant would 
be promoted to lieutenant, while a much smaller percentage of 
white sergeants would be promoted. As the quota "worked its way 
up" the ranks, a heavy burden might fall on a relatively small 
number of whites. 
~ ;; . - T 
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CHAMI!IERS Of" 
.JUSTICE w .. . .J. BRENNAN, .JR. 
.h.prtntt <!Jonrl of flt"t ~b .itatts 
Jfu~ ~. <!J. 2llc?,.~ 
November 14, 1986 
No. 85-999 
United States v. Paradise 
No. 85-1129 
Johnson v. Transportation Agency 
Dear Chief, 
I' 11 try my hand at opinions for 
the Court in the above two cases. 
Sincerely, 
The Chief Justice 
Copies to the Conference 
~u:puuu Clfo-urt o-f tltt ~b ~hdt• 
,ruJrUtgto-u. ~. Clf. 2llbi'l$ 
CHAMBERS OF" 
JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
,. 
December 12, 1986 
Re: 85-999 - United States v. Paradise 
Dear Bill: 
Unfortunately I will not be able to join your 
circulating draft. I am particularly distressed by 
the assumption that seems to pervade the entire draft 
that standards developed in cases like Wygant should 
be applied in reviewing a judicial decree entered in 
response to a proven violation of law. 
Voluntary race-conscious decisions by employers, 
both public and private, are presumptively unlawful. 
When an employer seeks to justify such decisions on 
the ground that they are designed to remedy past 
discrimination, the "Court has consistently held that 
some elevated level of scrutiny is required" (see 
your circulating draft at page 14). But no such 
requirement has ever been imposed on federal judges 
who are fashioning equitable remedies for proven 
violations of the law. As I read it, your opinion 
seems to assume that the employer "is entitled to 
stand before the Court in the same position as one 
who has never violated the law at all," International 
Salt Co. v. United States, 332 u.s. 392, 400 (1947). 
In my opinion, the burden of demonstrating that 
the relief granted by the district court is excessive 
rests squarely on the law violator--not on the victim 
of the wrongdoing. The basic question is whether the 
relief granted by the federal court represents an 
abuse of discretion or is punitive rather than 
remedial in character. I cannot subscribe to an 
opinion that assumes that the rules that limit race-
conscious decision-making by presumptively innocent 
-2-
employers apply equally to federal judges who have a 





Copies to the Conference 
~tqrrtutt ~lturl ttf tlrt ~b ~Udts 
'llhteJrhtgto~ ~. ~· 2ll.;i'!;t 
CHAMI!IERS OP' 
JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL 
December 12, 1986 
Re: No. 85-999-United States v. Paradise 
Dear Bill: 





cc: The Conference 
December 13, 1986 
85-999 United States v. Paradise 
Dear Bill: 
1 have just completed carefully reading the first 
draft of your opinion in this case. It has been a pleasant 
Saturday morning exercise for me. Your opinion in thorough 
and persuasively written. 
Subject to relatively minor changes in textual lan-
guage, and my concern about subpart 111-0, 1 will be happy 
to join your entire opinion. With respect to the language 
changes, 1 am having my clerk mark up a copy of your draft 
that 1 will send with this note. 1 do not think any of 
these will create a problem in view of the basic similarity 
of our views. 
My concern about subpart 111-0 is substantive. 
This subpart - except for the quote from CAS - consists of 
only three paragraphs. The important purpose of the para-
graphs is to show that the burden on innocent third parties 
is not substantial. 1 agree with this, and differ only as to 
your reliance on the argument that because some whites have 
been benefited from the Department's discrimination, the 
burden on individual white troopers .!lQl!.. is not particularly 
significant under equal protection analysis. 
1 do not think it is necessary for us to say this. 
1 also have considerable doubt as to whether it would be 
wise to do so. We are talking only about innocent employ-
ees, many of whom may have shared the views expressed on 
behalf of the City of Birmingham (see amicus brief) that the 
Department's discriminatory policy was shameful. Also, it 
is probable that some of these employees may have prepared 
themselves for promotion by extra study or special diligence 
as troopers. This could be true of troopers who had chil-
dren to educate and who needed an increase in income. 
1 could join a briefer subpart 111-0 that makes the 
argument in the first paragraph in your present draft. Un-
2. 
like layoffs - that I would never tolerate - the potential 
burden with respect to promotions is problematic as to any 
particular trooper. The burden is not as "diffused" as it 
is where job applicants - rather than present employees -
are implicated. But it is diffused both in time and as to 
whom it may affect adversely. Moreover - and I do not be-
lieve your draft emphasizes this sufficiently - the basic 
limitation of being "qualified" remains. Thus qualified 
whites simply have to compete with qualified blacks. To be 
sure, as long as the "mathematical" requirements exist, 
there will be some advantage to blacks. But again, as you 
properly emphasize this should be temporary and is subject 
to amelioration by action of the Department itself. 
If you prefer to leave III-D substantially as it is 
written, I will join all of your opinion except that part. 
If you make revisions along the lines I suggest, I will 
gladly join your entire opinion. I probably would write a 
very brief concurring opinion, but this would be supportive 




lfp/ss 12/15/86 PARADISE2 SALLY-POW 
MEMORANDUM 
TO: Bob DATE: December 15, 1986 
FROM: Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
85-999 Paradise 
In line with our discussion at lunch on Saturday, 
unless you have a Court opinion to write I suggest that you 
consider what anticipatory writing you can undertake. 
I will, of course, be interested in Justice Bren-
nan's reaction to our proposed changes. When you hear from 
him, call me at the Kahler Hotel. As I probably will be 
having tests throughout the day, the best time to call would 
be between 5:30 and 7:30 Washington time. The Clinic closes 
up at 6:00p.m., Washington time {5:00p.m., out there), and 
so I am likely to be in my room until Jo and I go out for 
dinner. 
As we have discussed, I will probably want to write 
a brief opinion that summarizes my view in my own language. 
I would emphasize, perhaps more explicitly than Justice 
Brennan has the similarity between Paradise and the case 
last Term that I think of as Local 28 {from New York). In 
Paradise, as in that case, there was a flagrant and long 
time disregard of court orders. 
When you call, I will, of course, want to know 
which cases have been assigned to us and which of you will 
prepare initial drafts for me. As you now know, if we are 
2. 
going to circulate all of our assigned opinions before the 
January assignments are made (probably January 24 or 26} , I 
will need the clerks' drafts by the first of the year when-
ever this is feasible. We will have a long Conference on 
January 9, with a long discuss list. Also, I will be pre-
paring for the January arguments. I would appreciate your 




lfp/ss 12/15/86 PARAD1SE2 SALLY-POW 
M.EMORANDUM 
TO: Sob DATE: December 15, 1986 
FROM: Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
85-999 Parad .ise 
In line with our discussion at lunch on Saturday, 
unless you have a Court opinion to write 1 suggest that you 
consider what anticipatory writing you can undertake. 
1 will, of course, be interested in Justice Bren-
nan's reaction to our proposed changes. When you hear from 
him, call me at the Kahler Hotel. A~ 1 probably will be 
havinq tests throughout the day, the best time to call would 
be between 5:30 and 7:30 Washington time. The Clinic closes 
up at 6:00p.m., washington time (5:00p.m., out there), and 
so 1 am likely to be in my room until Jo and 1 go out for 
dinner. 
As we have discussed, 1 will probably want to write 
a brief opinion that summarizes my view in my own language. 
1 woul1 emph~size, perhaps more explicitly than Justice 
Brennan has the similarity between Paradise and the case 
last Term that 1 think of as Local 28 (from New York). In 
Paradise, as in that case, there was a flagrant and long 
time ~isregard of court orders. 
When you call, 1 will, of cour~e, want to know 
which cases have been assigned to us and which of you will 
prepare initial drafts for me. As you now know, if we are 
2. 
going to circulate all of our assigned opinions before the 
January assignments are made (probably January 24 or 26), 1 
will need the clerks' drafts by the first of the year when-
ever this is feasible. We will have a long Conference on 
January 9, with a lonq discuss list. Also, 1 will be pre-
paring for the January arguments. 1 would appreciate vour 
sharing these thoughts as to a time schedule with your co-
clerks. 




.JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE 
.llnprtmt Ofltttrl of tltt ~ .lltatu' 
Jtu~fington. ~. Of. 2llc?~~ 
December 16, 1986 
85-999 - United States v. Paradise 
Dear Bill, 
I shall await the dissent. 
Sincerely yours·,· 
Justice Brennan 
Copies to the Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR 
_itqtrtm.t ~ouri !tf t4t 'Jttittb .itatt.tr 
Jluftingtou. ~. ~. 2ll~'l~ 
December 17, 1986 
No. 85-999 United States v. Paradise 
Dear Bill, 
As soon as I can get around to it, I will 




Copies to the Conference 
CHAMBERS 0~ 
JUSTICE ANTONIN SCALIA 
Re: 
Dear Bill, 
.l'U¥rtmt <qgut of tift )htitt~ .l\talts 
"ul{ington. J). <q. 2Llp,.~ 
December 18, 1986 
No. 85-999 - United States v. Paradise 
I will await the dissent in this case. 
Sincerely, 
Justice Brennan 
Copies to the Conference 
December 18, 1986 
85-999 United States v. Paradise 
Dear Bill: 
Please join me ~n your opinion tor the Court. 
1 may write a brief concurring opinion, and may not 




cc: The Conference 
December 19, 1986 
85-999 United States v. Paradise 
Dear Bill: 
You will receive with this note, a copy of my 
•Join• note that should give you the first Court decision in 
which five of us have agreed in an affirmative action case. 
1 send congratulations, and also my warm thanks for 
making the changes that I thought were necessary. 
1 may write a few pages in a concurring opinion. 




January 6, 1987 
85-99'L.!lni. te-1 St~t--s v. P~tradise 
Dear Bi11: 
ijere i~ a 1st draft of a br1ef con~urr•n~ opl~to~ 
in thi.a case. 
1 tntnk tt fg entirelv co~~fgtent in ev~rv respect 
wttn ynu fine optnion for the Court. Unless you have 8ug-






JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN 
~mtt <tromt of tift ~nittb .jfattg 
'JfzuJrington. ~. ar. 21l~-"'~ 
Re: No. 85-999, United States v. Paradise 
Dear Bill: 
December 29, 1986 
/ 
I am pleased to join your recirculation of December 17• 
Sincerely, 
Justice Brennan 
cc: The Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
ilnprnnt C!fouri of t4t ~b ;\\tzdts 
'cJfasJringhm. ~.Of. 2n~_,.~ 
January 29, 1987 
Re: 85-999 - United States v. Paradise 
Dear Sandra: 
Please join me in your dissent. 
Sincerely, 
Justice O'Connor 
cc: The Conference 
December 31, 1986 
85-999 United States v. Paradise 
Dear Bill: 
Thank you for your note of December 31. I had forgotten 
your mistakes in Bakke! 
Of course, the point is hardly one of vast importance. 
Also, a good deal has been written since Bakke by both of us, 
and now we seem to be fully in accord as to the applicable 
principles - at least in cases similar to Johnson and Paradise. 
I am writing a brief concurring opinion in this case, and 
will be glad for you to take a look .at it before it is circulated. 
My little opinion is not necessary, but as I have written in 
each of our previous affirmative action cases I want to keep my 
record intact. 
I will add a brief note simply .to the effect that the 
"school cases", though broadly relevant, are different from the 
subsequent affirmative action cases cited in your opinion. No 
one has been denied the right to go to school. Apart from the 
possible inconvenience of being bused, the children suffered no 
detriment. But busing had prevailed in many if not most school 




C H A MBERS OF 
.JUSTICE W M . ..J . B R E NNA N, .J R . 
,ju.prmu Q}tturi ttf tlft~b ~hdtg 
..-ulrbt¢~ ~. Q}. 2ll&i,.~ 
/ 
December 31, 1986 
United States v. Paradise, No. 85-999 
Dear Lewis, 
I have run into a difficulty. In light of the following 
from my opinion in Bakke, 438 u.s. 265, 366 n. 41 (1978), don't 
you think I had better let well enough alone? 
"Our cases cannot be distinguished by 
suggesting as our Brother POWELL does, that 
in none of them was anyone deprived of 'the 
relevant benefit.' Ante, at 304. Our school 
cases have deprived whites of the 
neighborhood school of their choice; our 
Title VII cases have deprived 
nondiscriminating employees of their settled 
seniority expectations; and UJO deprived the 
Hassidim of bloc-voting strength. Each of 
these injuries was constitutionally 






JUSTICE ANTONIN SCALIA 
•11p'rtUtt <ijourl &tf tlft ~ittb •talts 
._ulfinghm. J). cq. 2llt?'l' 
February 19, 1987 
Re: 85-999 - United States v. Philip Paradise 
Dear Sandra: 
I would be pleased to join your dissent in the above case. 
Sincerely, 
Justice O'Connor 
Copies to the Conference 
... 
85-999 United States v. Paradise (Bob) 
WJB for the Court 11/17/86 
1st draft 12/11/86 
2nd draft 12/17/86 
jrd draft 1/30/87 
4th araft 2/2/87 
5th draft 2/6/87 
Joined by TM 12/12/86 
LFP 12/18/86 
HAB 12/19/86 
JPS concurring in the judgment 
1st draft 12/29/86 
2nd draft 1/6/87 
3rd draft 1/13/87 
4th draft 1/21/87 
5th draft 2/6/87 
6th draft 2/12/87 
LFP concurring 
1st draft 1/7/87 
2nd draft 2/17/87 
soc dissenting 
1st draft 1/28/87 
2nd draft 2/20/87 
Joined by CJ 
As 
BRW dissenting 
1st draft 2/19/87 
2nd draft 2/20/87 
1/29/87 
2/19/87 
BRW awaiting dissent 12/16/86 
SOC will dissent 12/17/86 
LFP may write concurring opinion 12/18/86 
AS awaiting dissent 12/18/86 
SDO with WHR dissenting 
3rd draft 2/10/87 
THB HBW YORK TIMBS, THURSDAY, PBBkU.:~RY 16, IN1 1 · 
L...oo--'1· I --------J . ~ . • ..... Appolatell .,..... • 
HIGH COURT BACKS · :~. r:.r::jo~~a::~!:e.n: · 
. ' promoted ahead ot whltel with hlahef'· 
BASING PROMOTION · 1 :;:~;:s:Ec:: 
· . whitel be laid off before leu aenlor : 
I a~ A 'A RArwzr AL Q. r lQ,.. A ~· bla..:a-decision also c:onflrmed specula- :. 'l ' \,J X . lJ ~ l.tl tlon that President Reqan's aamq 
. . , · . • W~am H. Rehnqulat u a.tef Juatlce 
.. : aa. IUmmer and ~Una Antorun 
JUSTICES SPLIT 5-4. ~:,: -:.e ~:~r::~;-: 
Temporary Use Allowed 
in Alabama Because 
of Severity of Case 
ay STUART TAYLOR lr. 
...., ........... Y-' '1'11111 ' 
W ASHJNGTON, Feb. 25 ~A sharply 
divided SUpreme Cuurt, re)ectlna the ......... ;;.."' , •. 
Reapn AdmlnlstraUon position, ruJed • ~,_,. .... '""':.:-~~"" :~. '-~ 
today that Jud&es may order employ· 
en to use llrict nclal quotas tempo-
rarily Ill promotions u weD u hlrin& to 
counter JeYere put dlscrlmlnaUon 
qalnst blac:b. · 
8y 5 to 4, the Cuun upheld a Federal 
district Judie'• arden In 1183 and 1184 
nquJrln& Alabama to promote ane 
black atate trooper for eac:b wblte atate 
trooper, auumln& qualified blacb 
were •vallable, •UJ the llate could de-
ftlop • pramotlon procedure accept· 
able to the Judie. 
1be decllloa reinforced and partly 
expanded three JDajor rullnp last ,.ar 
In wblc:b the ODurt rejected the Ad*· 
lltratlon'a broad auaclt an~ Ule f1l ra-1 
dal preferences to remedy put Job 
1 
diacrimiDatlon and approved .. d 
temporary,llmlted h1J1na preferences. · 
Cue • Iebieu ileaelltl 
In other JDajor cues decided toclaj,: 
the Htah ODurt ruled that ... tes may 
not deny unemployment benefits to em-
ployees who are dismissed for refultn& 
to wort on their ubbeth and upheld aa 
Ohio ... that pull the burden of proof. 
an criminal defendants who coo...a: 
lhey acted ID aelf..renae. (Pqe .qi.J ;. 
In Ita afftrmatlve adJon dedaloa. the: 
CDurt made clear lor the lint time the\ 
cauns. at leut tD extreme c:uea. ~ 
order ne!lal prefereocea In~: 
u well uln 111r1na. Del rU.i u.ellflbfj 
t!p8Ciftc IIUIDel1cal "'atdHip" quotas 
.., a.rtna u -employer's wort force 
qulcltly Into line ... tbe pen:entqe flf,. 
.-unect memben d mlnDrlty JI'OUPI 
ID Cbe •vallable labor pool. j 
Auociate Justice ·William J. 
Brennan Jr., in his plurality opin-. 
·ion, rejected arguments that the 
Alabama quota system wu not 
'"narrowly tailored" enough. 
Auociate Justice Lewia F. Powell 
Jr., in a cone~ opinion, .-id 
that the ltate "had engag~ in 
periiatent viobJ~n . of constitu-. 
tiona! rights ana repea\.edly failed 
to Carr_y out court.orden." 
ward the Administration's position aa. 
afflrmaUve action. 
Both men dtssented today, as ,xpect: 
ed, sldins with the Admlnlstrauon view 
::that the quota order was not a aood 
remedy for the discrimination. But this 
did not represent a change In the over· 
all voting lineup. 
Mr. Rehnquist, as an Associate Jus-
tice, cons(stently opposed affirmative 
action preferences. While Warren E. 
Burger, .who retired as Chief Justice 
last summer, was Jess consistent In op-
posing affirmative action, be aided 
with the Administration In all three of 
last year's cases. 
Solicitor C.lled It Arbitrary 
In the Alabama case, Solicitor Gen· 
eral Charles FrJed bad assailed the 
one-for-one promotion quota as ''pro-
foundly Ulegal" and "wholly arbi· 
trary." The Court upheld It In light of 
the Alabama state trooper force's long 
history of racial discrimination and 
resistance to court ordel'6. The ltate 
had totally excluded blacks from the 
.force unUilt was forced to hire some by 
a 1972 court order. · 
Deborah Burstlon-Wade, apoltes-
woman for Assistant Attorney Ge:Mral 
.William Bradford Reynolds, bead of 
the Justice Department's Civil Rtghts ' 
Dlvir>ion, said the decision was not IUr· 
prlslng after last year's rulings and 
"didn't break any new 1round." 
Justice William J. Brennan Jr.'s 
opinion, which was joined by only three 
other JustJces, rejected arguments by 
the Administration and the dissenters 
that the one-for-one quota was not 
"narrowly tailored" · enough to pass 
muster under the standards the Court 
laid down last year. 
'Astonlshlnl' VIew Cited 
He termed "astonlshtna" what he 
called Mr. Fried's auggestton that after 
,ears or unfulfilled promises by the 
state that It would adopt procedures to 
comply with .court orders, "In 1883 the 
district court was constitutionally re-
quired to aettle for yet another piJ)m· 
ise." 
Mr. Fried said through a spokesman 
today that he was disappointed with the 
tullng and qreed with the dissenters. 
Civil rights aroups balled the decision 
In the case, United States v Paradise, 
·No. 85-9i9. · 
THURSDAY, FEBRUARY ~6. 198'1 
~High Court Upholds Racial Quota lor Promotions 
Barry Goldstein, a lawyer for the even though the promotions of aome was not aufficently "narrowly tal-
NAACP Legal Defense and Educa- white troopers would be delayed. lored," and was unduly burdensome on 
tiona! Fund, &tressed the majority's re- Justice John Paul Stevens concurred iMocent white troopers aeeking 
Jection of "rigid limitations on affirma- In the decision but did not join Justice promotions. 
live action." Brennan's opinion. He stressed that She faulted the district court for 1m-
He said the decision lhowed that Mr. Federal c:ourts had broad discretion to posing "a racial quota without first 
Fried had beeR wrong in asserting that order racial preferences in cases in considering the effectiveness of alter-
•last year's rulings meant racial prefer- which past discrimination had · been natives," such as' imposing "stiff fines 
ences c:ould ''hardly ever" be used. proved. or other penalties" on the Alabama De-
Justice BreMan, citing last year's Justice Stevens's opinion seemed to partment of Public Safety until it 
decisions, aa~ "It Is now well-esta~ endorse judicial ~se of affirmative ac- adopted adequate procedures for 
. llshed that sovemment bocHes, includ- ·lion to remedy past discrimination promotion of blacks. 
, lnB c:ourts, may constitutionally em- even more broadly than did Justice ''The one-for~ promotion quota 
I pJoy racial classJficlations essential to Brennan's opinion. . used in this case far' exceeded the per-
remedy unlawfultreatment of racial or Citing the Court's endorsement of centase of blacks in the trooper force, 
· ethn!~ sroups subject to dlscrlmlna- "broad and nexlble" judicial authority and there Is no evidence in the record 
. tion. · to remedy constitutional violations in that auch an extreme quota was neces-
'Raee-Censelous Reller Needed the context of school desegregation sary," Justice O'Connor wrote. 
He added that "the pervasive, ..,s- cases, Justice Stevens said judicial au- About 25 percent of the people quali-·J fied to be state troopers were blacks. 
tematic and obstinate dtscriminatory , Justice BreMan said temporary use of 
=~d~ ,:r.r;::Jtu:::~~O: Its 5-4 decision ~::,m~u:~r;:s ·;:~<'f~P~ ~=::! 
for the race-<:onsclous rellel ordered by day when blacks would occupy some-
the district court." on an Alabama thing like 25 percent of the depart-
. Justice Brennan's 34-page oplnlori ment's upper positions. 
was joined by Justices ThW'Iood Mar- f b ff. th p 
shall, Harry A. Blackmun and Lewis F.. CaSe e U S e ressure on Departmeat SoUpt 
Powell, Jr.. Ad . . tr t• He said the promotion . quota was 
Justice Powell said til a concurring ffilDlS a 10n. "narrowly tailored" to the ·legitimate 
opinion that the state ~·had engaged in soals of eliminating 'the effects of past 
persistent violation of constitutional discrimination, ·~ducing the depart-
rights and repeated:f failed to carry thority to remedy job discrimination ment to Implement a promotion proce-
out c:ourt Orders" that the f should be ~ually broad. dure that would not have an adverse one- or- Impact on biacks," and ellmlna~ the one promotion quota had been enforced Unlike a fjrmatlve action plans 
by the district court on only one occa- voluntarily adopted by state and local effects of the department'slong de ay. 
slon, when it ordered the promotion of sovemments, Justice Stevens said, The lower court had found the proce-
eight blacks and eight whites to the those Imposed by Federal judges need dures previously adopted by the de-
rank of corporal in 1984. . not be "narrowly tailored to achieve a partment inadequate because they in-
He also said that unlike affirmative compelling governmental interest." eluded examinations on which blacks 
action plans requlrln& layoffs of whites Rather, they need only be within the had scored much lower on average 
before Jess-eenlor blacks which a rna- bounds of "reasonableness." than whites. 
jority of the Court . disapproved last O'Connor Writes Dissent Justice Hrennan also termed the 
year as Imposing a harsh burden ~ Justice Sandra Day · O'Connor dis- quota "fiexlble in appJicatlon" because 
white employ~ •• the district cou~ s sented, joined by Olief Justice Rehn- It applied only to the extent that quali-
proF~ion11quotaf•~!'otlnddts1ru1dPt '"!; · qulst and Justice Scalia. Justice Byron fled black troopers were available and 
ous Y e ves o uu""""'nt v _ ua s, · R.. White dissented separately. the department "needed to make 
· Justice O'Connor, like Mr. Fried, promotions, and because It would be 
argued that even though Alabama was lifted whenever the department 
sullty of an "egregious history of dis- adopted adequate procedures of its 
crimination," the lower court's quota own. 
To: The Chief Justice fvk 
Justice White 
Justice Marshall 





~ From: Justice Brennan 
v# ~ ~ . 1 pcu!ated: DEC ll 1986 
~~ ~·R:::;te~+<sb/j~ 
1st DRAFT .--~ <i-- <fr~ C ~ 
SUPREME COURT OF TilE UNITED STATES ~ ~ 
No, 85-999 ~~-
UNITED STATES, PETITIONER v. PHILLIP PARA- -..../ "1 A'} 
DISE, JR., ET AL. £A-_ -i . U/. 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT 
[December -, 1986] 
JusTICE BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court. 
The question we must decide is whether relief awarded in 
this case, in the form of a one-black-for-one-white promotion 
quota to be applied as an interim measure to state trooper 
promotions in the Alabama Department of Public Safety (the 
Department), is permissible under the Equal Protection 
guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
In 1972 the United States District Court for the Middle 
District of Alabama held that the Department had systemati-
cally excluded blacks from employment in violation of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. Some eleven years later, con-
fronted with the Department's failure to develop promotion 
procedures that did not have an adverse impact on blacks, 
the District Court ordered the promotion of one black trooper 
for each white trooper elevated in rank, as long as qualified 
black candidates were available, until the Department imple-
mented an acceptable promotion procedure. The United 
States challenges the constitutionality of this order. 1 
'The Department and its director, Colonel Byron Prescott, and the in-
tervenors, a class of white applicants for promotion within the Depart-
ment, have filed briefs in support of the United States, but they did not 
themselves petition for certiorari. 
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I 
Because the Department's prior employment practices and 
conduct during this lawsuit bear directly on the constitution-
ality of any race-conscious remedy imposed upon it, we must 
relate the tortuous course of this litigation in some detail. 
A 
In 1972 the National Association for the Advancement of 
Colored People (NAACP) brought this action challenging the 
Department's long-standing practice of excluding blacks from 
employment. The United States was joined as a party plain-
tiff, and Phillip Paradise, Jr. intervened on behalf of a class of 
black plaintiffs. District Judge Frank M. Johnson, Jr. deter-
mined that 
"[p]laintiffs have shown without contradiction that the 
defendants have engaged in a blatant and continuous 
pattern and practice of discrimination in hiring in the Al-
abama Department of Public Safety, both as to troopers 
and supporting personnel. In the thirty-seven year his-
tory of the patrol there has never been a black trooper 
and the only Negroes ever employed by the. department 
have been nonmerit system laborers. This unexplained 
and unexplainable discriminatory conduct by state offi-
cials is unquestionably a violation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment." NAACP v. Allen, 340 F . Supp. 703, 705 
(MD Ala. 1972). 
He concluded: 
"Under such circumstances ... the courts have the au-
thority and the duty not only to order an end to discrimi-
natory practices, but also to correct and eliminate the 
present effects of past discrimination. The racial dis-
crimination in this instance has so permeated the De-
partment['s] employment policies that both mandatory 
and prohibitory injunctive relief are necessary to end 
these discriminatory practices and to make some sub-
85-999-0PINION 
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stantial progress toward eliminating their effects." !d., 
at 705-706 (citations omitted). 
As a result, the court issued an order (the 1972 order), en-
joining the Department to hire one black trooper for each 
white trooper hired until blacks constituted approximately 
25% of the state trooper force. 2 Judge Johnson also en-
joined the Department from "engaging in any employment 
practices, including recruitment, examination, appointment, 
training, promotion, retention or any other personnel action, 
for the purpose or with the effect of discriminating against 
any employee, or actual or potential applicant for employ-
ment, on the ground of race or color." ld., at 706 (emphasis 
added). The court further required that "eligible and pro-
motional registers heretofore used for the purpose of hiring 
troopers be and they are hereby abrogated to the extent nec-
essary to comply with this decree." ld., at 707. 3 
The defendants appealed, 4 but the Fifth Circuit upheld the 
hiring requirement: 
2 In United States v. Frazer, 317 F . Supp. 1079 (MD Ala. 1970), Judge 
Johnson found that certain state agencies, including the Personnel Depart-
ment, which supplies support staff to the Department, were engaged in 
systematic violations of the constitutional rights of black applicants and 
employees. In NAACP v. Allen, 340 F . Supp. 703 (MD Ala. 1972), the 
decree in United States v. Frazer was amended to require the Personnel 
Department to ensure that, until blacks constituted 25% of the Depart-
ment's support personnel, 50% of the individuals hired for those positions 
were black. Id., at 706. 
3 The court awarded attorney's fees to the plaintiffs. Judge Johnson 
found that the defendants "unquestionably knew and understood that their 
discriminatory practices violated the Fourteenth Amendment" and that, as 
a consequence, "their defense of th[e] lawsuit amount[ed] to unreasonable 
and obdurate conduct which necessitated the expense of the litigation." 
NAACP v. Allen, supra, at 708. 
4 While the appeal was pending, the Court of Appeals ordered the Dis-
trict Judge to supplement the record and to reconsider his decree. After 
discovery, Judge Johnson decided not to alter his order. He explicitly 
compared the results achieved by the injunction prohibiting discrimination 
4 
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"The use of quota relief in employment discrimination 
cases is bottomed on the chancellor's duty to eradicate 
the continuing effects of past unlawful practices. By 
mandating the hiring of those who have been the object 
of discrimination, quota relief promptly operates to 
change the outward and visible signs of yesterday's ra-
cial distinctions and thus, to provide an impetus to the 
process of dismantling the barriers, psychological or oth-
erwise, erected by past practices. It is a temporary 
remedy that seeks to spend itself as promptly as it can 
by creating a climate in which objective, neutral employ-
ment criteria can successfully operate to select public 
employees solely on the basis of job-related merit." 
NAACP v. Allen, 493 F. 2d 614, 621 (CA5 1974). 
The Court of Appeals also held that white applicants who 
had higher eligibility rankings than blacks were not denied 
due process or equal protection of the laws by the one-for-one 
hiring order. The Department's use of unvalidated selection 
procedures that disproportionately excluded blacks pre-
cluded any argument that "'quota hiring produces uncon-
stitutional 'reverse' discrimination, or a lowering of employ-
ment standards, . or the appointment of less or unqualified 
persons."' ld., at 620. 5 
in United States v. Frazer, supra, and the hiring order in NAACP v. Al-
len, supra: 
"The contrast in results achieved to this point in the Allen case and the 
Frazer case under the two orders entered in those cases is striking indeed. 
Even though the agencies affected by the Frazer order and the Depart-
ment of Public Safety draw upon the same pool of black applicants-that is, 
those who have been processed through the Department of Personnel......,.Al-
len has seen substantial black hiring, while the progress under Frazer has 
been slow and, in many instances, nonexistent .... 
[T]his Court's experience reflects that the decrees that are entered must 
contain hiring goals; otherwise effective relief will not be achieved." 
United States v. Dothard, 373 F. Supp. 504, 506-507 (MD Ala.) aff'd sub 
nom. NAACP v. Allen, 493 F. 2d 614 (CA5 1974). 
6 None of the parties sought certiorari review of the Court of Appeals' 
determination that the 50% hiring quota at issue in NAACP v. Allen, 
supra, was constitutional. 
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In 1974, only shortly after the Court of Appeals' decision, 
the plaintiffs found it necessary to seek further relief from 
the District Court. Judge Johnson found that "defendants 
have, for the purpose of frustrating or delaying full relief to 
the plaintiff class, artificially restricted the size of the trooper 
force and the number of new troopers hired." Paradise v. 
Dothard, Civ. Action No. 3561-N (MD Ala., Aug. 5, 1975). 
The court also addressed the disproportionate failure of 
blacks hired to achieve permanent trooper status: 6 
"[T]he high attrition rate among blacks resulted from the 
selection of other than the best qualified blacks from the 
eligibility rosters, some social and official discrimination 
against blacks at the trooper training academy, pref-
erential treatment of whites in some aspects of training 
and testing, and discipline of blacks harsher than that 
given whites for similar misconduct while on the force." 
Ibid. 
The court reaffirmed the 1972 hiring order, enjoining any fur-
ther attempts by the Department to delay or frustrate 
compliance. 
B 
In September 1977 the plaintiffs again had to return to the 
District Court for supplemental relief, this time specifically 
on the question of the Department's promotion practices. 
Following extensive discovery, the parties entered into a 
Partial Consent Decree (the 1979 Decree), approved by the 
court in February 1979. In this decree, the Department 
agreed to develop within one year a promotion procedure 
that would be fair to all applicants and have "little or no ad-
verse impact upon blacks seeking promotion to corporal." 
App. 40. In the decree, the Department also agreed that 
the promotion procedure would conform with the 1978 Uni-
6 At this time, 40 blacks had been hired as a result of the 1972 District 
Court order; only 27 remained on the force . All29 whites hired during the 
same period had retained their positions. Paradise v. Dothard, Civ. Ac-
tion No. 3561-N (MD Ala., Aug. 5, 1975). 
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form Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures, 28 CFR 
§ 50.14. 7 Once such a procedure was in place for the rank of 
corporal, the decree required the defendants to develop simi-
lar procedures for the other upper ranks-sergeant, lieuten-
ant, captain, and major. The decree expressly provided that 
the plaintiffs might apply to the court for enforcement of its 
terms or for other appropriate relief. App. 41. 8 
Five days after approval of the 1979 Decree, the defend-
ants sought clarification of the 1972 hiring order. The De-
partment maintained that its goal-a 25% black trooper 
force-applied only to officers in entry-level positions and not 
to the upper ranks. The court responded: 
"On this point, there is no ambiguity. The Court's 
[1972] order required that one-to-one hiring be carried 
out until approximately twenty-five percent of the state 
trooper force is black. It is perfectly clear that the 
order did not distinguish among troopers by rank." 
Paradise v. Shoemaker, 470 F. Supp. 439, 440 (MD Ala. 
1979) (emphasis in original). 
The Department also argued that because the 25% objec-
tive could not be achieved unless 37.5% of entry-level posi-
tions were held by blacks, "more qualified white applicants" 
were passed over than was constitutionally permissible. 
!d., at 441. The District Court rejected the argument, 
stating: 
To modify this order would be to do less than the law re-
quires, which is to eradicate the continuing effects of 
past unlawful practices. In 1972, defendants were not 
just found guilty of discriminating against blacks in hir-
7 The Uniform Guidelines are "designed to provide a framework for 
determining the proper use of tests and other [employee] selection proce-
dures consistent with Federal law." 28 CFR § 50.14, Pt. 1, § 1 (1978). 
8 In the interim the parties agreed to utilize the existing state merit sys-
tem for promotions to the rank of corporal, provided that at least three 
black troopers were promoted. The details of this procedure were set 
forth in an "Agreement of Counsel for the Parties." App. 46. 
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ing to entry-level positions. The Court found that in 
thirty-seven years there had never been a black trooper 
at any rank. One continuing effect of that discrimina-
tion is that, as of November 1, 1978, out of 232 state 
troopers at the rank of corporal or above, there is still 
not one black. The [hiring] quota fashioned by the 
Court provides an impetus to promote blacks into those 
positions. To focus only on the entry-level positions 
would be to ignore that past discrimination by the De-
partment was pervasive, that its effects persist, and that 
they are manifest. . . . The order in this case is but the 
necessary remedy for an intolerable wrong." !d., at 442 
(emphasis added). 
In April 1981, more than a year after the deadline set in 
the 1979 Decree, the Department proposed a selection proce-
dure for promotion to corporal and sought approval from the 
District Court. The United States and the plaintiff class 
both objected to implementation of the procedure, arguing 
that it had not been validated and that its use would be im-
permissible if it had an adverse impact on blacks. To resolve 
this dispute the parties executed a second consent decree 
(the 1981 Decree) which the District Court approved on Au-
gust 18, 1981. 
In the 1981 Decree, the Department reaffirmed its commit-
ment made in 1979 to implement a promotion procedure with 
little or no adverse impact on blacks. The parties then 
agreed to the administration of the proposed promotion pro-
cedure and that its results would be "reviewed to determine 
whether the selection procedure has an adverse impact 
against black applicants." App. 51. Whether there was ad-
verse impact was to be determined by reference to the "four-
fifths" rule of section 4 of the Uniform Guidelines. See 28 
CFR § 50.14 (1978). 9 If the parties proved unable to agree 
9 According to § 4 of the Uniform Guidelines, "[a] selection rate for any 
racial, ethnic or sex group which is less than four-fifths (4/5) (or eighty per-
cent) of the rate for the group with the highest rate will generally be re-
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on a procedure, its determination would be submitted to the 
District Court. No promotions would occur until the "par-
ties ... agreed in writing or the Court . . . ruled upon the 
method to be used for making promotions with little or no ad-
verse impact." App. 53. 
The defendants administered the test to 262 applicants of 
whom 60 (23%) were black. Of the 60 blacks who took the 
test, only 5 (8. 3%) were listed in the top half of the promotion 
register; the highest ranked black candidate was number 80. 
!d., at 119. In response to an inquiry from the United 
States, the Department indicated that there was an immedi-
ate need to make between 8 and 10 promotions to corporal 
and announced its intention to elevate between 16 and 20 in-
dividuals before construction of a new list. 1 Record 222. 
The United States objected to any rank-ordered use of the 
list, stating that "such use would result in substantial ad-
verse impact on black applicants" and suggested that the de-
fendants submit an alternative proposal that would comply 
with the requirements of the 1979 and 1981 decrees. I d., at 
220-221. No proposal was submitted, and no promotions 
were made during the next nine months. 
In April 1983, plaintiffs returned to District Court and 
sought an order enforcing the terms of the two consent de-
crees. Specifically, they requested that defendants be re-
quired to promote blacks to corporal "at the same rate at 
which they have been hired, 1 for 1, until such time as the 
defendants implement a valid promotion procedure." 1 
Record 112. The plaintiff class contended that such an order 
would "encourage defendants to develop a valid promotional 
procedure as soon as possible," and would "help alleviate the 
gross underrepresentation of blacks in the supervisory ranks 
garded as evidence of adverse impact." 28 CFR § 50.14, Pt. 1, § 4 (1978). 
In other words, if 60% of the white troopers who take a promotion test pass 
it, then 48% of the black troopers to whom it is administered must pass. 
85-999---0PINION 
UNITED STATES v. PARADISE 9 
of the Department" 10-an underrepresentation caused by the 
Department's past discrimination and exacerbated by its con-
tinuing refusal to implement a fair procedure. Ibid. 
Although it opposed the one-for-one promotion require-
ment, the United States agreed that the consent decrees 
should be enforced. It stated that "defendants [had] failed 
to offer any reasons why promotions should not be made, nor 
had they offered an explanation as to why they [had] halted 
progress towards remedying the effects of past discrimina-
tion." !d., at 199-201. The United States further observed 
that the Department's failure to produce a promotion plan in 
compliance with the 1979 and 1981 decrees "suggests that a 
pattern of discrimination against blacks in the Department 
... may be continuing." Id., at 200.n 
After the motion to enforce was filed, four white applicants 
for promotion to corporal sought to intervene on behalf of a 
class composed of those white applicants who took the pro-
posed corporal's examination and ranked #1 through #79. 
App. 81-87. They argued that the 1979 and 1981 Decrees 
and the relief proposed by the plaintiffs in their motion to en-
force were "unreasonable, illegal, unconstitutional or against 
public policy." Id., at 99. 
In an order entered October 28, 1983, the District Court 
held that the Department's selection procedure had an ad-
verse impact on blacks. Paradise v. Prescott, 580 F. Supp. 
171, 174 (MD Ala. 1983). 12 Observing that even if 79 corpo-
10 In fact, the only black candidates who had been promoted since 1972 
were the four promoted pursuant to the counsels' sidebar to the 1979 De-
cree. See note 8, supra. 
11 The Department opposed the motion to enforce, arguing that the relief 
sought by the plaintiffs was unconstitutional. The Department requested 
an opportunity to demonstrate that the proposed procedure was valid and 
that it did not adversely impact upon black candidates within the meaning 
of the consent decrees and the Uniform Guidelines. 
12 In a separate order issued that same day, the District Court permitted 
the white intervenors to participate in the case on a prospective basis only. 
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rals were promoted in rank order, rather than the 15 contem-
plated, none would be black, the court concluded that "[s]hort 
of outright exclusion based on race, it is hard to conceive of a 
selection procedure which would have a greater discrimina-
tory impact." I d., at 173. 13 The Department was ordered 
to submit, by November 10, 1983, "a plan to promote to cor-
poral, from qualified candidates, at least 15 persons in a man-
ner that will not have an adverse racial impact." I d., at 175. 
The Department subsequently submitted a proposal to pro-
mote 15 persons to the rank of corporal, of whom four would 
be black. In addition, the Department requested that the 
Department of Personnel be given more time to develop and 
submit for court approval a nondiscriminatory promotion 
procedure. 
The United States did not oppose the Department's pro-
posal, but plaintiffs did. They argued that the proposal "to-
tally disregards the injury plaintiffs have suffered due to the 
defendants' four-and-a-half year delay [since the 1979 De-
cree] and fails to provide any mechanism that will insure the 
present scenario will not reoccur." 2 Record 382. 
On December 15, 1983, the District Court granted plain-
tiffs' motion to enforce the 1979 and 1981 Decrees. Paradise 
v. Prescott, 585 F. Supp. 72 (MD Ala. 1983). Confronted 
with the Department's immediate need to promote 15 troop-
ers to corporal and the parties' inability to agree, the court 
was required by the 1979 and 1981 Decrees to fashion a pro-
motion procedure. The District Judge summarized the 
situation: 
The court held that intervention was untimely as to prior orders, judg-
ments, and decrees. App. 116. 
13 The District Court also rejected the Department's argument that the 
one-for-one hiring order was a "special program" within the meaning of the 
Uniform Guidelines that would insulate the Department from any finding 
of adverse impact in its promotion procedures. Paradise v. Prescott, 580 
F. Supp. 171, 174 (MD Ala. 1983). 
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"On February 10, 1984, less than two months from 
today, twelve years will have passed since this court con-
demned the racially discriminatory policies and practices 
of the Alabama Department of Public Safety. Never-
theless, the effects of these policies and practices remain 
pervasive and conspicuous at all ranks above the entry-
level position. Of the 6 majors, there is still not one 
black. Of the 25 captains, there is still not one black. 
Of the 35 lieutenants, there is still not one black. Of the 
65 sergeants, there is still not one black. Of the 66 cor-
porals, only four are black. Thus, the department still 
operates an upper rank structure in which almost every 
trooper obtained his position through procedures that to-
tally excluded black persons. Moreover, the depart-
ment is still without acceptable procedures for advance-
ment of black troopers into this structure, and it does not 
appear that any procedures will be in place within the 
near future. The preceding scenario is intolerable and 
must not continue. The time has now arrived for the 
department to take affirmative and substantial steps to 
open the upper ranks to black troopers." I d., at 7 4 (em-
phasis in original). 
The court then fashioned the relief at issue here. It held 
that "for a period of time," at least 50% of the promotions to 
corporal must be awarded to black troopers, if qualified black 
candidates were available. The court also held that "if there 
is to be within the near future an orderly path for black 
troopers to enter the upper ranks, any relief fashioned by the 
court must address the department's delay in developing ac-
ceptable promotion procedures for all ranks." I d., at 75. 
Thus, the court imposed a 50% promotional quota in the 
upper ranks, but only if there . were qualified black candi-
dates, if the rank were less than 25% black, and if the De-
partment had not developed and implemented a promotion 
plan without adverse impact for the relevant rank. The 
court concluded that the effects of past discrimination in the 
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Department "will not wither away of their own accord" and 
that "without promotional quotas the continuing effects of 
this discrimination cannot be eliminated." I d., at 75 and 76. 
The court highlighted the temporary nature and flexible de-
sign of the relief ordered, stating that it was "specifically tai-
lored" to eliminate the lingering effects of past discrimina-
tion, to remedy the delayed compliance with the consent 
decrees, and to ensure prompt implementation of lawful pro-
cedures. Ibid. 
Finally, the Department was ordered to submit within 30 
days a schedule for the development of promotion procedures 
for all ranks above the entry-level. The schedule was to be 
"based upon realistic expectations" as the court intended that 
"the use of the quotas . . . be a one-time occurrence." I d:, at 
75 and 76. The District Court reasoned that, under the 
order it had entered, the Department had "the prerogative to 
end the promotional quotas at any time, simply by developing 
acceptable promotion procedures." I d., at 76. 
Numerous motions for reconsideration of the court's order 
and for the alteration or amendment of the court's judgment 
were denied by the District Court. In its motion, the De-
partment set forth the "new contention" that it was "without 
legal authority and sufficiently trained personnel to design 
any promotional procedures" because "this function is allo-
cated by statute to the Department of Personnel." Paradise 
v. Prescott, Civ. Action No. 3561-N (MD Ala., Jan. 13, 
1984). The District Court responded that the Department 
had signed consent decrees in 1979 and 1981 mandating 
development of an acceptable procedure and that Depart-
ment counsel had represented at the January 5, 1984 hearing 
that "it was anticipated that the development of these proce-
dures would take only a few months." Ibid. The judge 
concluded: 
"It is now years later and this court will not entertain the 
excuse that the department is now without legal author-
ity to meet its obligations under the consent de-
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crees. . . . [T]he Department of Personnel, which is 
also a party to these proceedings, assured the court at 
the January 5, [1984] hearing that it would work closely 
with the Public Safety Department to develop acceptable 
promotion procedures. The Public Safety Department's 
contention that it is without legal authority is not only 
meritless, it is frivolous. 
Moreover, that the Department of Public Safety would 
even advance this argument dramatically demonstrates 
the need for the relief imposed by this court. Such frivo-
lous arguments serve no purpose other than to prolong 
the discriminatory effects of the department's 37-year 
history of racial discrimination." Ibid. (emphasis 
added). 
In February 1984, the Department promoted eight blacks 
and eight whites to corporal pursuant to the District Court's 
order enforcing the consent decrees. 
Four months later, the Department submitted for the 
court's approval its proposed procedure for promotions to the 
rank of corporal. The District Court ruled that the Depart-
ment could promote up to 13 troopers utilizing this procedure 
and suspended application of the one-for-one requirement for 
that purpose. App. 163-164. In October 1984, following 
approval of the Department's new selection procedure for 
promotion to sergeant, the court similarly suspended applica-
tion of the quota at that rank. App. 176-177. 14 
On appeal the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit af-
firmed the District Court's order. The Court of Appeals 
concluded that the relief at issue was designed to remedy the 
present effects of past discrimination-"effects which, as the 
history of this case amply demonstrates, 'will not wither 
away. of their own accord."' Paradise v. Prescott, 767 F. 2d 
14 In addition, the Department has been permitted to promote only white 
troopers to lieutenant and captain because no blacks have qualified, as of 
yet, for promotion to those ranks. Paradise v. Prescott, 767 F. 2d 1514, 
1538 n. 19 (CA5 1985). 
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1514, 1533 (CA5 1985) (quoting Paradise v. Prescott, 585 F. 
Supp., at 75). In addition, the relief awarded was deemed to 
"exten[d] ·no further than necessary to accomplish the objec-
tive of remedying the 'egregious' and long-standing racial im-
balances in the upper ranks of the Department." I d., at 
1532-1533. 
We granted certiorari. 
affirm. 
II 
U.S. - (1986). We 
The United States maintains that the race-conscious relief 
ordered in this case violates the Equal Protection Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment to. the Constitution of the United 
States. 15 
It is now well established that government bodies, includ-
ing courts, may constitutionally employ racial classifications 
essential to remedy unlawful treatment of groups historically 
subject to discrimination. See Sheet Metal Workers v. 
EEOC, 478 U. S. --, -- (1986), and cases cited therein. 
See also Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education, 476 U. S. 
-- , -- (1986) ("The Court is in agreement that . . . rem-
edying past discrimination is a sufficiently weighty state in-
terest to warrant the remedial use of a carefully constructed 
affirmative action program") (O'CONNOR, J., concurring). 
But although this Court has consistently held that some ele-
vated level of scrutiny is required when a racial or ethnic dis-
tinction is made for remedial purposes, it has yet to reach 
15 The Government framed the issue presented as "[ w ]hether the one-
black-for-one-white promotion quota adopted by the district court ... is 
permissible under the equal protection guarantees of the Fourteenth and 
Fifth Amendments to the United States Constitution." Brief for Peti-
tioner 1. Because the reach of the equal protection guarantee of the Fifth 
Amendment is co-extensive with that of the Fourteenth, we need not de-
cide whether the race-conscious relief ordered in this case would violate the 
former as well as the latter constitutional provision. 
'· .~ 
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consensus on the appropriate constitutional analysis. 16 We 
need not do so in this case, however, because we conclude 
that the relief ordered in this case survives even strict scru-
tiny analysis: it is "narrowly tailored" to serve a "compelling 
governmental purpose." Id., at-- (opinion of POWELL, 
J.). 
The government unquestionably has a compelling interest 
in remedying past and present discrimination by a state ac-
tor. See Wygant, supra, at-- (opinion of POWELL, J.); 
id., at -- (O'CONNOR, J., concurring); Sheet Metal Work-
ers, supra, at -- (opinion of BRENNAN, J.). See also 
Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., 424 U. S. 747, 763 
(1976) (prevention and remedying of racial discrimination and 
its effects is a national policy of "highest priority"). In 1972 
the District Court found, and the Court of Appeals affirmed, 
that for almost four decades the Department had excluded 
blacks from all positions, including jobs in the upper ranks. 
Such egregious discriminatory conduct was "unquestionably 
a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment." NAACP v. Al-
len, 340 F. Supp., at 705. As the United States concedes, 
Brief for Petitioner 21, the pervasive, systematic, and obsti-
nate discriminatory conduct of the Department created a pro-
found need and a firm justification for the race-conscious re-
16 See Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education, 476 U.S. - , -
(1986) (opinion of POWELL, J.) (the means chosen must be "narrowly tai-
lored" to achieve a "compelling government interest"); id., at- (O'CoN-
NOR, J., concurring) (same); id., at- (MARSHALL, J., dissenting, joined 
by BRENNAN, J . and BLACKMUN, J.) (remedial use of race permissible if it 
serves "important governmental objectives" and is "substantially related 
to achievement of those objectives") (quoting University of California Re-
gents v. Bakke, 438 U. S. 265, 359 (1978)); id., at- (STEVENS, J ., dis-
senting) (both public interest served by racial classification and means em-
ployed must justify adverse effects on the disadvantaged group); Fullilove 
v. Klutznick, 448 U. S. 448, 507 (1980) (POWELL, J ., concurring) (express-
ing concern first articulated in Bakke, supra, at 362, that review not be 
"'strict' in theory and fatal in fact"). 
.. 
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lief ordered by the District Court. 17 
The Department and the intervenors, however, maintain 
that the Department was found guilty only of discrimination 
in hiring, and not in its promotional practices. They argue 
that no remedial relief is justified in the promotion context 
because the intentional discrimination in hiring was without 
effect in the upper ranks, and because the Department's pro-
motional procedure was not discriminatory. There is no 
merit in either premise. 
Discrimination at the entry-level necessarily precluded 
blacks from competing for promotions, and resulted in a de-
partmental hierarchy dominated exclusively by 
nonminorities. The lower courts determined that this situa-
tion was explicable only by reference to the Department's 
17 Amici, the City of Birmingham, the City of Detroit, the City of Los 
Angeles, and the District of Columbia, state that the operations of police 
departments are crippled by the lingering effects of past discrimination. 
They believe that race-conscious relief in hiring and promotion restores 
community trust in the fairness of law enforcement and facilitates effective 
police service by encouraging citizen cooperation. See also Wygant, 
supra, at -- (STEVENS, J., dissenting) ("[I]n a city with a recent history 
of racial unrest, the superintendent of police might reasonably conclude 
that an integrated police force could develop a better relationship with the 
community and do a more effective job of maintaining law and order than a 
force composed only of white officers"); NAACP v. Allen, 493 F. 2d, at 621 
("This is a police department and the visibility of the Black patrolman in 
the community is a decided advantage for all segments of the public at a 
time when racial divisiveness is plaguing law enforcement" (citation omit-
ted)). Amicus NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc. sug-
gests that the governmental interest in a racially integrated Department is 
amplified here due to community perceptions of, and reactions to the De-
partment's historical role in defense of segregation and its active opposition 
to the civil rights movement. We need not decide if either the generalized 
governmental interest in effective law enforcement or the more particular-
ized need to overcome any impediments to law enforcement created by per-
ceptions arising from the egregious discriminatory conduct of the Depart-
ment is compelling. The judicial determinations of prior discriminatory 
policies and conduct satisfy the first prong of the strict scrutiny test. 
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past discriminatory conduct. 18 In 1972 the Department was 
"not just found guilty of discriminating against blacks in hir-
ing to entry-level positions. The Court found that in thirty-
seven years there had never been a black trooper at any 
rank." Paradise v. Shoemaker, 470 F. Supp., at 442. In 
1979 the District Judge stated that one continuing effect of 
the Department's historical discrimination was that, "as of 
November 1, 1978, out of 232 state troopers at the rank of 
corporal or above, there is still not one black." Ibid. The 
court explained that the hiring quota it had fashioned was in-
tended to provide "an impetus to promote blacks into those 
positions" and that "(t]o focus only on the entry-level posi-
tions would be to ignore that past discrimination by the De-
partment was pervasive, that its effects persist, and that 
they are manifest." Ibid. The District Court crafted the 
relief it did due to "the department's failure after almost 
twelve years to eradicate the continuing effects of its own 
discrimination." 585 F. Supp., at 75 n. 1. It is too late for 
the Department to attempt to segregate the results achieved 
by its hiring practices and those achieved by its promotional 
practices. 
The argument that the Department's promotion procedure 
was not discriminatory is belied by the record. In 1979, 
faced with additional allegations of discrimination, the De-
partment agreed to adopt promotion procedures without an 
adverse impact on black candidates within one year. See 
Paradise v. Prescott, 767 F. 2d, at 1532. By 1983 the De-
partment had promoted only four blacks, and these promo-
tions had been made pursuant to the 1979 Decree, and "not 
the voluntary action of the Department." Id., at 1533 n. 16. 
In December 1983, the District Court found, despite the com-
18 Compare this situation with that described in Wygant, supra, at -
(opinion of POWELL, J.) ("There are numerous explanations for a disparity 
between the percentage of minority students and the percentage of minor-
ity faculty, many of them completely unrelated to discrimination of any 
kind"). 
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mitments made in the consent decrees, that the Depart-
ment's proposed promotion plan would have an adverse im-
pact upon blacks, Paradise v. Prescott, 580 F. Supp., at 174, 
and that "the department still operate[d] an upper rank 
structure in which almost every trooper obtained his position 
through procedures that totally excluded black persons." 
Paradise v. Prescott, 585 F. Supp., at 74 (emphasis in origi-
nal). On appeal, the Fifth Circuit summarily rejected the 
argument of the Department and the intervenors: 
"[l]t is no answer in this case to say that plaintiffs have 
not proven that the Department has discriminated 
against blacks above · the entry-level seeking promo-
tions. . . . [l]t cannot be gainsaid that white troopers 
promoted since 1972 were the specific beneficiaries of an 
official policy which systematically excluded all 
blacks." Paradise v. Prescott, 767 F. 2d, at 1533 n. 16 
(emphasis added). 
Promotion, like hiring, has been a central concern of the 
District Court since the commencement of this action; since 
1972, the relief crafted has included strictures against promo-
tion procedures that have a discriminatory purpose or effect. 
The race-conscious relief at issue here is justified by a com-
pelling interest in remedying the discrimination that perme-
ated entry-level hiring practices and the promotional process 
alike. 19 
'
9 We also reject the argument of the United States, the Department, 
and the intervenors that the purpose of the order enforcing the consent de-
crees was the imposition of a particular racial balance on the upper ranks of 
the Department. The one-for-one mechanism was employed not to punish 
the Department's failure to achieve racial balance, but to remedy the De-
partment's refusal to fulfill the commitment made in the consent decrees to 
implement a promotion procedure without adverse impact on blacks and to 
eradicate the effects of its past delay and discrimination. The racial imbal-
ances in the Department are properly characterized as the effects of the 
Department's past discriminatory actions and of its failure to develop a 
promotion procedure without adverse impact as required by the previous 
court orders and the consent decrees. Cf. Sheet Metal Workers, supra, at 
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Finally, in this case, as in Sheet Metal Workers, supra, at 
--(POWELL, J., concurring), the District Court's enforce-
ment order is "supported not only by the governmental inter-
est in eradicating [the Department's] discriminatory prac-
tices, it is also supported by the societal interest in 
compliance with the judgments of federal courts." The relief 
at issue was imposed upon a defendant with a consistent his-
tory of resistance to the District Court's orders, and only 
after the Department failed to live up to its court-approved 
commitments. 
III 
While conceding that . the District Court's order serves a 
compelling interest, the Government insists that it was not 
narrowly tailored to accomplish its purposes-to remedy past 
discrimination and eliminate its lingering effects, to enforce 
compliance with the 1979 and 1981 Decrees by bringing about 
the speedy implementation of a promotion procedure that 
would not have an adverse impact on blacks, and to eradicate 
the ill effects of the Department's delay in producing such a 
procedure. We cannot agree. 
In determining whether race-conscious remedies are ap-
propriate, we look to several factors, including the necessity 
for the relief and the efficacy of alternative remedies, the 
flexibility and duration of the relief, including the availability 
of waiver provisions; the relationship of the numerical goals 
to the relevant labor market; and the impact of the relief on 
the rights of third parties. Sheet Metal Workers, supra, at 
--(opinion of BRENNAN, J.); id., at-- (POWELL, J., con-
curring): Wygant, supra, at-- (opinion ofPOWELL, J.); id., 
at -- (O'CONNOR, J., concurring); id., at -- (WHITE, J., 
concurring in the judgment); id., at-- (MARSHALL, J., dis-
senting). When considered in light of these factors, it was 
amply established, and we find that the one-for-one promo-
-(POWELL, J., concurring) ("The contempt order was not imposed for 
the Union's failure to achieve the goal, but for its failure to take the pre-
scribed steps that would facilitate achieving the goal"). 
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tion requirement was narrowly tailored to serve its several 
purposes, both as applied to the initial set of promotions to 
the rank of corporal and as a continuing contingent order 
with respect to the upper ranks. 
A 
To evaluate the District Court's determination that it was 
necessary to order the promotion of eight whites and eight 
blacks to the rank of corporal at the time of the motion to en-
force, we must examine the purposes the order was intended 
to serve. First, the court sought to eliminate the effects of 
the Department's "long term, open, and pervasive" dis-
crimination, including the absolute exclusion of blacks from 
its upper ranks. Second, the judge sought to ensure expe-
ditious compliance with the 1979 and 1981 Decrees by induc-
ing the Department to implement a promotion procedure that 
would not have an adverse impact on blacks. Finally, the 
court needed to eliminate so far as possible the effects of the 
Department's delay in producing such a procedure. Con-
fronted by the Department's urgent need to promote at least 
15 troopers to corporal, the District Court determined that 
all of its purposes could be served only by ordering the pro-
motion of eight blacks and eight whites, as requested by the 
plaintiff class. 
The options proffered by the Government and the Depart-
ment would not have served the court's purposes. The De-
partment proposed, as a stop-gap measure, to promote four 
blacks and eleven whites and requested additional time to 
allow the Department of Personnel to develop and submit a 
nondiscriminatory promotion procedure. The United States 
argues that the Department's proposal would have allowed 
this round of promotions to be made without adverse impact 
on black candidates. 
The Department's proposal was inadequate because it com-
pletely failed to address two of the purposes cited above. 
The Department's ad hoc offer to make one round of promo-
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tions without an adverse impact ignored the court's concern 
that an acceptable procedure be adopted with alacrity. As 
early as 1972, the Department had been enjoined from engag-
ing in any promotional practices "for the purpose or with the 
effect of discriminating against any employee . . . on the 
ground of race or color." NAACP v. Allen, 340 F. Supp., at 
706. In 1979, the Department had promised in a court-ap-
proved consent decree to develop and implement a procedure 
without adverse impact by 1980. By 1983, such a procedure 
still had not been established, and Paradise sought enforce-
ment of the consent decrees. Given the record of delay, we 
find it astonishing that the Department should suggest that 
in 1983 the District Court was constitutionally required to 
settle for yet another promise that such a procedure would be 
forthcoming "as soon as possible." 2 Record 358. 
Moreover, the Department's proposal ignored the injury to 
the plaintiff class that resulted from its delay in complying 
with the terms of the 1972 order and the 1979 and 1981 De-
crees. 20 As the Fifth Circuit pointed out, no blacks were 
20 The Government contends that "the Department in reality had acted 
with reasonable diligence to devise a new corporal's examination" and that 
both Paradise and the District Judge "failed to appreciate how difficult it is 
to develop and implement selection procedures that satisfy the rigorous 
standards of the Uniform Guidelines" because "the validation of selection 
procedures is an expensive and time-consuming process usually extending 
over several years" and because the tests, besides being validated, had to 
be without adverse impact. Brief for Petitioner 25 n. 13. 
This argument is without merit. Since the District Court order at issue 
here was rendered, the Department has timely proposed and the court has 
tentatively approved, procedures for promotion to corporal and sergeant. 
App. 163-164, 176-177. Although these procedures have not yet been val-
idated (and, according to the Government, may not be for some time, Tr. of 
Oral Arg. 41-42), the use of the one-for-one promotion requirement was 
suspended by the court both times the Department proposed a procedure 
that appeared to be without adverse impact. It is therefore clear that any 
inevitable delay in validating the procedures will not be utilized to maintain 
the one-for-one requirement when the Department implements a proce-
dure without apparent adverse impact. The difficulties of validating a 
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promoted between 1972 and 1979; the four blacks promoted 
in 1979 were elevated pursuant to the 1979 Decree and not as 
a result of the voluntary action of the Department; and, fi-
nally, the whites promoted since 1972 "were the specific 
beneficiaries of an official policy which systematically ex-
cluded all blacks." Paradise v. Prescott, 767 F. 2d, at 1533 
n. 16. To permit ad hoc decisionmaking to continue and 
allow only four of fifteen slots to be filled by blacks would 
have denied relief to black troopers who had irretrievably 
lost promotion opportunities. Thus, adoption of the Depart-
ment's proposal would have fallen far short of the remedy 
necessary to eliminate the effects of the Department's past 
discrimination, would not have ensured adoption of a proce-
dure without adverse impact, and would not have vitiated the 
effects of the defendant's delay. 21 
The Government suggests that the trial judge could have 
imposed heavy fines and fees on the Department pending 
compliance. This alternative was never proposed to the Dis-
trict Court. Furthermore, the Department had been ordered 
to pay the plaintiffs' attorney's fees and costs throughout this 
lengthy litigation; these court orders had done little to pre-
vent future foot-dragging. 22 See, e. g., NAACP v. Allen, 
procedure do not excuse the Department's delay in developing a test with-
out adverse impact. 
In addition, it was the Department that initially proposed to implement a 
validated procedure within one year; this time period was not imposed by 
the court. Surely the Department was in the best position to assess the 
practicality of its own proposal. 
21 The merit of the District Court's determination in 1983 that it could 
not accept the Department's promise to develop a promotion procedure 
without adverse impact is illustrated by the Department's petition for re-
consideration of the court's order enforcing the consent decrees. The De-
partment argued that it was without legal authority to comply with the 
court's order; the District Court stated that this argument was yet another 
delaying tactic. See supra, at -- and App. 139. 
22 Indeed, the Department had shown itself willing to sacrifice a great 
deal of money to avoid the court's orders. See Paradise v. Dothard, Civ. 
Action No. 3561-N (MD Ala. 1975) ("The evidence outlined above estab-
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317 F. Supp., at 1093, United States v. Frazer, 340 F. Supp., 
at 708-710. In addition, imposing fines on the defendant 
does nothing to compensate the plaintiffs for the long delays 
in implementing acceptable promotion procedures. Finally, 
the Department had expressed an immediate and urgent 
need to make 15 promotions, and the District Court took this 
need into consideration in constructing its remedy. 23 As we 
observed only last Term, "a district court may find it neces-
sary to order interim hiring or promotional goals pending the 
development of nondiscriminatory hiring or promotion proce-
dures. In these cases, the use of numerical goals provides 
the compromise between two unacceptable alternatives: an 
outright ban on hiring or promotions . . . continued use of a 
discriminatory selection procedure," or, we might add, use of 
no selection procedure at all. Sheet Metal Workers, supra, 
lishes and this Court finds that, at the time of and in the years following the 
Court's 1972 order, the administration and the heads of the Department of 
Public Safety perceived a need for additional troopers-a need character-
ized as critical; that there were appropriated and available to the defend-
ants funds in excess of $3 million, a substantial portion of which could have 
been used for salaries and ancillary expenses for new troopers; and that 
this money was not spent for the critically needed additional troopers but 
went unspent or was diverted to other uses. These findings, when com-
bined with the considerable testimony regarding the defendants' reluc-
tance to implement the Court's remedial order by placing black troopers on 
the state's highways, necessitate the conclusion that the defendants have, 
for the purpose of frustrating or delaying full relief to the plaintiff class, 
artificially restricted the size of the trooper force and the number of new 
troopers hired"). 
23 Fining the defendant lacks even the lone virtue of the Department's 
proposal to promote four blacks: that at least a step would be taken toward 
the eradication of past discrimination by elevating blacks in the hierarchy. 
Furthermore, it does nothing to compensate plaintiffs for the past and fu-
ture delay in implementation of procedures without adverse effect. While 
fines vindicate the court's authority, here they would not fulfill the court's 
additional responsibility to "eliminate the discriminatory effects of the past 
as well as bar like discrimination in the future." Louisiana v. United 
States, supra, at 154. 
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at-- (opinion of BRENNAN, J.). 24 
By 1984 the District Court was plainly justified in imposing 
the remedy chosen. Any order allowing further delay by the 
Department was entirely unacceptable. Cf. Green v. 
County School Bd. of New Kent County, 391 U. S. 430, 438 
(1968) ("[A] plan that at this late date fails to provide mean-
ingful assurance of prompt and effective disestablishment of a 
dual system is . . . intolerable. . . . The burden on a school 
board today is to come forward with a plan that promises re-
alistically to work, and promises realistically to work now"). 
Not only was the immediate promotion of blacks to the rank 
of corporal essential, but, if the need for continuing judicial 
oversight was to end, it was also essential that the Depart-
ment be required to develop a procedure without adverse im-
pact on blacks, and that the effect of past delays be 
eliminated. 25 
24 The United States also suggests that the District Court could have 
made the promotion decisions itself or appointed a trustee to supervise the 
Department's progress. Again neither of these alternatives were pro-
posed to the judge. The suggestions appear rather beside the point as the 
United States would presumably object if the District Court or the trustee 
simply selected 50% blacks to be promoted each time vacancies occurred 
until a test without adverse impact was created, rather than ordering the 
Department to select 50% blacks. If the United States is actually suggest-
ing that the court come up with an ad hoc proposal for each batch of promo-
tions, this solution is subject to the same deficiencies noted with respect to 
the Department's proposal to the court. See supra, at --. 
2/) The imposition of the quota in the ranks beyond corporal was also 
clearly justified. At the time the District Court imposed the corporal pro-
motion ratio, it had required the Department to submit for its approval a 
schedule for the development of promotion procedures for all ranks above 
the entry level position "based upon realistic expectations." Paradise v. 
Prescott, 585 F. Supp., at 75. The Department complied, proposing peri-
ods of time ranging from five months for the position of corporal to twenty-
four months for the position of major. 2 Record 569-570. Thus far, all 
procedures have been submitted in a timely manner preventing any impo-
sition of the one-for-one requirement in the upper ranks. The record indi-
cates that, while the order itself is a continuing one, its application is en-
tirely contingent on the repetition of the exact circumstances that 
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We conclude that in 1983, when the District Judge entered 
his order, "it is doubtful, given [the Department's] history in 
this litigation, that the District Court had available to it any 
other effective remedy." Sheet Metal Workers, supra, at 
-- (POWELL, J., concurring). 
B 
The features of the one-for-one requirement and its actual 
operation indicate that it is flexible in application at all ranks. 
The requirement may be waived if no qualified black candi-
dates are available. The Department has, for example, been 
permitted to promote only white troopers to the ranks of lieu-
tenant and captain since no black troopers have qualified for 
those positions. Further, it applies only when the Depart-
ment needs to make promotions. Thus, if external forces, 
such as budget cuts, necessitate a promotion freeze, the De-
partment will not be required to make gratuitous promotions 
to remain in compliance with the court's order. 26 
Most significantly, the one-for-one requirement is ephem-
eral; the term of the quota's application is contingent upon 
prompted its initial formulation. The District Court will resort to the 
quota again only if confronted with further delay by the Department in im-
plementing a neutral promotion procedure according to the schedule the 
Department itself proposed. Thus, any future use of the one-for-one re-
quirement will be lawful for the same reason that justified the District 
Judge in ordering the promotion of eight blacks and eight whites to the 
rank of corporal: the failure of the Department to meet its court-approved 
commitments. 
26 Cf. Sheet Metal Workers, supra, at-- (opinion of BRENNAN, J.) 
("The [district] court has twice adjusted the deadline for achieving the 
[membership] goal, and has continually approved of changes in the size of 
the apprenticeship classes to account for the fact that economic conditions 
prevented petitioners from meeting their membership targets; there is 
every reason to believe that both the court and the administrator will con-
tinue to accommodate legitimate explanations for the petitioners' failure to 
comply with the court's orders"); id., at-- (POWELL, J., concurring) 
("Additional flexibility is evidenced by the fact that this goal, originally set 
to be achieved by 1981, has been twice delayed and is now set for 1987"). 
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the Department's own conduct. The quota endures only 
until the Department comes up with a procedure that does 
not have an adverse impact on blacks-something the De-
partment was enjoined to do in 1972 and expressly promised 
to do by 1980. As noted supra, at note --, the court has 
taken into account the difficulty of validating a test and does 
not require validation as a prerequisite for suspension of the 
promotional requirement. The one-for-one requirement 
evaporated at the ranks of corporal and sergeant upon imple-
mentation of promotion procedures without an adverse im-
pact, demonstrating that it is not a disguised means to 
achieve racial balance. Cf. Sheet Metal Workers, supra, at 
-- (POWELL, J., concurring). 
Finally, the record reveals that this requirement was flexi-
ble, waivable, and temporary in application. When the Dis-
trict Court imposed the provision, the judge expressed the 
hope that its use would be "a one-time occurrence." Para-
dise v. Prescott, 585 F. Supp., at 76. The court believed 
that this hope would be fulfilled: at the January 15,.1984 hear-
ing on the plaintiffs' motion to enforce the consent decrees, 
"the Personnel Department pledged that it would now devote 
its full resources to assisting the Public Safety Department in 
not only developing acceptable promotion procedures as re-
quired by the two consent decrees, but in doing so within the 
near future." App. 141. The Department has since timely 
submitted procedures for promotions to corporal and ser-
geant, and the court has consequently suspended application 
of the promotional quota in those ranks. In the higher 
ranks, the Department has been permitted to promote only 
white troopers. It now appears that the effect of the order 
enforcing the decrees will be "the development of acceptable 
promotion procedures for all ranks and the nullification of the 
promotion quota." Paradise v. Prescott, 767 F. 2d, at 1538 
n. 19. The remedy chosen has proven both effective and 
flexible. 
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c 
We must also examine the relationship between the nu-
merical relief ordered and the percentage of nonwhites in the 
relevant workforce. The original hiring quota imposed upon 
the Department required it to hire 50% black applicants until 
25% of the state trooper force was composed of blacks; the 
latter figure reflects the percentage of blacks in the relevant 
labor market. Paradise v. Prescott, 585 F. Supp., at 75 
n. 2. The enforcement order at issue here is less restrictive: 
it requires the Department to promote 50% black candidates 
until 25% of the rank in question is black, but only until a pro-
motion procedure without an adverse impact on blacks is in 
place. Thus, had the promotion quota remained in effect for 
the rank of corporal, it would have survived only until 25% of 
the Department's corporals were black. 
The Government suggests that the one-for-one require-
ment is arbitrary because it bears no relationship to the 25% 
minority labor pool relevant here. This argument ignores 
that the 50% figure is not itself the goal; rather it represents 
the speed at which the goal of 25% will be achieved. The in-
terim requirement of one-for-one promotion (had it contin-
ued) would simply have determined how quickly the Depart-
ment progressed toward this ultimate goal. This 
requirement is therefore analogous to the imposition in Sheet 
Metal Workers of an end date, which regulated the speed of 
progress toward fulfillment of the hiring goal. Sheet Metal 
Workers, supra, at-- (POWELL, J., concurring). 
To achieve the goal of 25% black representation in the 
upper ranks, the court was not limited to ordering the promo-
tion of only 25% blacks at any one time. Some promptness in 
the administration of relief was plainly justified in this case, 
and use of deadlines or end-dates had proven ineffective. In . 
these circumstances, the use of a temporary requirement of 
50% minority promotions, which, like the end date in Sheet 
... 
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Metal Workers, was crafted and applied flexibly, was con-
stitutionally permissible. 
The District Court did not accept the argument that in 
order to achieve a goal of 25% representation, it could order 
only 25% of any particular round of promotions to be awarded 
to minorities. Had it done so, the court would have imple-
mented the Department's proposal to promote 4 blacks and 
11 whites when it issued its order enforcing the consent de-
cree, because this proposal approximated the 25% figure. 27 
Again, however, this proposal completely ignores the fact 
and the effects of the Department's past discrimination and 
its delay in implementing the necessary promotion proce-
dure. Here the District Court considered both the Depart-
ment's proposal and the possibility of promoting blacks to all 
15 corporal positions "[i]n light of the department's failure 
after almost twelve years to eradicate the continuing effects 
of its own discrimination and to develop acceptable promotion 
procedures and in light of the severity of the existing racial 
imbalances." Paradise v. Prescott, 585 F. Supp., at 75 n. 1. 
The court rejected both of these alternatives and, upon con-
sideration of the Department's behavior and of the interests 
and the purposes to be served, arrived at an intermediate fig-
ure. Although the appropriate ratio here "necessarily in-
volve[d] a degree of approximation and imprecision," Team-
sters v. United States, 431 U. S. 324, 372 (1977), the District 
Court, with its first-hand experience of the parties and the 
potential for resistance, imposed the requirement that it de-
27 Following adoption of the plaintiffs' proposal that 8 blacks and 8 whites 
should be promoted, the corporal rank was composed of 14 black and 73 
white troopers (16% black). Under the Department's proposal that 4 
blacks and 11 whites should be promoted, the corporal rank would have 
been composed of 8 black and 79 white troopers (9.2% black). Neither 
proposal would have raised the percentage of blacks in the corporal rank to 
the 25% mark set as an alternate goal by the District Court (the other al-
ternative being the adoption of a promotion procedure without adverse im-
pact). Obviously, however, the plaintiffs' proposal provided an acceler-
ated approach to achieving that goal to compensate for past delay . 
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termined would compensate for past delay and prevent fu-
ture recalcitrance, while not unduly burdening the interests 
of white troopers. 28 
It would have been improper for the District Judge to ig-
nore the effects of the Department's delay and its continued 
default of its obligation to develop a promotion procedure, 
and to require only that, commencing in 1984, the Depart-
ment promote one black for every three whites promoted. 
The figure selected to compensate for past discrimination and 
delay necessarily involved a delicate calibration of the rights 
and interests of the plaintiff class, the Department, and the 
white troopers. The Government concedes that a one-to-
three requirement would have been lawful, Tr. of Oral Arg. 
43; the District Court determined that more stringent meas-
ures were necessary. This Court should not second-guess 
the lower court's carefully considered choice of the figure 
necessary to achieve its many purposes, especially when that 
figure is hedged about with specific qualifying measures de-
. signed to prevent any unfair impact that might arise from 
rigid application. 
D 
The one-for-one requirement did not impose an unaccept-
able burden on innocent third parties. As stated above, the 
temporary and extremely limited nature of the requirement 
substantially limits any potential burden on white applicants 
28 We have previously recognized the importance of expediting elimina-
tion of the vestiges of longstanding discrimination. In U. S . v. Montgom-
ery County Bd. of Education, 395 U. S. 225 (1969), we upheld a District 
Court's imposition of black-to-white faculty quota against modifications 
made by the Court of Appeals , saying that the District Court order 
"was adopted in the spirit of this Court's opinion in Green .. . in that his 
plan 'promises realistically to work, and promises realistically to work 
now.' The modifications ordered by the panel of the Court of Appeals, 
while of course not intended to do so, would, we think, take from the order 
some of its capacity to expedite, by means of specific commands, the day 
when a completely unified, unitary, nondiscriminatory school system be-
comes a reality instead of a hope .. . . " Id., at 235- 236. 
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for promotion. It was used only once at the rank of corporal 
and may not be utilized at all in the upper ranks. Nor has 
the court imposed an "absolute bar" to white advancement. 
Sheet Metal Workers, supra, at--. In the one instance in 
which the quota was employed, 50% of those elevated were 
white. At most, the order briefly postponed the promotion 
of certain white troopers to the rank of corporal. 29 "Denial of 
a future employment opportunity is not as intrusive as loss of 
an existing job," Wygant, supra, at-- (opinion of POWELL, 
J.), and plainly postponement imposes a lesser burden still. 
Any burden on nonminority expectations must be evalu-
ated in light of the Department's past discriminatory con-
duct, its use of promotion procedures that had an adverse im-
pact on black employees, and the altered expectations 
created by the 1972 order and the 1979 and 1981 Decrees. 
"[W]here an employer has violated an anti-discrimination 
law, the expectations of non-minority workers are them-
selves products of discrimination and hence 'tainted' and 
therefore more easily upset." Bakke, 438 U. S., at 365 
(opinion of BRENNAN, J.). Cf. Fullilove, supra, at 484-485 
(opinion of Burger, C. J.) ("some nonminority business may 
have reaped competitive benefit over the years from the vir-
tual exclusion of minority firms from these contracting oppor-
tunities"). It is manifest that white promotion candidates 
derived competitive benefit from the Department's pre- and 
post-1972 discriminatory practices. Although enjoined from 
using promotion procedures with discriminatory impact as of 
1972, the Department had not implemented an acceptable 
29 The one-for-one requirement does not require the layoff and discharge 
of white employees and therefore does not impose burdens of the sort that 
concerned the plurality in Wygant, 476 U. S., at- (opinion of POWELL, 
J.) ("layoffs impose the entire burden of achieving racial equality on par-
ticular individuals, often resulting in serious disruption of their lives"). 
Because the one-for-one requirement is so limited in scope and duration, it 
only postpones the promotions of affected whites. Consequently, like a 
hiring goal, it "impose[s] a diffuse burden, ... foreclosing only one of sev-
eral opportunities." Wygant, supra, at-. 
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procedure by January 1984; throughout the intervening years 
the Department had continued to utilize a procedure with ad-
verse impact, virtually ensuring that white troopers would 
not have to compete with black candidates. As the Court of 
Appeals determined, "it cannot be gainsaid that white troop-
ers promoted since 1972 were the specific beneficiaries of an 
official policy which systematically excluded all blacks." 
Paradise v. Prescott, 767 F. 2d, at 1533 n. 16 (emphasis 
added). 
We are not persuaded by the intervenors' claim that they 
are entitled to promotion due to their higher eligibility rank-
ing on the Department's test. As the Court of Appeals ex-
plained in 1974: · 
"[N]o applicant for public employment can base any 
claim of right under the Fourteenth Amendment's equal 
protection or due process clauses upon an eligibility 
ranking which results from unvalidated selection proce-
dures that have been shown to disqualify blacks at a dis-
proportionate rate. This is so because by definition 
such criteria have not been shown to be predictive of suc-
cessful job performance. Hence there is no reliable way 
to know that any accepted applicant is truly better quali-
fied than others who have been rejected." I d., at 618. 30 
The court order in 1972 put the Department and all troop-
ers on notice that promotion procedures without an adverse 
impact on minorities were required; the 1979 Decree put the 
Department on record as committed to the implementation of 
such procedures by 1980. It is these orders that created le-
gitimate expectations about promotions; after their entry, 
30 In the promotion procedure proposed by the Department in 1981, se-
niority counted as 10% of the candidate's score. App. 56. But, under the 
point system established, differences in seniority among candidates could 
affect scores by no more than 3%. !d., at 50-51. Greater seniority did 
not, therefore , by itself create an expectation of promotion. Moreover, 
the greater seniority of white candidates itself is a result of the Depart-
ment's prior discrimination against blacks. 
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there could be no claim of any interest in a promotion 
awarded by a procedure with an adverse impact. It was a 
matter of public knowledge that such procedures were unlaw-
ful. Accordingly, the one-for-one promotion requirement 
imposed in this case does not disproportionately harm the in-
terests, or unnecessarily trammel the rights, of innocent 
individuals. 
E 
In determining whether this order was "narrowly tai-
lored," we must acknowledge the respect owed a District 
Judge's judgment that specified relief is essential to cure a 
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. A district court 
has "not merely the power but the duty to render a decree 
which will so far as possible eliminate the discriminatory ef-
fects of the past as well as bar like discrimination in the fu-
ture." Louisiana v. United States, 380 U. S. 145, 154 
(1965). "[O]nce a right and a violation have been shown, the 
scope of a district court's power to remedy past wrongs is 
broad, for breadth and flexibility are inherent in equitable 
remedies." Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educa-
tion, 402 U. S. 1, 15 (1971). 
Nor have we "required remedial plans to be limited to the 
least restrictive means of implementation. We have recog-
nized that the choice of remedies to redress racial discrimina-
tion is 'a balancing process left, within appropriate constitu-
tional and statutory limits, to the sound discretion of the trial 
court."' Fullilove, supra, at 508 (POWELL, J., concurring) 
(quoting Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., 424 U. S., 
at 794 (POWELL, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part)). Cf. Green v. County School Bd. of New Kent 
County, 391 U. S., at 439 ("The obligation of the district 
courts, as it always has been, is to assess the effectiveness of 
a proposed plan in achieving desegregation. There is no uni-
versal answer to the complex problems of desegregation; 
there is obviously no one plan that will do the job in every 
85-999-0PINION 
UNITED STATES v. PARADISE 33 
case. The matter must be assessed in light of the circum-
stances present and the options available in each instance"). 
The district court has first-hand experience with the par-
ties and is best qualified to deal with the "flinty, intractable 
realities of day-to-day implementation of constitutional com-
mands." Swann, supra, at 6. In this case, as in Sheet 
Metal Workers, "th[e] court having had the parties before it 
over a period of time, was in the best position to judge 
whether an alternative remedy, such as a simple injunction, 
would have been effective in ending [the] discriminatory 
practices." I d., at-- (POWELL, J., concurring). The Dis-
trict Judge determined that the record demonstrated that 
"without promotional quotas the continuing effects of [the 
Department's] discrimination cannot be eliminated." Para-
dise v. Prescott, 585 F. Supp., at 76. His proximate position 
and broad equitable powers mandate substantial respect for 
this judgment. 
Plainly the District Court's discretion in remedying the 
deeply-rooted Fourteenth Amendment violations here was 
limited by the rights and interests of the white troopers seek-
ing promotion to corporal. But we conclude that the District 
Judge properly balanced the individual and collective inter-
ests at stake, including the interests of the white troopers eli-
gible for promotion, in shaping this remedy. See Swann, 
supra, at 16 ("The task is to correct, by a balancing of the 
individual and collective interests, the condition that offends 
the Constitution"). While a remedy must be narrowly tai-
lored, that requirement does not operate to remove all dis-
cretion from the District Court in its construction of a reme-
dial decree. 31 
31 See also Fullilove, 448 U. S. , at 527 (Stewart, J ., dissenting) (con-
trasting legislative branch with court of equity and suggesting that the lat-
ter has the "dispassionate objectivity" and the "flexibility" necessary "to 
mold a race-conscious remedy around the single objective of eliminating 
the effects of past or present discrimination"); International Salt Co. v. 
United States, 332 U. S. 392, 400 (1947) (Jackson, J.) ("The framing of de-
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IV 
The remedy imposed here is an effective, temporary and 
flexible measure. It applies only if qualified blacks are avail-
able, only if the Department has an objective need to make 
promotions, and only if the Department fails to implement a 
promotion procedure that does not have an adverse impact on 
blacks. The one-for-one requirement is the product of the 
considered judgment of the District Court which, with its 
knowledge of the parties and their resources, properly deter-
mined that strong measures were required in light of the De-
partment's long and shameful record of delay and resistance. 
The race-conscious relief.imposed here was amply justified, 
and narrowly tailored to serve the legitimate and laudable 
purposes of the District Court. The judgment of the Court 
of Appeals, upholding the order of the District Court, is 
Affirmed. 
crees should take place in the District rather than in the Appellate Court. 
They are invested with large discretion to model their judgments to the 
exigencies of the particular case") (citations and footnote omitted). 
To: The Chief Justice 
Justice White '-( 1__ (J 
Justice Marshall (/v T. . 
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DISE, JR., ET AL. 
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APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT 
[December -, 1986] 
JUSTICE BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court. 
The question we must decide is whether relief awarded in 
this case, in the form of a one-black-for-one-white promotion 
requirement to be applied as an interim measure to state 
trooper promotions in the Alabama Department of Public 
Safety (Department), is permissible under the Equal Protec-
tion guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
In 1972 the United States District Court for the Middle 
District of Alabama held that the Department had systemati-
cally excluded blacks from employment in violation of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. Some 11 years later, confronted 
with the Department's failure to develop promotion proce-
. dures that did not have an adverse impact on blacks, the Dis-
trict Court ordered the promotion of one black trooper for 
each white trooper elevated in rank, as long as qualified black 
candidates were available, until the Department imple-
mented an acceptable promotion procedure. The United 
States challenges the constitutionality of this order. 1 
' The Department and its director, Colonel Byron Prescott, and the in-
tervenors, a class of white applicants for promotion within the Depart-
ment, have filed briefs in support of the United States, but they did not 
themselves petition for certiorari. 
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I 
Because the Department's prior employment practices and 
conduct during this lawsuit bear directly on the constitution-
ality of any race-conscious remedy imposed upon it, we must 
relate the tortuous course of this litigation in some detail. 
A 
In 1972 the National Association for the Advancement of 
Colored People (NAACP) brought this action challenging the 
Department's long-standing practice of excluding blacks from 
employment. The United States was joined as a party plain-
tiff, and Phillip Paradise, Jr., intervened on behalf of a class 
of black plaintiffs. District Judge Frank M. Johnson, Jr., 
determined that: 
"Plaintiffs have shown without contradiction that the 
defendants have engaged in a blatant and continuous 
pattern and practice of discrimination in hiring in the Al-
abama Department of Public Safety, both as to troopers 
and supporting personnel. In the thirty-seven year his-
tory of the patrol there has never been a black trooper 
and the only Negroes ever employed by the department 
have been nonmerit system laborers. This unexplained 
and unexplainable discriminatory conduct by state offi-
cials is unquestionably a violation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment." NAACP v. Allen, 340 F. Supp. 703, 705 
(MD Ala. 1972). 
He concluded: 
"Under such circumstances ... the courts have the 
authority and the duty not only to order an end to dis-
criminatory practices, but also to correct and eliminate 
the present effects of past discrimination. The racial 
discrimination in this instance has so permeated the De-
partment['s] employment policies that both mandatory 
and prohibitory injunctive relief are necessary to end 
these discriminatory practices and to make some sub-
85-999-0PINION 
UNITED STATES v. PARADISE 3 
stantial progress toward eliminating their effects." I d., 
at 705-706 (citations omitted). 
As a result, the court issued an order (1972 order), enjoin-
ing the Department to hire one black trooper for each white 
trooper hired until blacks constituted approximately 25% of 
the state trooper force. 2 Judge Johnson also enjoined the 
Department from "engaging in any employment practices, in-
cluding recruitment, examination, appointment, training, 
promotion, retention or any other personnel action, for the 
purpose or with the effect of discriminating against any em-
ployee, or actual or potential applicant for employment, on 
the ground of race or color." Id., at 706 (emphasis added). 
The court further required that "eligible and promotional 
registers heretofore used for the purpose of hiring troopers 
be and they are hereby abrogated to the extent necessary to 
comply with this decree." /d., at 707. 3 
The defendants appealed, 4 but the Fifth Circuit upheld the 
hiring requirement: 
2 In United States v. Frazer, 317 F. Supp. 1079 (MD Ala. 1970), Judge 
Johnson found that certain state agencies, including the Personnel Depart-
ment, which supplies support staff to the Department, were engaged in 
systematic violations of the constitutional rights of black applicants and 
employees. In NAACP v. Allen, 340 F. Supp. 703 (MD Ala. 1972), the 
decree in United States v. Frazer was amended to require the Personnel 
Department to ensure that, until blacks constituted 25% of the Depart-
ment's support personnel, 50% of the individuals hired for those positions 
were black. 340 F. Supp., at 706. 
3 The court awarded attorney's fees to the plaintiffs. Judge Johnson 
found that the defendants "unquestionably knew and understood that their 
discriminatory practices violated the Fourteenth Amt;ndment" and that, as 
a consequence, "their defense of th[e] lawsuit amount[ed] to unreasonable 
and obdurate conduct which necessitated the expense of litigation." I d., 
· at 708. 
'While the appeal was pending, the Court of Appeals ordered the Dis-
trict Judge to supplement the record and to reconsider his decree. After 
discovery, Judge Johnson decided not to alter his order. He explicitly 
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"The use of quota relief in employment discrimination 
cases is bottomed on the chancellor's duty to eradicate 
the continuing effects of past unlawful practices. By 
mandating the hiring of those who have been the object 
of discrimination, quota relief promptly operates to 
change the outward and visible signs of yesterday's ra-
cial distinctions and thus, to provide an impetus to the 
process of dismantling the barriers, psychological or oth-
erwise, erected by past practices. It is a temporary 
remedy that seeks to spend itself as promptly as it can 
by creating a climate in which objective, neutral employ-
ment criteria can successfully operate to select public 
employees solely on the basis of job-related merit." 
NAACP v. Allen, 493 F. 2d 614, 621 (1974). 
The Court of Appeals also held that white applicants who 
had higher eligibility rankings than blacks were not denied 
due process or equal protection of the laws by the one-for-one 
hiring order. The Department's use ofunvalidated selection 
procedures that disproportionately excluded blacks pre-
cluded any argument that "quota hiring produces unconstitu-
tional 'reverse' discrimination, or a lowering of employment 
standards, or the appointment of less or unqualified persons." 
ld., at 618. 5 
in United States v. Frazer, supra, and the hiring order in NAACP v. 
Allen, supra: 
"The contrast in results achieved to this point in the Allen case and the 
Frazer case under the two orders entered in those cases is striking indeed. 
Even though the agencies affected by the Frazer order and the Depart-
ment of Public Safety draw upon the same pool of black applicants-that is, 
those who have been processed through the Department of Personnel-Al-
len has seen substantial black hiring, while the progress under Frazer has 
been slow and, in many instances, nonexistent .... 
"[T]his Court's experience reflects that the decrees that are entered 
must contain hiring· goals; otherwise effective relief will not be achieved." 
United States v. Dothard, 373 F. Supp. 504, 506-507 (MD Ala.), aff'd sub 
nom. NAACP v. Allen, 493 F. 2d 614 (CA5 1974). 
& None of the parties sought certiorari review of the Court of Appeals' 
determination that the 50% hiring quota at issue was constitutional. 
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In 1974, only shortly after the Court of Appeals' decision, 
the plaintiffs found it necessary to seek further relief from 
the District Court. Judge Johnson found that "defendants 
have, for the purpose of frustrating or delaying full relief to 
the plaintiff class, artificially restricted the size of the trooper 
force and the number of new troopers hired." Paradise v. 
Dothard, Civ. Action No. 3561-N (MD Ala., Aug. 5, 1975). 
The court also addressed the disproportionate failure of 
blacks hired to achieve permanent trooper status: 6 
"[T]he high attrition rate among blacks resulted from the 
selection of other than the best qualified blacks from the 
eligibility rosters, some social and official discrimination 
against blacks at the trooper training academy, pref-
erential treatment of whites in some aspects of training 
and testing, and discipline of blacks harsher than that 
given whites for similar misconduct while on the force." 
Ibid. 
The court reaffirmed the 1972 hiring order, enjoining any fur-
ther attempts by the Department to delay or frustrate 
compliance. 
B 
In September 1977 the plaintiffs again had to return to the 
District Court for supplemental relief, this time specifically 
on the question of the Department's promotion practices. 
Following extensive discovery, the parties entered into a 
Partial Consent Decree (1979 Decree), approved by the court 
in February 1979. 7 In this decree, the Department agreed 
to develop within one year a promotion procedure that would 
be fair to all applicants and have "little or no adverse impact 
6 At this time, 40 blacks had been hired as a result of the 1972 District 
Court order; only 27 remained on the force. All29 whites hired during the 
· same period had retained their positions. Paradise v. Dothard, Civ. Ac-
tion No. 3561-N (MD Ala., Aug. 5, 1975). 
7 Judge Johnson presided in this litigation until he assumed his position ! 
Df'l ~the former Fifth Circuit in 1979. At that time, the case was transferred 
to District Judge Varner; subsequentlJ it was reassigned to Judge Myron 
Thompson in October 1980. D( 
.. 
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upon blacks seeking promotion to corporal." App. 40. In 
the decree, the Department also agreed that the promotion 
procedure would conform with the 1978 Uniform Guidelines 
on Employee Selection Procedures, 28 CFR § 50.14 (1978). 8 
Once such a procedure was in place for the rank of corporal, 
the decree required the defendants to develop similar proce-
dures for the other upper ranks-sergeant, lieutenant, cap-
tain, and major. The decree expressly provided that the 
plaintiffs might apply to the court for enforcement of its 
terms or for other appropriate relief. App. 41. 9 
Five days after approval of the 1979 Decree, the defend-
ants sought clarification of the 1972 hiring order. The De-
partment maintained that its goal-a 25% black trooper 
force-applied only to officers in entry-level positions and not 
to the upper ranks. The court responded: 
"On this point, there is no ambiguity. The Court's 
[1972] order required that one-to-one hiring be carried 
out until approximately twenty-five percent of the state 
trooper force is black. It is perfectly clear that the 
order did not distinguish among troopers by rank." 
Paradise v. Shoemaker, 470 F. Supp. 439, 440 (MD Ala. 
1979) (emphasis in original). 
The Department also argued that because the 25% objec-
tive could not be achieved unless 37.5% of entry-level posi-
tions were held by blacks, "more qualified white applicants" 
were passed over than was constitutionally permissible. 
I d., at 441. The District Court rejected the argument, 
stating: 
8 The Uniform Guidelines are "designed to provide a framework for 
determining the proper use of tests and other [employee] selection proce-
. dures consistent with Federal law." 28 CFR § 50.14, pt. 1, § 1 (1978). 
• In the interim the parties agreed to utilize the existing state merit sys-
tem for promotions to the rank of corporal, provided that at least three 
black troopers were promoted. The details of this procedure were set 
forth in an "Agreement of Counsel for the Parties." App. 46. 
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"To modify this order would be to do less than the law 
requires, which is to eradicate the continuing effects of 
·past unlawful practices. In 1972, defendants were not 
just found guilty of discriminating against blacks in hir-
ing to entry-level positions. The Court found that in 
thirty-seven years there had never been a black trooper 
at any rank. One continuing effect of that discrimina-
tion is that, as of November 1, 1978, out of 232 state 
troopers at the rank of corporal or above, there is still 
not one black. The [hiring] quota fashio!led py the 
Court provides an impetus to promote blacks into those 
positions. To focus only on the entry-level positions 
would be to ignore that past discrimination by the De-
partment was pervasive, that its effects persist, and that 
they are manifest. . . . The order in this case is but the 
necessary remedy for an intolerable wrong." Id., at 442 
(emphasis added). 
In April 1981, more than a year after the deadline set in 
the 1979 Decree, the Department proposed a selection proce-
dure for promotion to corporal and sought approval from the 
District Court. The United States and the plaintiff class 
both objected to implementation of the procedure, arguing 
that it had not been validated and that its use would be im-
permissible if it had an adverse impact on blacks. To resolve 
this dispute the parties executed a second consent decree 
(1981 Decree) which the District Court approved on August 
18, 1981. 
In the 1981 Decree, the Department reaffirmed its commit-
ment made in 1979 to implement a promotion procedure with 
little or no adverse impact on blacks. The parties then 
agreed to the administration of the proposed promotion pro-
cedure and that its results would be "reviewed to determine 
· whether the selection procedure has an adverse impact 
against black applicants." App. 51. Whether there was ad-
verse impact was to be determined by reference to the "four-
fifths" rule of § 4 of the Uniform Guidelines. See 28 CFR 
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§ 50.14 (1978). 10 If the parties proved unable to agree on a 
procedure, its determination would be submitted to the Dis-
trict Court. No promotions would occur until the "parties 
. . . agreed in writing or the Court . . . ruled upon the 
method to be used for making promotions with little or no ad-
verse impact." App. 53. 
The defendants administered the test to 262 applicants of 
whom 60 (23%) were black. Of the 60 blacks who took the 
test, only 5 (8.3%) were listed in the top half of the promotion 
register; the highest ranked black candidate was number 80. 
ld., at 119. In response to an inquiry from the United 
States, the Department indicated that there was an immedi-
ate need to make between 8 and 10 promotions to corporal 
and announced its intention to elevate between 16 and 20 in-
dividuals before construction of a new list. 1 Record 222. 
The United States objected to any rank-ordered use of the 
list, stating that such use "would result in substantial ad-
verse impact against black applicants" and suggested that the 
defendants submit an alternative proposal that would comply 
with the requirements of the 1979 and 1981 decrees. /d. , at 
220-221. No proposal was submitted, and no promotions 
were made during the next nine months. 
In April 1983, plaintiffs returned to District Court and 
sought an order enforcing the terms of the two consent de-
crees. Specifically, they requested that defendants be re-
quired to promote blacks to corporal "at the same rate at 
which they have been hired, 1 for 1, until such time as the 
defendants implement a valid promotional procedure." I d., 
at 112. The plaintiff class contended that such an order 
would "encourage defendants to develop a valid promotional 
10 According to § 4 of the Uniform Guidelines, "[a] selection rate for any 
· racial, ethnic or sex group which is less than four-fifths (4/5) (or eighty per-
cent) of the rate for the group with the highest rate will generally be re-
garded as evidence of adverse impact." 28 CFR § 50.14, pt. 1, § 4 (1978). 
In other words, if 60% of the white troopers who take a promotion test pass 
it, then 48% of the black troopers to whom it is administered must pass. 
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procedure as soon as possible," and would "help to alleviate 
the gross underrepresentation of blacks in the supervisory 
ranks of the Department" 11-an underrepresentation caused 
by the Department's past discrimination and exacerbated by 
its continuing refusal to implement a fair procedure. Ibid. 
Although it opposed the one-for-one promotion require-
ment, the United States agreed that the consent decrees 
should be enforced. It stated that defendants had failed to 
offer "any reason[s] why promotions should not be made," 
nor had they offered an explanation as to why they had halted 
"progress towards remedying the effects of past discrimina-
tion." !d., at 199-201. The United States further observed 
that the Department's failure to produce a promotion plan in 
compliance with the 1979 and 1981 decrees "suggests that a 
pattern of discrimination against blacks in the Department 
... may be continuing." Id., at 200. 12 
After the motion to enforce was filed, four white applicants 
for promotion to corporal sought to intervene on behalf of a 
class composed of those white applicants who took the pro-
posed corporal's examination and ranked #1 through #79. 
App. 81-87. They argued that the 1979 and 1981 Decrees 
and the relief proposed by the plaintiffs in their motion to en-
force were "unreasonable, illegal, unconstitutional or against 
public policy." Id., at 99. 
In an order entered October 28, 1983, the District Court 
held that the Department's selection procedure had an ad-
verse impact on blacks. Paradise v. Prescott, 580 F. Supp. 
11 In fact, the only black candidates who had been promoted since 1972 
were the four promoted pursuant to the counsels' sidebar to the 1979 De-
cree. See n. 8, supra. 
12 The Department opposed the motion to enforce, arguing that the relief 
sought by the plaintiffs was unconstitutional. The Department requested 
an opportunity to demonstrate that the proposed procedure was valid and 
that it did not adversely impact upon black candidates within the meaning 
of the consent decrees and the Uniform Guidelines. 
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171, 174 (MD Ala.). 13 Observing that even if 79 corporals 
were promoted in rank order, rather than the 15 contem-
plated, none would be black, the court concluded that "[s]hort 
of outright exclusion based on race, it is hard to conceive of a 
selection procedure which would have a greater discrimina-
tory impact." I d., at 173. 14 The Department was ordered 
to submit, by November 10, 1983, "a plan to promote to cor-
poral, from qualified candidates, at least 15 persons in a man-
ner that will not have an adverse racial impact." I d., at 175. 
The Department subsequently submitted a proposal to pro-
mote 15 persons to the rank of corporal, of whom four would 
be black. In addition, the Department requested that the 
Department of Personnel be given more time to develop and 
submit for court approval a nondiscriminatory promotion 
procedure. 
The United St~tes did not oppose the Department's pro-
posal, but plaintiffs did. They argued that the proposal "to-
tally disregards the injury plaintiffs have suffered due to the 
defendants' four-and-a-half year delay [since the 1979 De-
cree.] and fails to provide any mechanism that will insure the 
present scenario will not reoccur." 2 Record 382. 
On December 15, 1983, the District Court granted plain-
tiffs' motion to enforce the 1979 and 1981 Decrees. Paradise 
v. Prescott, 585 F. Supp. 72 (MD Ala.). Confronted with the 
Department's immediate need to promote 15 troopers to cor-
poral and the parties' inability to agree, the court was re-
quired by the 1979 and 1981 Decrees to fashion a promotion 
procedure. The District Judge summarized the situation: 
13 In a separate order issued that same day, the District Court permitted 
the white intervenors to participate in the case on a prospective basis only. 
The court held that intervention was untimely as to prior orders, judg-
ments, and decrees. App. 116. 
14 The District Co\lrt also rejected the Department's argument that the 
one-for-one hiring order was a "special program" within the meaning of the 
Uniform Guidelines that would insulate the Department from any finding 
of adverse impact in its promotion procedures. Paradise v. Prescott, 580 
F. Supp. 171, 174 (MD Ala. 1983). 
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"On February 10, 1984, less than two months from 
today, twelve years will have passed since this court con-
demned the racially discriminatory policies and practices 
of the Alabama Department of Public Safety. Never-
theless, the effects of these policies and practices remain 
pervasive and conspicuous at all ranks above the entry-
level position. Of the 6 majors, there is still not one 
black. Of the 25 captains, there is still not one black. 
Of the 35 lieutenants, there is still not one black. Of the 
65 sergeants, there is still not one black. Of the 66 cor-
porals, only four are black. Thus, the department still 
operates an upper rank structure in which almost every 
trooper obtained his position through procedures that to-
tally excluded black persons. Moreover, the depart-
ment is still without acceptable procedures for advance-
ment of black troopers into this structure, and it does not 
appear that any procedures will be in place within the 
near future. The preceding scenario is intolerable and 
must not continue. The time has now arrived for the 
department to take affirmative and substantial steps to 
open the upper ranks to black troopers." /d., at 74 (em-
phasis in original). 
The court then fashioned the relief at issue here. It held 
that "for a period of time," at least 50% of the promotions to 
corporal must be awarded to black troopers, if qualified black 
candidates were available. The court also held that "if there 
is to be within the near future an orderly path for black 
troopers to enter the upper ranks, any relief fashioned by the 
court must address the department's delay in developing ac-
ceptable promotion procedures for all ranks." I d., at 75. 
Thus, the court imposed a 50% promotional quota in the 
. upper ranks, but only if there were qualified black candi-
dates, if the rarik were less than 25% black, and if the De-
partment had not developed and implemented a promotion 
plan without adverse impact for the relevant rank. The 
court concluded that the effects of past discrimination in the 
85-999-0PINION 
12 UNITED STATES v. PARADISE 
Department "will not wither away of their own accord" and 
that "without promotional quotas the continuing effects of 
this discrimination cannot be eliminated." I d., at 75 and 76. 
The court highlighted the temporary nature and flexible de-
sign of the relief ordered, stating that it was "specifically tai-
lored" to eliminate the lingering effects of past discrimina-
tion, to remedy the delayed compliance with the consent 
decrees, and to ensure prompt implementation of lawful pro-
cedures. Ibid . 
Finally, the Department was ordered to submit within 30 
days a schedule for the development of promotion procedures 
for all ranks above the entry-level. The schedule was to be 
"based upon realistic expectations" as the court intended that 
"the use of the quotas . . . be a one-time occurrence." Ibid. 
The District Court reasoned that, under the order it had en-
tered, the Department had "the prerogative to end the pro-
motional quotas at any time, simply by developing acceptable 
promotion procedures." I d., at 76. 
Numerous motions for reconsideration of the court's order 
and for the alteration or amendment of the court's judgment 
were denied by the District Court. In its motion, the De-
partment set forth the "new contention" that it was "without 
legal authority and sufficiently trained personnel to design 
any promotional procedures" because "this function is allo-
cated by statute to the Department of Personnel." Paradise 
v. Prescott, Civ. Action No. 3561-N (MD Ala., Jan. 13, 
1984). The District Court responded that the Department 
had signed consent decrees in 1979 and 1981 mandating 
development of an acceptable procedure and that Depart-
ment counsel had represented at the January 5, 1984, hearing 
that "it was anticipated that the development of these proce-
dures would take only a few months." Ibid. The judge 
concluded: 
"It is now years later and this court will not entertain the 
excuse that the department is now without legal author-
ity to meet its obligations under the consent de-
: 
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crees. . . . [T]he Department of Personnel, which is 
also a party to these proceedings, assured the court at 
the January 5, [1984] hearing that it would work closely 
with the Public Safety Department to develop acceptable 
promotion procedures. The Public Safety Department's 
contention that it is without legal authority is not only 
meritless, it is frivolous. 
"Moreover, that the Department of Public Safety 
would even advance this argument dramatically demon-
strates the need for the relief imposed by this court. 
Such frivolous arguments serve no purpose other than to 
prolong the discriminatory effects of the department's 
37-year history of racial discrimination." Ibid. (em-
phasis added). 
In February 1984, the Department promoted eight blacks 
and eight whites to corporal pursuant to the District Court's 
order enforcing the consent decrees. 
Four months later, the Department submitted for the 
court's approval its proposed procedure for promotions to the 
rank of corporal. The District Court ruled that the Depart-
ment could promote up to 13 troopers utilizing this procedure 
and suspended application of the one-for-one requirement for 
that purpose. App. 163-164. In October 1984, following 
approval of the Department's new selection procedure for 
promotion to sergeant, the court similarly suspended applica-
tion of the quota at that rank. I d., at 176-177. 15 
On appeal the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit 
affirmed the District Court's order. The Court of Appeals 
concluded that the relief at issue was designed to remedy the 
present effects ofpast discrimination-"effects which, as the 
history of this case amply demonstrates, 'will not wither 
. away of their own accord."' Paradise v. Prescott, 767 F. 2d 
15 In addition, the Department has been permitted to promote only white 
troopers to lieutenant and captain because no blacks have qualified, as of 
yet, for promotion to those ranks. Paradise v. Prescott, 767 F . 2d 1514, 
1538, n. 19 (CAll 1985). 
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1514, 1533 (1985) (quoting 585 F. Supp., at 75). In addition, 
the relief awarded was deemed to "exten[d] no further than 
necessary to accomplish the objective of remedying the 'egre-
gious' and long-standing racial imbalances in the upper ranks 
of the Department." 767 F. 2d, at 1532-1533. 
We granted certiorari. 478 U. S. -- (1986). We 
affirm. 
II 
The United States maintains that the race-conscious relief 
ordered in this case violates the Equal Protection Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United 
States.'6 
It is now well established that government bodies, includ-
ing courts, may constitutionally employ racial classifications 
essential to remedy unlawful treatment of racial or ethnic \ 
groups subject to discrimination. See Sheet Metal Workers 
v. EEOC, 478 U. S. -- , -- (1986), and cases cited 
therein. See also Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education, 
476 U. S. --,-- (1986) ("The Court is in agreement that 
. . . remedying past or present racial discrimination . . . is a 
sufficiently weighty state interest to warrant the remedial 
use of a carefully constructed affirmative action program") 
(O'CONNOR, J., concurring in part and concurring in judg-
ment). But although this Court has consistently held that 
some elevated level of scrutiny is required when a racial or 
ethnic distinction is made for remedial purposes, it has yet to 
16 The Government framed the issue presented as "[ w ]hether the one-
black-for-one-white promotion quota adopted by the district court . .. is 
permissible under the equal protection guarantees of the Fourteenth and 
· Fifth Amendments .to the United States Constitution." Brief for United 
States I. Because the reach of the equal protection guarantee of the Fifth 
Amendment is co-extensive with that of the Fourteenth, we need not de-
cide whether the race-conscious relief ordered in this case would violate the 
former as well as the latter constitutional provision. 
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reach consensus on the appropriate constitutional analysis. 17 
We need not do so in this case, however, because we conclude 
that the relief ordered in this case survives even strict scru-
tiny analysis: it is "narrowly tailored" to serve a "compelling 
governmental purpose." /d., at-- (opinion of POWELL, 
J.). 
The government unquestionably has a compelling interest 
in remedying past and present discrimination by a state ac-
tor. See Wygant, 476 U. S., at-- (opinion of POWELL, 
J.); id., at -- (O'CONNOR, J., concurring); Sheet Metal 
Workers, supra, at-- (opinion of BRENNAN, J.). See also 
Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., 424 U. S. 747, 763 
(1976) (prevention and remedying of racial discrimination and 
its effects is a national policy of "highest priority"). In 1972 
the District Court found, and the Court of Appeals affirmed, 
that for almost four decades the Department had excluded 
blacks from all positions, including jobs in the upper ranks. 
Such egregious discriminatory conduct was "unquestionably 
a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment." NAACP v. Al-
len, 340 F. Supp., at 705. As the United States concedes, 
Brief for United States 21, the pervasive, systematic, and ob-
stinate discriminatory conduct of the Department created a 
profound need and a firm justification for the race-conscious 
17 See Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education, 476 U.S.-,-
(1986) (opinion of PowELL, J.) (the means chosen must be "narrowly tai-
lored" to achieve a "compelling government interest"); id., at- (O'CoN-
NOR, J., concurring) (same); id., at- (MARSHALL, J., dissenting, joined 
by BRENNAN, J. and BLACKMUN, J.) (remedial use of race permissible if it 
serves "'important governmental objectives'" and is "'substantially re-
lated to achievement of those objectives'") (quoting University of Califor-
nia Regents v. Bakke, 438 U. S. 265, 359 (1978)); 476 U. S., at- (STE-
. YENS, J., dissenting) (both public interest served by racial classification 
and means employed must justify adverse effects on the disadvantaged 
group); Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U. S. 448, 507 (1980) (POWELL, J., con-
curring) (expressing concern first articulated in Bakke, supra, at 362, that 
review not be "'strict' in theory and fatal in fact"). 
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relief ordered by the District Court. 18 
The Department and the intervenors, however, maintain 
that the Department was found guilty only of discrimination 
in hiring, and not in its promotional practices. They argue 
that no remedial relief is justified in the promotion context 
because the intentional discrimination in hiring was without 
effect in the upper ranks, and because the Department's pro-
motional procedure was not discriminatory. There is no 
merit in either premise. 
Discrimination at the entry-level necessarily precluded 
blacks from competing for promotions, and resulted in a de-
partmental hierarchy dominated exclusively by nonminor-
ities. The lower courts determined that this situation was 
explicable only by reference to the Department's past dis-
'
8 Amici, the City of Binningham, the City of Detroit, the City of Los 
Angeles, and the District of Columbia, state that the operations of police 
departments are crippled by the lingering effects of past discrimination. 
They believe that race-conscious relief in hiring and promotion restores 
community trust in the fairness of law enforcement and facilitates effective 
police service by encouraging citizen cooperation. See also Wygant , 
supra, at-- (STEVENS, J., dissenting) ("[I]n a city with a recent history 
of racial unrest, the superintendent of police might reasonably conclude 
that an integrated police force could develop a better relationship with the 
community and do a more effective job of maintaining law and order than a 
force composed only of white officers"); NAACP v. Allen, 493 F. 2d, at 621 
("This is a police department and the visibility of the Black patrolman in 
the community is a decided advantage for all segments of the public at a 
time when racial divisiveness is plaguing law enforcement" (citation omit-
ted)). Amicus NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., sug-
gests that the governmental interest in a racially integrated Department is 
amplified here due to community perceptions of, and reactions to the De-
partment's historical role in defense of segregation and its active opposition 
to the civil rights movement. We need not decide if either the generalized 
governmental interest in effective law enforcement or the more particular-
. ized need to overcome any impediments to law enforcement created by per-
ceptions arising froin the egregious discriminatory conduct of the Depart-
ment is compelling. In this case the judicial detenninations of prior 
discriminatory policies and conduct satisfy the first prong of the strict scru-
tiny test. 
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criminatory conduct. 19 In 1972 the Department was "not 
just found guilty of discriminating against blacks in hiring to 
entry-level positions. The Court found that in thirty-seven 
years there had never been a black trooper at any rank." 
Paradise v. Shoemaker, 470 F. Supp., at 442. In 1979 the 
District Judge stated that one continuing effect of the De-
partment's historical discrimination was that, "as of N ovem-
ber 1, 1978, out of 232 state troopers at the rank of corporal 
or above, there is still not one black." Ibid. The court ex-
plained that the hiring quota it had fashioned was intended to 
provide "an impetus to promote blacks into those positions" 
and that "[t]o focus only on the entry-level positions would be 
to ignore that past discrimination by the Department was 
pervasive, that its effects persist, and that they are mani-
fest." Ibid. The District Court crafted the relief it did due 
to "the department's failure after almost twelve years to 
eradicate the continuing effects of its own discrimination." 
585 F. Supp., at 75, n. 1. It is too late for the Department to 
attempt to segregate the results achieved by its hiring prac-
tices and those achieved by its promotional practices. 
The argument that the Department's promotion procedure 
was not discriminatory is belied by the record. In 1979, 
faced with additional allegations of discrimination, the De-
partment agreed to adopt promotion procedures without an 
adverse impact on black candidates within one year. See 
767 F. 2d, at 1532. By 1983 the Department had promoted 
only four blacks, and these promotions had been made pursu-
ant to the 1979 Decree, and "not the voluntary action of the 
Department." Id., at 1533, n. 16. In December 1983, the 
District Court found, despite the commitments made in the 
consent decrees, that the Department's proposed promotion 
19 Compare this situation with that described in Wygant, supra, at-.-
(opinion of PowELL; J.) ("There are numerous explanations for a disparity 
between the percentage of minority students and the percentage of minor-
ity faculty, many of them completely unrelated to discrimination of any 
kind"). 
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plan would have an adverse impact upon blacks, 580 F. 
Supp., at 174, and that "the department still operate[ d) an 
upper rank structure in which almost every trooper obtained 
his position through procedures that totally excluded black 
persons." 585 F. Supp., at 74 (emphasis in original). On 
appeal, the Eleventh Circuit summarily rejected the argu-
ment of the Department and the intervenors: 
"[l]t is no answer in this case to say that plaintiffs have 
not proven that the Department has discriminated 
against blacks above the entry-level seeking promo-
tions. . . . [l]t cannot be gainsaid that white troopers 
promoted since 1972 were the specific beneficiaries of an 
official policy which systematically excluded all 
blacks." 767 F . 2d, at 1533, n. 16 (emphasis added). 
Promotion, like hiring, has been a central concern of the 
District Court since the commencement of this action; since 
1972, the relief crafted has included strictures against promo-
tion procedures that have a discriminatory purpose or effect. 
The race-conscious relief at issue here is justified by a com-
pelling interest in remedying the discrimination that perme-
ated entry-level hiring practices and the promotional process 
alike. 20 
20 We also reject the argument of the United States, the Department, 
and the intervenors that the purpose of the order enforcing the consent de-
crees was the imposition of a particular racial balance on the upper ranks of 
the Department. The one-for-one mechanism was employed not to punish 
the Department's failure to achieve racial balance, but to remedy the De-
partment's refusal to fulfill the commitment made in the consent decrees to 
implement a promotion procedure without adverse impact on blacks and to 
eradicate the effects of its past delay and discrimination. The racial imbal-
ances in the Department are properly characterized as the effects of the 
· Department's past :discriminatory actions and of its failure to develop a 
promotion procedure without adverse impact as required by the previous 
court orders and the consent decrees. Cf. Sheet Metal Workers v. EEOC, 
478 U. S., at--,-- (1986) (POWELL, J., concurring in part and concur-
ring in judgment) ("The contempt order was not imposed for the Union's 
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Finally, in this case, as in Sheet Metal Workers, 478 U. S., 
at -- (POWELL, J., concurring in part and concurring in 
judgment), the District Court's enforcement order is "sup-
ported not only by the governmental interest in eradicating 
[the Department's] discriminatory practices, it is also sup-
ported by the societal interest in compliance with the judg-
ments of federal courts." The relief at issue was imposed 
upon a defendant with a consistent history of resistance to 
the District Court's orders, and only after the Department 
failed to live up to its court-approved commitments. 
III 
While conceding that the District Court's order serves a 
compelling interest, the Government insists that it was not 
narrowly tailored to accomplish its purposes-to remedy past 
discrimination and eliminate its lingering effects, to enforce 
compliance with the 1979 and 1981 Decrees by bringing about 
the speedy implementation of a promotion procedure that 
would not have an adverse impact on blacks, and to eradicate 
the ill effects of the Department's delay in producing such a 
procedure. We cannot agree. 
In determining whether race-conscious remedies are ap-
propriate, we look to several factors, including the necessity 
for the relief and the efficacy of alternative remedies, the 
flexibility and duration of the relief, including the availability 
of waiver provisions; the relationship of the numerical goals 
to the relevant labor market; and the impact of the relief on 
the rights of third parties. Sheet Metal Workers, 478 U. S., 
at-- (opinion of BRENNAN, J.); id., at-- (POWELL, J., 
concurring in part and concurring in judgment); Wygant, 476 
U. S., at-- (opinion of POWELL, J.); id., at-- (O'CON-
NOR, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment); id., 
at -- (WHITE, J., concurring in judgment); id., at --
(MARSHALL, J.,: dissenting). When considered in light of 
failure to achieve the goal, but for its failure to take the prescribed steps 
that would facilitate achieving the goal"). 
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these factors, it was amply established, and we find that the 
one-for-one promotion requirement was narrowly tailored to 
serve its several purposes, both as applied to the initial set of 
promotions to the rank of corporal and as a continuing contin-
gent order with respect to the upper ranks. 
A 
To evaluate the District Court's determination that it was 
necessary to order the promotion of eight whites and eight 
blacks to the rank of corporal at the time of the motion to en-
force, we must examine the purposes the order was intended 
to serve. First, the court sought to eliminate the effects of 
the Department's "long term, open, and pervasive" dis-
crimination, including the absolute exclusion of blacks from 
its upper ranks. Second, the judge sought to ensure expe-
ditious compliance with the 1979 and 1981 Decrees by induc-
ing the Department to implement a promotion procedure that 
would not have an adverse impact on blacks. Finally, the 
court needed to eliminate so far as possible the effects of the 
Department's delay in producing such a procedure. Con-
fronted by the Department's urgent need to promote at least 
15 troopers to corporal, see Paradise v. Prescott, 580 F. 
Supp. , at 173, the District Court determined that all of its 
purposes could be served only by ordering the promotion of 
eight blacks and eight whites, as requested by the plaintiff 
class. 
The options proffered by the Government and the Depart-
ment would not have served the court's purposes. The De-
partment proposed, as a stop-gap measure, to promote four 
blacks and eleven whites and requested additional time to 
allow the Department of Personnel to develop and submit a 
·nondiscriminatory promotion procedure. The United States 
argues that the Department's proposal would have allowed 
this round of promotions to be made without adverse impact 
on black candidates. 
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The Department's proposal was inadequate because it com-
pletely failed to address two of the purposes cited above. 
The Department's ad hoc offer to make one round of promo-
tions without an adverse impact ignored the court's concern 
that an acceptable procedure be adopted with alacrity. As 
early as 1972, the Department had been enjoined from engag-
ing in any promotional practices "for the purpose or with the 
effect of discriminating against any employee . . . on the 
ground of race or color." NAACP v. Allen, 340 F. Supp., at 
706. In 1979, the Department had promised in a court-ap-
proved consent decree to develop and implement a procedure 
without adverse impact by 1980. By 1983, such a procedure 
still had not been established, and Paradise sought enforce-
ment of the consent decrees. Given the record of delay, we 
find it astonishing that the Department should suggest that 
in 1983 the District Court was constitutionally required to 
settle for yet another promise that such a procedure would be 
forthcoming "as soon as possible." 2 Record 358. 
Moreover, the Department's proposal ignored the injury to 
the plaintiff class that resulted from its delay in complying 
with the terms of the 1972 order and the 1979 and 1981 De-
crees. 21 As the Fifth Circuit pointed out, no blacks were 
21 The Government contends that "the Department in reality had acted 
with reasonable diligence to devise a new corporal's examination" and that 
both Paradise and the District Judge "failed to appreciate how difficult it is 
to develop and implement selection procedures that satisfy the rigorous 
standards of the Uniform Guidelines" because "the validation of selection 
procedures is an expensive and time-consuming process usually extending 
over several years" and because the tests, besides being validated, had to 
be without adverse impact. Brief for United States 24-25, n. 13. 
This argument is without merit. Since the District Court order at issue 
here was rendered, the Department has timely proposed and the court has 
tentatively approved, procedures for promotion to corporal and sergeant . 
. App. 163-164, 176-177. Although these procedures have not yet been val-
idated (and, according to the Government, may not be for some time, Tr. of 
Oral Arg. 41-42), the use of the one-for-one promotion requirement was 
suspended by the court both times the Department proposed a procedure 
that appeared to be without adverse impact. It is therefore clear that any 
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promoted between 1972 and 1979; the four blacks promoted 
in 1979 were elevated pursuant to the 1979 Decree and not as 
a result of the voluntary action of the Department; and, fi-
nally, the whites promoted since 1972 "were the specific 
beneficiaries of an official policy which systematically ex-
cluded all blacks." 767 F . 2d, at 1533, n. 16. To permit ad 
hoc decisionmaking to continue and allow only four of fifteen 
slots to be filled by blacks would have denied relief to black 
troopers who had irretrievably lost promotion opportunities. 
Thus, adoption of the Department's proposal would have 
fallen far short of the remedy necessary to eliminate the ef-
fects of the Department's past discrimination, would not have 
ensured adoption of a procedure without adverse impact, and 
would not have vitiated the effects of the defendant's delay. 22 
The Government suggests that the trial judge could have 
imposed heavy fines and fees on the Department pending 
compliance. This alternative was never proposed to the Dis-
trict Court. Furthermore, the Department had been ordered 
to pay the plaintiffs' attorney's fees and costs throughout this 
lengthy litigation; these court orders had done little to pre-
vent future foot-dragging. 23 See, e. g., United States v. Fra-
inevitable delay in validating the procedures will not ~sult in 
reinposition of the one-for-one requirement so long as the Department im-
plements a procedure without apparent adverse impact. The difficulties 
of validating a procedure do not excuse the Department's delay in develop-
ing a test without adverse impact. 
In addition, it was the Department that initially proposed to implement a 
validated procedure within one year; this time period was not imposed by 
the court. Surely the Department was in the best position to assess the 
practicality of its own proposal. 
22 The merit of the District Court's determination in 1983 that it could 
not accept the Department's promise to develop a promotion procedure 
without adverse impact is illustrated by the Department's petition for re-
. consideration of the court's order enforcing the consent decrees. The De-
partment argued that it was without legal authority to comply with the 
court's order; the District Court stated that this argument was yet another 
delaying tactic. See supra, at --, and App. 139. 
23 Indeed, the Department had shown itself willing to sacrifice a great 
deal of money to avoid the court's orders. See Paradise v. Dothard, Civ. 
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zer, 317 F. Supp. 1079, 1093 (1970); NAACP v. Allen, 340 F. 
Supp., at 708-710. In addition, imposing fines on the de-
fendant does nothing to compensate the plaintiffs for the long 
delays in implementing acceptable promotion procedures. 
Finally, the Department had expressed an immediate and ur-
gent need to make 15 promotions, and the District Court took 
this need into consideration in constructing its remedy. 24 As 
we observed only last Term, "a district court may find it nec-
essary to order interim hiring or promotional goals pending 
the development of nondiscriminatory hiring or promotion 
procedures. In these cases, the use of numerical goals pro-
vides a compromise between two unacceptable alternatives: 
an outright ban on hiring or promotions ... continued use of 
a discriminatory selection procedure," or, we might add, use 
of no selection procedure at all. Sheet Metal Workers, 478 
Action No. 3561-N (MD Ala., Aug. 5, 1975) ("The evidence outlined above 
establishes and this Court now finds that, at the time of and in the years 
following the Court's 1972 order, the administration and the heads of the 
Department of Public Safety perceived a need for additional troopers-a 
need characterized as critical; that there were appropriated and available 
to the defendants funds in excess of $3 million, a substantial portion of 
which could have been used for salaries and ancillary expenses for new 
troopers; and that this money was not spent for the critically needed addi-
tional troopers but went unspent or was diverted to other uses. These 
findings , when combined with the considerable testimony regarding the de-
fendants ' reluctance to implement the Court's remedial order by placing 
black troopers on the state's highways, necessitate the conclusion that the 
defendants have, for the purpose of frustrating or delaying full relief to the 
plaintiff class, artificially restricted the size of the trooper force and the 
number of new troopers hired"). 
24 Fining the defendant lacks even the lone virtue of the Department's 
proposal to promote four blacks: that at least a step would be taken toward 
the eradication of past discrimination by elevating blacks in the hierarchy. 
· Furthermore, it does nothing to compensate plaintiffs for the past and fu-
ture delay in implementation of procedures without adverse effect. While 
fines vindicate the court's authority, here they would not fulfill the court's 
additional responsibility to "eliminate the discriminatory effects of the past 
as well as bar like discrimination in the future." Louisiana v. United 
States , 380 U. S. 145, 154 (1965). 
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U. 8., at-- (opinion of BRENNAN, J.). 25 
By 1984 the District Court was plainly justified in imposing 
the remedy chosen. Any order allowing further delay by the 
Department was entirely unacceptable. Cf. Green v. 
County School Bd. of New Kent County, 391 U. S. 430, 438 
(1968) ("[A] plan that at this late date fails to provide mean-
ingful assurance of prompt and effective disestablishment of a 
dual system is . . . intolerable. . . . The burden on a school 
board today is to come forward with a plan that promises re-
alistically to work, and promises realistically to work now"). 
Not only was the immediate promotion of blacks to the rank 
of corporal essential, but, if the need for continuing judicial 
oversight was to end, it was also essential that the Depart-
ment be required to develop a procedure without adverse im-
pact on blacks, and that the effect of past delays be 
eliminated. 26 
25 The United States also suggests that the District Court could have 
made the promotion decisions itself or appointed a trustee to supervise the 
Department's progress. Again neither of these alternatives were pro-
posed to the judge. The suggestions appear rather beside the point as the 
United States would presumably object if the District Court or the trustee 
simply selected 50% blacks to be promoted each time vacancies occurred 
until a test without adverse impact was created, rather than ordering the 
Department to select 50% blacks. If the United States is actually suggest-
ing that the court come up with an ad hoc proposal for each batch of promo-
tions, this solution is subject to the same deficiencies noted with respect to 
the Department's proposal to the court. See supra, at --. 
26 The imposition of the District Court's requirement with respect to the 
ranks beyond corporal was also clearly justified. At the time the District 
Court imposed the corporal promotion ratio, it had required the Depart-
ment to submit for its approval a schedule for the development of promo-
tion procedures for all ranks above the entry level position "based upon re-
alistic expectations." Paradise v. Prescott, 585 F. Supp. 72, 75 (1983). 
The Department complied, proposing periods of time ranging from 5 
. months for the position of corporal to 24 months for the position of major. 
2 Record 569-570. : Thus far, all procedures have been submitted in a 
timely manner preventing any imposition of the one-for-one requirement in 
the upper ranks. The record indicates that, while the order itself is a con-
tinuing one, its application is entirely contingent on the repetition of the 
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We conclude that in 1983, when the District Judge entered 
his order, "it is doubtful, given [the Department's] history in 
this litigation, that the District Court had available to it any 
other effective remedy." Sheet Metal Workers, supra, at 
-- (POWELL, J., concurring in part and concurring in 
judgment). 
B 
The features of the one-for-one requirement and its actual 
operation indicate that it is flexible in application at all ranks. 
The requirement may be waived if no qualified black candi-
dates are available. The Department has, for example, been 
permitted to promote only white troopers to the ranks of lieu-
tenant and captain since no black troopers have qualified for 
those positions. Further, it applies only when the Depart-
ment needs to make promotions. Thus, if external forces, 
such as budget cuts, necessitate a promotion freeze, the De-
partment will not be required to make gratuitous promotions 
to remain in compliance with the court's order. 27 
exact circumstances that prompted its initial formulation. The District 
Court will resort to ~ again only if confronted with further delay by 
the Department in imple entmg a neutral promotiOn procedure accordmg 
to the schedule the Department itself proposed. Thus, any future use of 
the one-for-one requirement will be lawful for the same reason that justi-
fied the District Judge in ordering the promotion of eight blacks and eight 
whites to the rank of corporal: only in the event the Department fails to 
meet its court-approved commitments. We cannot anticipate that this will 
occur. 
27 Cf. Sheet Metal Workers, 478 U. S., at-- (opinion of BRENNAN, J.) 
("The [district] court has twice adjusted the deadline for achieving the 
[membership] goal, and has continually approved of changes in the size of 
the apprenticeship classes to account for the fact that economic conditions 
prevented petitioners from meeting their membership targets; there is 
every reason to believe that both the court and the administrator will con-
. tinue to accommodate legitimate explanations for petitioners' failure . to 
comply with the court's orders"); id., at-- (POWELL, J., concurring in 
part and concurring in judgment) ("Additional flexibility is evidenced by 
the fact that this goal, originally set to be achieved by 1981, has been twice 
delayed and is now set for 1987"). 
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Most significantly, the one-for-one requirement is ephem-
eral; the term of its application is contingent upon the De-
partment's own conduct. The requirement endures only \ 
until the Department comes up with a procedure that does 
not have a discriminatory impact on blacks-something the 
Department was enjoined to do in 1972 and expressly prom-
ised to do by 1980. As noted at note --, supra, the court 
has taken into account the difficulty of validating a test and 
does not require validation as a prerequisite for suspension of 
the promotional requirement. The one-for-one requirement 
evaporated at the ranks of corporal and sergeant upon imple-
mentation of promotion procedures without an adverse im-
pact, demonstrating that it is not a disguised means to 
achieve racial balance. Cf. Sheet Metal Workers, supra, at 
-- (POWELL, J., concurring in part and concurring in 
judgment). 
Finally, the record reveals that this requirement was flexi-
ble, waivable, and temporary in application. When the Dis-
trict Court imposed the provision, the judge expressed the 
hope that its use would be "a one-time occurrence." 585 F. 
Supp., at 76. The court believed that this hope would be ful-
filled: at the January 15, 1984, hearing on the plaintiffs' mo-
tion to enforce the consent decrees, "the Personnel Depart-
ment pledged that it would now devote its full resources to 
assisting the Public Safety Department in not only develop-
ing acceptable promotion procedures as required by the two 
consent decrees, but in doing so within the near future." 
App. 141. The Department has since timely submitted pro-
cedures for promotions to corporal and sergeant, and the 
court has consequently suspended application of the promo-
tional order with respect to in those ranks. In the higher 
· ranks, the Department has been permitted to promote only 
white troopers. It now appears that the effect of the order 
enforcing the decrees will be "the development of acceptable 
promotion procedures for all ranks and the nullification of the 
85-999--0PINION 
UNITED STATES v. PARADISE 27 
promotion quota." 767 F. 2d, at 1538, n. 19. The remedy 
chosen has proven both effective and flexible. 
c 
We must also examine the relationship between the nu-
merical relief ordered and the percentage of nonwhites in the 
relevant workforce. The original hiring order of the District I 
Court required the Department to hire 50% black applicants 
until 25% of the state trooper force was composed of blacks; 
the latter figure reflects the percentage of blacks in the rele-
vant labor market. 585 F. Supp., at 75, n. 2. The enforce-
ment order at issue here is less restrictive: it requires the De-
partment to promote 50% black candidates until 25% of the 
rank in question is black, but only until a promotion proce-
dure without an adverse impact on blacks is in place. Thus, 
had the promotion order remained in effect for the rank of 
corporal, it would have survived only until 25% of the De-
partment's corporals were black. 
The Government suggests that the one-for-one require-
ment is arbitrary because it bears no relationship to the 25% 
minority labor pool relevant here. This argument ignores 
that the 50% figure is not itself the goal; rather it represents 
the speed at which the goal of 25% will be achieved. The 
interim requirement of one-for-one promotion (had it contin-
ued) would simply have determined how quickly the Depart-
ment progressed toward this ultimate goal. This require-
ment is therefore analogous to the imposition in Sheet Metal 
Workers of an end date, which regulated the speed of 
progress toward fulfillment of the hiring goal. Sheet Metal 
Workers , 478 U. S., at-- (POWELL, J., concurring in part 
and concurring in judgment). 
To achieve the goal of 25% black representation in the 
·upper ranks, the court was not limited to ordering the promo-
tion of only 25% blacks at any one time. Some promptness in 
the administration of relief was plainly justified in this case, 
and use of deadlines or end-dates had proven ineffective. In 
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these circumstances, the use of a temporary requirement of 
50% minority promotions, which, like the end date in Sheet 
Metal Workers, was crafted and applied flexibly, was con-
stitutionally permissible. 
The District Court did not accept the argument that in 
order to achieve a goal of 25% representation, it could order 
only 25% of any particular round of promotions to be awarded 
to minorities. Had it done so, the court would have imple-
mented the Department's proposal to promote 4 blacks and 
11 whites when it issued its order enforcing the consent de-
cree, because this proposal approximated the 25% figure. 28 
Again, however, this proposal completely ignores the fact 
and the effects of the Department's past discrimination and 
its delay in implementing the necessary promotion proce-
dure. Here the District Court considered both the Depart-
ment's proposal and the possibility of promoting blacks to all 
15 corporal positions "[i]n light of the department's failure 
after almost twelve years to eradicate the continuing effects 
of its own discrimination and to develop acceptable promotion 
procedures and in light of the severity of the existing racial 
imbalances." 585 F. Supp., at 75, n. 1. The court rejected 
both of these alternatives and, upon consideration of the De-
partment's behavior and of the interests and the purposes to 
be served, arrived at an intermediate figure. Although the 
appropriate ratio here "necessarily involve[ d) a degree of ap-
proximation and imprecision," Teamsters v. United States, 
431 U. S. 324, 372 (1977), the District Court, with its first-
28 Following adoption of the plaintiffs' proposal that 8 blacks and 8 whites 
should be promoted, the corporal rank was composed of 14 black and 73 
white troopers (16% black). Under the Department's proposal that 4 
blacks and 11 whites should be promoted, the corporal rank would have 
been composed of 8 black and 79 white troopers (9.2% black). Neither 
. proposal would have raised the percentage of blacks in the corporal rank to 
the 25% mark set as an alternate goal by the District Court (the other al-
ternative being the adoption of a promotion procedure without adverse im-
pact). Obviously, however, the plaintiffs' proposal provided an acceler-
ated approach to achieving that goal to compensate for past delay. 
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hand experience of the parties and the potential for resis-
tance, imposed the requirement that it determined would 
compensate for past delay and prevent future recalcitrance, 
while not unduly burdening the interests of white troopers. 29 
It would have been improper for the District Judge to ig-
nore the effects of the Department's delay and its continued 
default of its obligation to develop a promotion procedure, 
and to require only that, commencing in 1984, the Depart-
ment promote one black for every three whites promoted. 
The figure selected to compensate for past discrimination and 
delay necessarily involved a delicate calibration of the rights 
and interests of the plaintiff class, the Department, and the 
white troopers. The Government concedes that a one-to-
three requirement would have been lawful, Tr. of Oral Arg. 
43; the District Court determined that more stringent meas-
ures were necessary. This Court should not second-guess 
the lower court's carefully considered choice of the figure 
necessary to achieve its many purposes, especially when that 
figure is hedged about with specific qualifying measures de-
signed to prevent any unfair impact that might arise from 
rigid application. 
D 
The one-for-one requirement did not impose an unaccept-
able burden on innocent third parties. As stated above, the 
29 We have previously recognized the importance of expediting elimina-
tion of the vestiges of longstanding discrimination. In United States v. 
Montgomery County Bd. of Education, 395 U. S. 225 (1969), we upheld a 
District Court's imposition of black-to-white faculty goal against modifica- / 
tions made by the Court of Appeals, saying that the District Court order 
"was adopted in the spirit of this Court's opinion in Green v. County School 
Board, [391 U. S. 430, 439 (1968)], in that his plan 'promises realistically 
to work, and promises realistically to work now.' The modifications or-
. dered by the panel of the Court of Appeals, while of course not intended to 
do so, would, we think, take from the order some of its capacity to expe-
dite, by means of specific commands, the day when a completely unified, 
unitary, nondiscriminatory school system becomes a reality instead of a 
hope .. . .'' Id., at 235-236. 
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temporary and extremely limited nature of the requirement 
substantially limits any potential burden on white applicants 
for promotion. It was used only once at the rank of corporal 
and may not be utilized at all in the upper ranks. Nor has 
the court imposed an "absolute bar" to white advancement. 
Sheet Metal Workers, 478 U. S. , at --. In the one in-
stance in which thellquota1\vas employed, 50% of those ele- V' v 
vated were white. " " 
The one-for-one requirement does not require the layoff 
~ discharge of white employees and therefore does not im-
pose burdens of the sort that concerned the plurality in 
Wygant, 476 U. S., at-- (opinion of POWELL, J.) ("layoffs 
impose the entire burden of achieving racial equality on par-
ticular individuals, often resulting in serious disruption of 
their lives") id., at-- (WHITE, J., concurring) (same). Be-
cause the one-for-one requirement is so limited in scope and 
duration, it only postpones the promotions of qualified 
whites. Consequently, like a hiring goal, it "impose[s] a dif-
fuse burden, . . . foreclosing only one of several opportuni-
ties." I d., at --. "Denial of a future employment oppor-
tunity is not as intrusive as loss of an existing job," Wygant, 
476 U. S., at-- (opinion of POWELL, J.), and plainly post-
ponement imposes a lesser burden still. 30 
Finally, the basic limitation, that black troopers promoted 
must be qualified, remains. Qualified white candidates sim-
ply have to compete with qualified black candidates. To be 
sure, should the District Court's promotion requirement be 
applied, black applicants would receive some advantage. 
But this situation is only temporary, and is subject to amelio-
ration by the action of the Department itself. 
80 In the promotion procedure proposed by the Department in 1981, se-
niority counted as 10% of the candidate's score. App. 56. But, under the 
point system established, differences in seniority among candidates could 
affect scores by no more than 3%. ld., at 50-51. Greater seniority did 
not, therefore, by itself create an expectation of promotion. 
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Accordingly, the one-for-one promotion requirement im-
posed in this case does not disproportionately harm the inter-
ests, or unnecessarily trammel the rights, of innocent 
individuals. 
E 
In determining whether this order was "narrowly tai-
lored," we must acknowledge the respect owed a District 
Judge's judgment that specified relief is essential to cure a 
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. A district court 
has "not merely the power but the duty to render a decree 
which will so far as possible eliminate the discriminatory ef-
fects of the past as well as bar like discrimination in the fu-
ture." Louisiana v. United States, 380 U. S. 145, 154 
(1965). "Once a right and a violation have been shown, the 
scope of a district court's equitable powers to remedy past 
wrongs is broad; for breadth and flexibility are inherent in 
equitable remedies." Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. 
of Education, 402 U. S. 1, 15 (1971). 
Nor have we in all situations "required remedial plans to be 
limited to the least restrictive means of implementation. We 
have recognized that the choice of remedies to redress racial 
discrimination is 'a balancing process left, within appropriate 
constitutional or statutory limits, to the sound discretion of 
the trial court."' Fullilove, supra, at 508 (POWELL, J., con-
curring) (quoting Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., 
424 U. S., at 794 (POWELL, J., concurring in part and dis-
senting in part)). Cf. Green v. County School Bd. of New 
Kent County, 391 U. S., at 439 ("The obligation of the dis-
trict courts, as it always has been, is to assess the effective-
ness of a proposed plan in achieving desegregation. There is 
no universal answer to the complex problems of desegrega-
. tion; there is o~viously no one plan that will do the job in 
every case. The matter must be assessed in light of the cir-
cumstances present and the options available in each 
instance"). 
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The district court has first-hand experience with the par-
ties and is best qualified to deal with the "flinty, intractable 
realities of day-to-day implementation of constitutional com-
mands." Swann, supra, at 6. In this case, as in Sheet 
Metal Workers, "th[e] court having had the parties before it 
over a period of time, was in the best position to judge 
whether an alternative remedy, such as a simple injunction, 
would have been effective in ending [the] discriminatory 
practices." 478 U. 8., at -- (POWELL, J., concurring). 
The District Judge determined that the record demonstrated 
that "without promotional quotas the continuing effects of 
[the Department's] discrimination cannot be eliminated." 
585 F. Supp., at 76. His proximate position and broad eq-
uitable powers mandate substantial respect for this 
judgment. 
Plainly the District Court's discretion in remedying the 
deeply-rooted Fourteenth Amendment violations here was 
limited by the rights and interests of the white troopers seek-
ing promotion to corporal. But we conclude that the District 
Judge properly balanced the individual and collective inter-
ests at stake, including the interests of the white troopers eli-
gible for promotion, in shaping this remedy. See Swann, 
supra, at 16 ("The task is to correct, by a balancing of the 
individual and collective interests, the condition that offends 
the Constitution"). While a remedy must be narrowly tai-
lored, that requirement does not operate to remove all dis-
cretion from the District Court in its construction of a reme-
dial decree. 31 
31 See also Fullilove, 448 U. S., at 527 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (con-
trasting legislative branch with court of equity and suggesting that the lat-
ter has the "dispassionate objectivity" and the "flexibility" necessary "to 
mold a race-conscious remedy around the single objective of eliminating 
. the effects of past or present discrimination"); International Salt Co. v. 
United States, 332 U. S. 392, 400 (1947) (Jackson, J.) ("The framing of de-
crees should take place in the District rather than in Appellate Courts. 
They are invested with large discretion to model their judgments to the 
exigencies of the particular case") (citations and footnote omitted). 
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IV 
The remedy imposed here is an effective, temporary and 
flexible measure. It applies only if qualified blacks are avail-
able, only if the Department has an objective need to make 
promotions, and only if the Department fails to implement a 
promotion procedure that does not have an adverse impact on 
blacks. The one-for-one requirement is the product of the 
considered judgment of the District Court which, with its 
knowledge of the parties and their resources, properly deter-
mined that strong measures were required in light of the De-
partment's long and shameful record of delay and resistance. 
The race-conscious relief imposed here was amply justified, 
and narrowly tailored to serve the legitimate and laudable 
purposes of the District Court. The judgment of the Court 
of Appeals, upholding the order of the District Court, is 
Affirmed. 
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[January-, 1987] 
JUSTICE STEVENS, concurring in the judgment. 
In 1970, two years before the District Court found in this 
case that the State of Alabama had persistently maintained a 
deliberately segregated police force, this Court issued a 
unanimous opinion setting forth the guidelines for district 
judges in fashioning remedies to eliminate the effects of racial 
segregation in public schools. Swann v. C harlotte-M ecklen-
burg Bd. of Education, 402 U. S. 1 (1970). The central 
theme of that opinion is that race-conscious remedies are 
obviously required to remedy racially discriminatory actions 
by the State that violate the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Because Swann explained the appropriate governing 
standard, it must have provided guidance to the district court 
in this case and it should now guide our deliberations. Chief 
Justice Burger wrote: 
"Once a right and a violation have been shown, the scope 
of a district court's equitable powers to remedy past 
wrongs is broad, for breadth and flexibility are inherent 
in equitable remedies. 
"'The essence of equity jurisdiction has been the 
power of the Chancellor to do equity and to mould 
each decree to the necessities of the particular case. 
Flexibility rather than rigidity has distinguished it. 
The qualities of mercy and practicality have made 
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equity the instrument for nice adjustment and rec-
onciliation between the public interest and private 
needs as well as between competing private claims." 
Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U. S. 321, 329-330 (1944), 
cited in Brown II, supra, at 300. 
"[A] school desegregation case does not differ funda-
mentally from other cases involving the framing of eq-
uitable remedies to repair the denial of a constitutional 
right. The task is to correct, by a balancing of the indi-
vidual and collective interests, the condition that offends 
the Constitution. 
"In default by the school authorities of their obligation to 
proffer acceptable remedies, a district court has broad 
power to fashion a remedy that will assure a unitary 
school system. 
"We see therefore that the use made of mathematical 
ratios was no more than a starting point in the process of 
shaping a remedy, rather than an inflexible requirement. 
From that starting point the District Court proceeded to 
frame a decree that was within its discretionary powers, 
as an equitable remedy for the particular circumstances. 
As we said in Green, a school authority's remedial plan 
or a district court's remedial decree is to be judged by its 
effectiveness. Awareness of the racial composition of 
the whole school system is likely to be a useful starting 
point in shaping a remedy to correct past constitutional 
violations. In sum, the very limited use made of math-
ematical ratios was within the equitable remedial discre-
tion of the District Court. 
"Absent a constitutional violation there would be no 
basis for judicially ordering assignment of students on a 
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racial basis. All things being equal, with no history of 
discrimination, it might well be desirable to assign pupils 
to schools nearest their homes. But all things are not 
equal in a system that has been deliberately constructed 
and maintained to enforce racial segregation. The rem-
edy for such segregation may be administratively awk-
ward, inconvenient, and even bizarre in some situations 
and may impose burdens on some; but all awkwardness 
and inconvenience cannot be avoided in the interim pe-
riod when remedial adjustments are being made to elimi-
nate the dual school systems. 
"The Court of Appeals, searching for a term to define 
the equitable remedial power of the district court, used 
the term 'reasonableness.' In Green, supra, this Court 
used the term 'feasible' and by implication, 'workable,' 
'effective,' and 'realistic' in the mandate to develop 'a 
plan that promises realistically to work, and . . . to work 
now.' On the facts of this case, we are unable to con-
clude that the order of the District Court is not rea-
sonable, feasible and workable. However, in seeking to 
define the scope of remedial power or the limits on reme-
dial power of courts in an area as sensitive as we deal 
with here, words are poor instruments to convey the 
sense of basic fairness inherent in equity. Substance, 
not semantics, must govern, and we have sought to sug-
gest the nature of limitations without frustrating the 
appropriate scope of equity." 402 U. S., at 15, 16, 25, 
28, 31. 
A party who has been found guilty of repeated and persist-
ent violations of the law bears the burden of demonstrating 
that the chancellor's efforts to fashion effective relief exceed 
the bounds of "reasonableness." The burden of proof in a 
case like this is precisely the opposite of that in cases such as 
85-99~CONCUR 
4 UNITED STATES v. PARADISE 
Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education, 476 U. S. --,and 
Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U. S. 448 (1980), which did not 
involve any proven violations of law.* In such cases the 
governmental decisionmaker who would make race-conscious 
decisions must overcome a strong presumption against them. 
No such burden rests on a federal district judge who has 
found that the governmental unit before him is guilty of ra-
cially discriminatory conduct that violates the Constitution. 
The relief that the district judge has a duty to fashion must 
unavoidably consider race. A unanimous Court held in 
North Carolina State Board of Education v. Swann, 402 
U. S. 43 (1971) (per curiam), a case decided on the same day 
as Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 
that the State's Anti-Busing Law, which prohibited assign-
ment of any student on account of race or for the purpose 
of creating a racial balance in the schools, conflicted with 
the State's duty to remedy constitutional violations. We 
observed: 
"[T]he statute exploits an apparently neutral form to 
control school assignment plans by directing that they be 
'color blind'; that requirement, against the background of 
segregation, would render illusory the promise of Brown 
v. Board of Education, 347 U. S. 483 (1954). Just as 
*The law violator who would oppose a remedy imposed against him as 
itself a violation of the law does not stand in the same position as an inno-
cent party; those whom the court has found in the wrong may not oppose a 
remedy on the ground that it would constitute a wrong if leveled at a non-
participant in the litigation. "In fashioning a remedy, the District Court 
may, of course, consider the fact that its injunction may impinge upon 
rights that would otherwise be constitutionally protected, but those protec-
tions do not prevent it from remedying" the violations. National Society 
of Professional Engineers v. United States, 435 U. S. 679, 697-698 (1978). 
See also International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U. S. 392, 400-401 
(1947); Chicago Teachers Union v. Hudson,- U.S.-,- n. 22 
(1986) ("The judicial remedy for a proven violation of law will often include 
commands that the law does not impose on the community at large.") (cita-
tions omitted). 
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the race of students must be considered in determining 
whether a constitutional violation has occurred, so also 
must race be considered in formulating a remedy. To 
forbid, at this stage, all assignments made on the basis of 
race would deprive school authorities of the one tool ab-
solutely essential to fulfillment of their constitutional 
obligation to eliminate existing dual school systems. 
"Similarly, the flat prohibition against assignment of 
students for the purpose of creating a racial balance 
must inevitably conflict with the duty of school authori-
ties to disestablish dual school systems. As we have 
held in Swann, the Constitution does not compel any 
particular degree of racial balance or mixing, but when 
past and continuing constitutional violations are found, 
some ratios are likely to be useful starting points in shap-
ing a remedy." 402 U. S., at 45-46. 
The District Court, like the school authority in Board of 
Education v. Swann, may, and in some instances must, re-
sort to race-conscious remedies to vindicate federal constitu-
tional guarantees. Because the instant employment dis-
crimination case "does not differ fundamentally from other 
cases involving the framing of equitable remedies to repair 
the denial of a constitutional right," Swann, supra, 402 
U. S., at 415-416, and because there has been no showing 
that the district judge abused his discretion in shaping a rem-
edy, I concur in the Court's judgment. 
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viously required to remedy racially discriminatory actions by 
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standard, it must have provided guidance to the District 
Court in this case and it should now guide our deliberations. 
Chief Justice Burger wrote: 
"Once a right and a violation have been shown, the scope 
of a district court's equitable powers to remedy past 
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" 'The essence of equity jurisdiction has been the 
power of the Chancellor to do equity and to mould 
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equity the instrument for nice adjustment and rec-
onciliation between the public interest and private 
needs as well as between competing private claims." 
Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U. S. 321, 329-330 (1944), 
cited in Brown [v. Board of Education, 349 U. S.], 
at 300. 
402 U. S. , at 15. 
In this case, the record discloses an egregious violation of the 
Equal Protection Clause. It follows, therefore, that the Dis-
trict Court had broad and flexible authority to remedy the 
wrongs resulting from this violation-exactly the opposite of 
the Solicitor General's unprecedented suggestion that the 
judge's discretion is constricted by a "narrowly tailored to 
achieve a compelling governmental interest" standard. 
Brief for Petitioner 17. 
The notion that this Court should craft special and narrow 
rules for reviewing judicial decrees in racial discrimination 
cases was soundly rejected in Swann. Chief Justice Burger 
wrote for a unanimous Court: 
"[A] school desegregation case does not differ funda-
mentally from other cases involving the framing of eq-
uitable remedies to repair the denial of a constitutional 
right. The task is to correct, by a balancing of the indi-
vidual and collective interests, the condition that offends 
the Constitution. 
"In default by the school authorities of their obligation to 
proffer acceptable remedies, a district court has broad 
power to fashion a remedy that will assure a unitary 
school system." Id., at 15-16. 
The Court was equally unambiguous in its rejection of the 
argument that a different standard of review is required 
when a remedial decree employs mathematical ratios. 
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"We see therefore that the use made of mathematical 
ratios was no more than a starting point in the process of 
shaping a remedy, rather than an inflexible requirement. 
From that starting point the District Court proceeded to 
frame a decree that was within its discretionary powers, 
as an equitable remedy for the particular circumstances. 
As we said in Green, a school authority's remedial plan 
or a district court's remedial decree is to be judged by its 
effectiveness. Awareness of the racial composition of 
the whole school system is likely to be a useful starting 
point in shaping a remedy to correct past constitutional 
violations. In sum, the very limited use made of math-
ematical ratios was within the equitable remedial discre-
tion of the District Court." I d., at 25. 
"Absent a constitutional violation there would be no 
basis for judicially ordering assignment of students on a 
racial basis. All things being equal, with no history of 
discrimination, it might well be desirable to assign pupils 
to schools nearest their homes. But all things are not 
equal in a system that has been deliberately constructed 
and maintained to enforce racial segregation. The rem-
edy for such segregation may be administratively awk-
ward, inconvenient, and even bizarre in some situations 
and may impose burdens on some; but all awkwardness 
and inconvenience cannot be avoided in the interim 
period when remedial adjustments are being made to 
eliminate the dual school systems." Id., at 28. 
"The Court of Appeals, searching for a term to define 
the equitable remedial power of the district courts, used 
the term 'reasonableness.' In Green, supra, this Court 
used the term 'feasible' and by implication, 'workable,' 
'effective,' and 'realistic' in the mandate to develop 'a 
plan that promises realistically to work, and . . . to work 
now.' On the facts of this case, we are unable to con-
clude that the order of the District Court is not rea-
sonable, feasible and workable. However, in seeking to 
4 
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define the scope of remedial power or the limits on reme-
dial power of courts in an area as sensitive as we deal 
. with here, words are poor instruments to convey the 
sense of basic fairness inherent in equity. Substance, 
not semantics, must govern, and we have sought to sug-
gest the nature of limitations without frustrating the ap-
propriate scope of equity." !d., at 31. 
A party who has been found guilty of repeated and persist-
ent violations of the law bears the burden of demonstrating 
that the chancellor's efforts to fashion effective relief exceed 
the bounds of "reasonableness." The burden of proof in a 
case like this is precisely the opposite of that in cases such 
as Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education, 476 U.S.--
(1986), and Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U. S. 448 (1980), 
which did not involve any proven violations of law. 1 In such 
cases the governmental decisionmaker who would make race-
conscious decisions must overcome a strong presumption 
against them. No such burden rests on a federal district 
judge who has found that the governmental unit before him is 
guilty of racially discriminatory conduct that violates the 
Constitution. 
The relief that the district judge has a duty to fashion must 
unavoidably consider race. A unanimous Court held in 
North Carolina State Board of Education v. Swann, 402 
1 The law violator who would oppose a remedy imposed against him as 
itself a violation of the law does not stand in the same position as an inno-
cent party; those whom the court has found in the wrong may not oppose a 
remedy on the ground that it would constitute a wrong if leveled at a non-
participant in the litigation. "In fashioning a remedy, the District Court 
may, of course, consider the fact that its injunction may impinge upon 
rights that would otherwise be constitutionally protected, but those protec-
tions do not prevent it from remedying" the violations. National Society 
of Professional Engineers v. United States, 435 U. S. 679, 697-698 (1978). 
See also International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U. S. 392, 400-401 
(1947); Teachers v. Hudson, 475 U. S. -,-n. 22 (1986) ("The judicial 
remedy for a proven violation of law will often include commands that the 
law does not impose on the community at large") (citations omitted). 
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U. S. 43 (1971), a case decided on the same day as Swann v. 
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, that the State's 
- Anti-Busing Law, which prohibited assignment of any stu-
dent on account of race or for the purpose of creating a racial 
balance in the schools, conflicted with the State's duty to 
remedy constitutional violations. We observed: 
"[T]he statute exploits an apparently neutral form to 
control school assignment plans by directing that they be 
'color blind'; that requirement, against the background of 
segregation, would render illusory the promise of Brown 
v. Board of Education, 347 U. S. 483 (1954). Just as 
the race of students must be considered in determining 
whether a constitutional violation has occurred, so also 
must race be considered in formulating a remedy. To 
forbid, at this stage, all assignments made on the basis of 
race would deprive school authorities of the one tool ab-
solutely essential to fulfillment of their constitutional ob-
ligation to eliminate existing dual school systems. 
"Similarly, the fiat prohibition against assignment of 
students for the purpose of creating a racial balance 
must inevitably conflict with the duty of school authori-
ties to disestablish dual school systems. As we have 
held in Swann, the Constitution does not compel any 
particular degree of racial balance or mixing, but when 
past and continuing constitutional violations are found, 
some ratios are likely to be useful starting points in shap-
ing a remedy." 402 U. S., at 45-46. 
The District Court, like the school authority in North 
Carolina State Board of Education v. Swann, may, and in 
some instances must, resort to race-conscious remedies to 
vindicate federal constitutional guarantees. Because the in-
stant employment discrimination case "does not differ funda-
mentally from other cases involving the framing of equitable 
remedies to repair the denial of a constitutional right," 
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 
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supra, at 15-16, and because there has been no showing that 
the District Judge abused his discretion in shaping a remedy, 
_ I concur in the Court's judgment. 2 
2 For reasons that are not entirely clear to me, JUSTICE PowELL as-
sumes that the standard to be applied in reviewing the court-ordered ac-
tion a State must take to correct its violations of the Equal Protection 
Clause is different when the violations take place in the administration of a 
public school system than when they occur in the operation of a public law 
enforcement agency. Ante, at 2 n. 2. Dismissing the inconvenience of \ 
being bused as a relatively inconsequential by-product of the remedial de-
cree, JUSTICE POWELL suggests that desegregation decisions upholding 
the District Court's broad remedial powers are less than fully applicable to 
this case; he seems to regard the possibility thaa ome white troopers will 
have their promotions delayed, ee id., at 4, as mandating a different and 
more exacting standard of review. 
I cannot agree that the applicability of the school desegregation cases in 
determining the validity of any particular remedial solution fashioned by a 
District Court and imposed on a State depends on detailed and inevitably 
imprecise calculations of hardship. For me the relevant fact in this case is 
that the remedial order was directed against a proven violator of the Con-
stitution. Just as I believe that a uniform standard should govern our re-
view of the merits of an equal protection claim, see Craig v. Boren, 429 
U. S. 190, 211 (1976) (STEVENS, J., concurring), so do I believe that a uni-
form standard should govern our review of all such decrees entered by Dis-
trict Courts. Of course, different violations require different remedies, 
but they should be reviewed under the principles of equitable discretion set 
forth in the school desegregation cases. "[A] school desegregation case 
does riot differ fundamentally from other cases involving the framing of eq-
uitable remedies to repair the denial of a constitutional right." Swann v. 
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Education, 402 U. S. 1, 15-16 (1971). The 
District Court's task in each case is to "be guided by equitable principles. 
Traditionally, equity has been characterized by a practical flexibility in 
shaping its remedies and by a facility for adjusting and reconciling public 
and private needs. These cases call for the exercise of the traditional 
attributes of equity power." Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U. S. 294, 
300 (1955) (footnotes omitted). Thus, the remedial issue in these cases is \ 
dramatically different from the question whether a statutory racial classifi-
cation can be justified as a response to a past societal wrong. See 
Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U. S. 448, 537-539 (1980) (STEVENS, J., 
dissenting). 
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JUSTICE O'CONNOR, dissenting. 
In Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education, 476 U. S. --, 
-- (1986), we concluded that the level of Fourteenth 
Amendment "scrutiny does not change merely because the 
challenged classification operates against a group that his-
torically has not been subject to governmental discrimina-
tion." Thus, in evaluating the constitutionality of the 
District Court order in this case under the Fourteenth 
Amendment, we must undertake a two-part inquiry. First, 
we must decide whether the order is "supported by a compel-
ling state purpose." I d., at --. Second, we must scruti-
nize the order to ensure that "the means chosen to accomplish 
that purpose are narrowly tailored." Ibid. 
One cannot read the record in this case without concluding 
that the Alabama Department of Public Safety had under-
taken a course of action that amounted to "pervasive, sys-
tematic, and obstinate discriminatory conduct." Ante, at 
--. Because the government has a compelling interest in 
remedying past and present discrimination by the Depart-
ment, the District Court unquestionably had the authority to 
fashion a remedy designed to end the Department's egre-
gious history of discrimination. In doing so, however, the 
District Court was obligated to fashion a remedy that was 
narrowly tailored to accomplish this purpose. The Court 
today purports to apply strict scrutiny, and concludes that 
\,-!OJld -l i\s 
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the order in this case was narrowly tailored for its remedial 
purpose. Because the Court adopts a standardless view of 
"narrowly tailored" far less stringent than that required by 
strict scrutiny, I dissent. 
As JUSTICE POWELL notes, this case is similar to Sheet 
Metal Workers v. EEOC, 478 U. S. -- (1986). In Sheet 
Metal Workers, I observed that "it is completely unrealistic 
to assume that individuals of each race will gravitate with 
mathematical exactitude to each employer or union absent 
unlawful discrimination." I d., at --. Thus, a rigid uota 
i~ iJ!!~~b~ because it adopts "an unjustified conclusion 
about tne preCise extent to which past discrimination has lin-
gering effects, or . . . an unjustified prediction about what 
would happen in the future in the absence of continuing dis-
crimination." Ibid. Even more flexible "goals," however, 
also may trammel unnecessarily the rights of nonminorities. 
Racially preferential treatment of nonvictims, therefore, 
should only be ordered "where such remedies are truly neces-
sary." Id., at--. Thus, "the creation of racial prefer-
ences by courts, even in the more limited form of goals rather 
than quotas, must be done sparingly and only where mani-
festly necessary." Ibid. 
In my view, whether characterized as a goal or a quota, the l 
District Court's order was not "manifestly necessary" to 
achieve compliance with that court's previous orders. The 
order at issue in this case clearly had one purpose, and one 
purpose only-to compel the Department to develop a promo-
tion procedure that would not have an adverse impact on 
blacks. Although the Court and the courts below suggest 
that the order also had the purpose of "eradicat[ing] the ill 
effects of the Department's delay in producing" such a pro-
motion procedure, ante, at --, the District Court's subse-
quent implementation of the order makes clear that the order 
cannot be defended on the basis of such a purpose. 
The order imposed the promotion quota only until the 
Department developed a promotion procedure that complied 
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with the consent decrees. If the order were truly designed 
to eradicate the effects of the Department's delay, the Dis-
trict Court would certainly have continued the use of the one-
for-one quota even after the Department had complied with 
the consent decrees. Consistent with the terms of the 
order, once the Department developed a promotion proce-
dure that did not have an adverse impact on blacks, the Dis-
trict Court suspended application of the quota. Under the 
approved promotion procedure, 13 troopers were promoted 
to corporal, of whom 3 (23.1%) were black. App. 160. The 
result of this new procedure was the promotion of a lower 
percentage of blacks than the purported goal of 25% black 
representation in the upper ranks, and the promotion of 
fewer blacks than even the Department's promotion proposal 
rejected by the District Court. To ·say the least, it strains 
credibility to view the one-for-one promotion quota as de-
signed to eradicate the past effects of the Department's delay 
when the quota was suspended once the Department devel-
oped a promotion procedure that promoted a lower percent-
age of blacks than the 25% black representation goal. 
Moreover, even if the one-for-one quota had the purpose of 
eradicating the effects of the Department's delay, this pur-
pose would not justify the quota imposed in this case. "[T]he 
relationship between the percentage of minority workers to 
be [promoted] and the percentage of minority group mem-
bers in the relevant population or work force" is of vital im-
portance in considering the validity of a racial goal. Sheet 
Metal Workers v. EEOC, supra, at-- (POWELL, J., con-
curring in part and concurring in the judgment). The one-
for-one promotion quota used in this case far exceeded the 
percentage of blacks in the trooper force, and there is no 
evidence in the record that such an extreme quota was neces-
sary to eradicate the effects of the Department's delay. The 
Court attempts to defend this one-for-one promotion quota as 
merely affecting the speed by which the Department attains 
the goal of 25% black representation in the upper ranks. 
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Ante, at --. Such a justification, however, necessarily 
eviscerates any notion of "narrowly tailored" because it has 
no stopping point; even a 100% quota could be defended on 
the ground that it merely "determined how quickly the De-
partment progressed toward" some ultimate goal. Ante, at 
--. If strict scrutiny is to have any meaning, therefore, a 
promotion goal must have a closer relationship to the per-
centage of blacks eligible for promotions. In this case the 
District Court-and indeed this Court-provide no justifica-
tion for the choice of a one-for-one promotion quota rather 
than a lower quota. In my view, therefore, the order in this 
case must stand or fall on its stated purpose of coercing the 
Department to develop a promotion procedure without an ad-
verse impact on black troopers. 
Given the singular in terrorem purpose of the District 
Court order, it cannot survive strict scrutiny. There is sim-
ply no justification for the use of racial preferences if the pur-
pose of the order could be achieved without their use because 
"[r ]acial classifications are simply too pernicious to permit 
any but the most exact connection between justification and 
classification." Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U. S. 448, 537 
(1980) (STEVENS, J., dissenting). Thus, to survive strict 
scrutiny, the District Court order must fit with greater preci-
sion than any alternative remedy. See Ely, The Constitu-
tionality of Reverse Racial Discrimination, 41 U. Chi. L. 
Rev. 723, 727, n. 26 (1974). The District Court had available 
several alternatives that would have achieved full compliance 
with the consent decrees without trammeling on the rights of 
nonminority troopers. The court, for example, could have 
appointed a trustee to develop a promotion procedure that 
would satisfy the terms of the consent decrees. By imposing 
the trustee's promotion procedure on the Department until 
the Department developed an alternative promotion proce-
dure that complied with the consent decrees, the District 
Court could have enforced the decrees without the use of ra-
cial preferences. Alternatively, the District Court could 
85-999---DISSENT 
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have found the recalcitrant Department in contempt of court, 
and imposed stiff fines or other penalties for the contempt. 
Surely, some combination of penalties could have been 
designed that would have compelled compliance with the con-
sent decrees. 
The District Court, however, did not discuss these options 
or any other alternatives to the use of a racial quota. Not a 
single alternative method of achieving compliance with the 
consent decrees is even mentioned in the District Court's 
opinion-with the exception of an even more objectionable 
100% racial quota. See Paradise v. Prescott, 585 F. Supp. 
72, 75, n. 1 (MD Ala 1983). What is most disturbing about 
the District Court's order, therefore, is not merely that it 
implicitly or explicitly rejected two particular options, but 
that the District Court imposed the m:omotion quota without 
consideration of any of the available alternatives. Even in I 
Sheet Metal Workers, supra, the District Court had "consid-
ere? the efficacy of altern~tive rem~dies" before imposing a 
racial quota. I d., at --, see also td., at -- (POWELL, J., 
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). Thus, 
the Court was able to evaluate the claim that the racial quota 
was "necessary." Without any exploration of the available 
alternatives in the instant case, no such evaluation is possi-
ble. Remarkably, however, the Court-purporting to apply 
"strict scrutiny" -concludes that the order in this case was 
narrowly tailored for a remedial purpose. 
Although the Court states that it is merely "respect[ing]" 
the "balancing process" of the District Court, ante, at--, it 
wholly ignores the fact that no such "balancing process" took 
place in this case. For even if, as the Court insists, the 
District Court "'was in the best position to judge whether an 
alternative remedy, such as a simple injunction, would have 
been effective in ending [the] discriminatory practices,"' 
ante, at -- (quoting Sheet Metal Workers, 478 U. S., at 
-- (POWELL, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment)), the least that strict scrutiny requires is that the 
85-999-DISSENT 
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District Court expressly evaluate the available alternative 
remedies. If a District Court order that is imposed after no 
evident consideration of the available alternatives can sur-
vive strict scrutiny as narrowly tailored, the requirement 
that a racial classification be "narrowly tailored" for a com-
pelling state purpose has lost most of its meaning. 
I have no quarrel with the Court's conclusion that the re-
calcitrance of the Department of Public Safety in complying 
with the consent decrees was reprehensible. In its under-
standable frustration over the Department's conduct, how-
ever, the District Court ill!.posed a racial qu9ta without first 
considering the effectiveness of alternatives that would have 
a lesser effect on the rights of nonminority troopers. Be-
cause the District Court did not even consider the available 
alternatives to ·a one-for-one promotion quota, and because 
these alternatives would have successfully compelled the 
Department to comply with the consent decrees, I must 
respectfully dissent. 
IS c-p\7roa-cl\(:d. ~'S rec~J 
0' >:.ev-t-, she.- does "'o+ So.y 
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~ JUSTICE POWELL, concurring. 
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view the remedy ordered by the District Court in this case 
~· meets the requirements of the Equal Protection Clause. 
assessing a constitutional challenge to a racial 
classification: 
"Any preference based on racial or ethnic 
criteria must necessarily receive a most 
searching examination to make sure that it does 
not conflict with constitutional guarantees." 
Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 u.s. 448, 491 (1980) 
(opinion of Burger, C.J.). There are two prongs 
to this examination. First, any racial 
classification "must be justified by a 
compelling governmental interest," Palmore v. 
Sidoti, 466 u.s. 429, 432 (1984) ~ see Loving v. 
Virginia, 388 u.s. 1, 11 (1967) ~ cf. Graham v. 
Richardson, 403 u.s. 365, 375 (1971) (alienage). 
Second, the means chosen by the State to 
effectuate its purpose must be "narrowly 
tailored to the achievement of that goal." 
I 
2. 
Fullilove, supra, at 480. Wyqant v. Jackson 
Board of Education, 476 u.s. ___ , (1986). 
h .. ~~ . h' t at examination IS met In t IS case. The District Court 
A 
~~, {N...~~~) 
found that the Alabama Department of Public 
" 
Safety engaged 
"' in "blatant and continuous" discrimination over a period 
of many years. NAACP v. Allen, 340 F. Supp. 703, 705 (MD 
r: &.4.1-c. ~rh....v t:h.~_ ...... _..J ~ V/ ---; H....4../-~ Wl.. 
Ala. 1972l ,j The District Court's orde~~o is supported ~ 
c;;iij2... ~ ..L.~·-••&Jt-~1 ~~~ ~-~-
compelling see-i-e-tal interest ir:t compliance with the 
" ~~. ~~ ~~-~~~C:: ~¥.•L~f-
( jUdgmePt S ~c:l.e..r.D l GGJ.J.l>-.q; .'\ See Sheet Metal Workers v.  
~. 
EEOC, U.S. ___ , ___ (opinion of POWELL, J.). j 
Workers, 
Id. , at Department~~ 







The District Court, unlike the court in Sheet Metal 
Workers, did not hold the defendants in contempt. The 
protracted history of this litigation nevertheless 
supports the conclusion that the ~~+et ~ourt would have 
been "powerless to provide an effective remedy" if it had 
lacked authority to establish a benchmark against which to 
~~--~ 
measure progress in remedying the effects of ~ 
.A. 
discrimination. Sheet Metal Workers, supra, at~ 
In determining whether an affirmative action remedy is 
~ 
narrowly~ilored to the achievement of its goal, I have 
relied on five factors: (i) the efficacy of alternative 
remedies; (ii) the planned duration of the remedy; (iii) 
the relationship between the percentage of minority 
workers to be employed and the percentage of minority 
group members in the relevant population or work force; 
__ _.... .. ----
~'-'-1 ~ .rx-7~ 
,~ ....... '-C.M"""'-J -.IZJ -t.J-~  . 
~a...-~~ 
~~~.6-~ .. ~ 
~~ ..... ~t;::;,._. 
~~~*"'""-~ C 19 I I J 
'...-1-c.~ 
4 0 
~ -:=a.··~ ..L~ f':J-~~ ,~ 
\\--- 1-o e:L- ".!~ 
.9 n. .... ~ ~ ,.,.__ ~ --4 Jllllt.~ f.,'·· ~ "!'-/. rt..- fd-~ 
(iv} the availability of waiver provisions 1f the hiring ~#~v\ 
plan could not be met; and (v) the effect of the remedy 
upon innocent third parties. Sheet Metal Workers, 
U.S., at ___ (; Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 510-
(opinion of POWELL, J.). 
District Court imposed the one-for-one promotion 
. ~ .:? 1--e- ~ 
requirement only on ccasion, when it ordered the 
promotion of eight blacks and eight whites to the rank of 
corporal in February 1984. Because the Department 
urgently needed at least fifteen additional ( corpor) ls, see 
.)(Ut; t; ........ .,... ~e: 
v. Paradise, 580 F. Supp., at 173, no remedy Prescott 
~ 
~ 
short of a direct order to make promotions would have met 
1\ 
~ ...L.z<:......4 ~-- . 7Z-. f).q.,f. C::.;"C·~·~ ~ J1u.:.v ~* 
the.( :i..mm.99iat~ eriS.S. A. The one-for-one requirement has not
1 
~I 
1 been applied to any subsequent promotions. The Department 
" has now proposed procedures for making promotions to 
5. 
corporal and sergeant, and the District Court has 
suspended the one-for-one requirement to allow the 
~~-
Department to ~e the procedures. If the Department 
t\ 
proceeds in good faith to develop valid promotion 
procedures, the one-for-one requirement will not be ./~ 
/I) /\_ .. ...r _Jil-~ 
Q' - reimposed as a result of any inevitable delay ~~ ~~ ~ 
~ rtw.:- f? 
If the promotion order is reimposed, it will remain in 
effect only until the Department proposes promotion 
procedures that appear to have no adverse effect on 
' !L a.--~ blacks. The Department itself propo~,e~ to adopt a fully 
? 
' validated procedure for making promotions to corporal 
within one year. ~ubsequent events have shown that it 
takes far less time to propose promotion procedures that 




There is no dispute that the 25 
related to the percentage of nonwhites in the relevant 
workforce. ~ this case the one-for-one promotion 
/ W7:tA-J requirement also ~ reasonably related to the ultimate 25 
j percent goal~ The Department's proposal to promote 11 
white troopers and 4 black troopers to corporal would have 
taken only a short step toward the ultimate goal. If the 
Department continued promoting blacks at this rate, it 
would not reach its goal until there had been a complete 
l 
turnover of Department personnel. In view of the 
Department's long history of discrimination and its 
~e failure to develop an acceptable remedial 
program, the District Court's order to take a longer first 







----~~~~~~ e District Court's order contains .. 
significant elements of flexib~~~~ applies 
"' 
only if qualified black candidates are available for 
promotion. The ~ ¢ourt, moreover, suspended the 
~ 
order as s~n -a-s the Department proposed procedures that 
"" 
appeared likely to have no adverse impact on minority 
applicants. As in Sheet Metal Workers, "[a]n examination 
of what has occurred in the litigation over the years 
makes plain that the District Court has not enforced the 
goal in [al rigid manner." u.s. __ , __ (emphasis in 
original). 
~~~~ 
Finally, the effects on innocent white troopers are 
1\ 
relatively diffuse. Unlike layoffs, promotion 
8. 
requirements generally do not "impose the entire burden of 
achieving racial equality on particular individuals," and 
do not disrupt seriously the lives of innocent 
individuals. See Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education, 
476 U.S. (1986) (opinion of POWELL, J.). 
~ ~~-1 - . ~-"-'--
-;> 1)/ a-,.,_~ ~ ~ yc.c,..c...c.. <:......u., 
~ AlthotHJh~e burden o~ promotion goa],$~ the burden 
of hiring goals, is not diffused among society generally, 
a.-"1~ 
it isj shdred by the nonminority employees over a period of 
a.-.. ...,...._. te.J.-~I' 
time. ~nly qualified minority applicants are eligible for 
A 
promotion, and qualified nonminority applicants remain 
eligible to compete for the available promotions. 
Although some white troopers will have their promotions 
d~yed, it is lii';!Y to --be uncertain whether any 
individual trooper, white or black, would have acheived a 
... 
9. 
different rank, or would have acheived it at a different 
time, but for the promotion requirement. 
I continue to believe that the indiscriminate use of 
race-conscious remedies violates the Equal Protection 
Clause. Sheet Metal Workers, supra, at In this 
case, however, I conclude that the District Court's order 
~
was necessary to remedy longstanding and pervasive 
~ 
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JUSTICE POWELL, concurring. 
I join JUSTICE BRENNAN's opinion. In my view the 
remedy ordered by the District Court in this case meets 
the requirements of the Equal Protection Clause. I have 
stated what I believe to be the standard for assessing a 
constitutional challenge to a racial classification: 
"'Any preference based on racial or ethnic 
criteria must necessarily receive a most 
searching examination to make sure that it does 
not conflict with constitutional guarantees.' 
Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 491 (1980) 
(opinion of Burger, C.J.). There are two prongs 
to this examination. First, any racial 
classification 'must be justified by a 
compelling governmental interest,' Palmore v. 
Sidoti, 466 u.s. 429, 432 (1984); see Loving v. 
Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967); cf. Graham v. 
Richardson, 403 u.s. 365, 375 (1971) (alienage). 
Second, the means chosen by the State to 
effectuate its purpose must be 'narrowly 
tailored to the achievement of that goal.' 
Fullilove, supra, at 480." Wygant v. Jackson 
Board of Education, 476 u.s. ____ , ____ (1986). 
I•' 
2. 
The District Court's order of December 1983, that is 
before us, clearly is justified by the compelling interest 
in eliminating proven racial discrimination. The District 
Court repeatedly found that the Alabama Department of 
Public Safety (the Department) engaged in blatant racial 
discrimination over a period of many years. NAACP v. 
Allen, 340 F. Supp. 703, 705 (MD Ala. 1972); Paradise v. 
Dothard, Civ. Action No. 3561-N (MD Ala., Aug. 5, 1975); 
Paradise v. Shoemaker, 470 F. Supp. 439, 442 (MD Ala. 
1979); Paradise v. Prescott, 585 F. Supp. 72, 74 (MD Ala. 
1983). A finding that an employer has engaged in 
egregious constitutional or statutory violations 
"establishes, without a doubt, a compelling governmental 
interest sufficient to justify the imposition of a 
racially classified remedy." Local 28 of Sheet Metal 
3. 
Workers v. EEOC, u.s. __ , (1986) <opinion of 
POWELL, J.) (hereinafter Sheet Metal Workers). The 
Department, moreover, failed to comply with final orders 
of the District Court and even failed to carry out its own 
commitments under the Consent Agreements. The District 
Court, unlike the court in Sheet Metal Workers, did not 
hold the defendants in contempt. A formal contempt 
finding, however, is not always a necessary prerequisite 
to a court order of race-conscious relief. As in Sheet 
Metal Workers, the protracted history of this litigation 
supports the conclusion that the court would have been 
"powerless to provide an effective remedy" if it had 
lacked authority to establish a benchmark against which to 
measure progress in remedying the effects of persistent 
discrimination. Id., at 
4. 
In determining whether an affirmative action remedy is 
precisely fitted to the achievement of its goal, I have 
relied on five factors: (i) the efficacy of alternative 
remedies; (ii) the planned duration of the remedy; (iii) 
the relationship between the percentage of minority 
workers to be employed and the percentage of minority 
group members in the relevant population or work force; 
(iv) the availability of waiver provisions if the hiring 
plan could not be met; and (v) the effect of the remedy 
upon innocent third parties. Id., at __ ; Fullilove v. 
Klutznick, 448 u.s. 448, 510-511, 514 (opinion of POWELL, 
J.). The Court's opinion today makes clear that the 
affirmative action ordered by the District Court and 
approved by the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit 
was carefully structured -- "narrowly tailored" -- to 
5. 
achieve the goal of remedying the proven and continuing 
discrimination. I therefore will mention only certain 
aspects of the plan before us. 
The District Court imposed the one-for-one promotion 
requirement only on one occasion, when it ordered the 
promotion of eight blacks and eight whites to the rank of 
corporal in February 1984. Because the Department 
urgently needed at least fifteen additional corporals, see 
Paradise v. Prescott, 580 F. Supp. 171, 173 CMD Ala. 
1983), no alternative remedy would have met the then-
existing need. Given the findings of egregious 
discrimination, the Department's long-standing resistance 
to necessary remedies, and the exigent circumstances 
presented to the District Court, the imposition of a one-
6. 
for-one requirement on the particular promotions at issue 
did not violate the Equal Protection Clause. 
The District Court's order contains significant 
elements of flexibility and fairness. First, the order 
applies only if qualified black candidates are available 
for promotion. Second, the District Court suspended the 
order when the Department proposed procedures that 
appeared likely to have no adverse impact on minority 
applicants. It thus appears that the District Court's 
order is based upon "realistic expectations," and that the 
one-for-one requirement is likely to be, as the District 
Court intended, a "one-time occurrence." Paradise v. 
Prescott, supra, at 75-76. As in Sheet Metal Workers, 
"[a]n examination of what has occurred in the litigation 
over the years makes plain that the District Court has not 
7. 
enforced the goal in [a) rigid manner." u.s. 
(emphasis in original). 
Finally, and particularly important, the effects of 
the order on innocent white troopers are relatively 
diffuse. Unlike layoff requirements, the promotion 
requirement at issue in this case does not "impose the 
entire burden of achieving racial equality on particular 
individuals," and does not disrupt seriously the lives of 
innocent individuals. See Wygant v. Jackson Board of 
Education, supra, at (opinion of POWELL, J.). 
Although the burden of a narrowly prescribed promotion 
goal, as in this case, is not diffused among society 
generally, the burden is shared by the nonminority 
employees over a period of time. As noted above, only 
qualified minority applicants are eligible for promotion, 
8. 
and qualified nonminority applicants remain eligible to 
compete for the available promotions. Although some white 
troopers will have their promotions delayed, it is 
uncertain whether any individual trooper, white or black, 
would have achieved a different rank, or would have 
achieved it at a different time, but for the promotion 
requirement. 
I continue to believe that the indiscriminate use of 
race-conscious remedies violates the Equal Protection 
Clause. Sheet Metal Workers, supra, at In this 
case, however, I conclude that the District Court's order 
was reasonably necessary to remedy longstanding and 
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" 'Any pre renee based on racial or eth · criteria must 
necessarily eceive a most searchi examination to 
make sure th t it does not confli with constitutional 
guarantees.' llilove v. Klut tck, 448 U. S. 448, 491 
(1980) (opinion of rger, C. . . There are two prongs 
to this examination. F' st, any racial classification 
'must be justified by ompelling governmental inter-
est,' Palmore v. Si i, 66 U. S. 429, 432 (1984); see 
Loving v. Virgini , 388 U. . 1, 11 (1967); cf. Graham v. 
Richardson, 4 U. S. 365, (1971) (alienage). Sec-
ond, the me s chosen by the St e to effectuate its pur-
pose mus e 'narrowly tailored t the achievement of 
that go .' Fullilove, supra, at 480. Wygant v. Jack-
son oard of Education, 476 U. S. -- (1986).i< - c- ~ J ~\rt. -\-V\uh .. 
The istrict Court's order of December 198 , that is before ~ (!..... -
us, early is justified by the compelling interest · eliminat-
in proven racial discrimination. The District Cou repeat-
aly found that the Alabama Department of Public Safety 
( 
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e_ Depa ment) engaged,. in -blatan~ racial discriminat' n 
over a per o of many years. NAACP v. Allen, 3 F. 
Supp. 703, 70 MD Ala. 1972); Paradise v. Dotha , Civ. 
Action No. 3561- (MD Ala., Aug. 5, 1975); P radise v. 
Shoemaker, 470 F. S . 439, 442 (MD Ala. 19 ); Paradise 
v. Prescott, 585 F. Supp~2, 74 (MD Ala. 1 ). A finding 
that an employer has enga~~ in egregio constitutional or 
statutory violations "establish~, witho a doubt, a compel-
ling governmental interest suffic o justify the imposition 
of a racially classified remedy." 'b cal 28 of Sheet Metal 
Workers v. EEOC,-- U. . --, (1986) (opinion of 
POWELL, J.) (hereinafter eet Metal Wo ers). The De-
partment, moreover, fa' d to comply with fina rders of the 
District Court and e en failed to carry out its o commit-
ments under the nsent Agreements. The Distri Court, 
unlike the cou ·n Sheet Metal Workers, did not hold e de-
fendants inc tempt. A formal contempt finding, howe er, ,,....,,.__..L<.....-1:- • __ 
is not alw s a necessary prerequisite to -,r ~ 
race-con ·cious relief. As in Sheet Metal Workers, the pro 
tracte history of this litigation supports the conclusion that 
the ourt would have been "powerless to provide an effective 
edy" if it had lacked authority to establish a benchmark 
gainst which to measure progress in remedying the effects 
. ~isrent-di -· · · _ 
~ In determining whether an affirmative action remedy is ~ Ll-~ 
111..  (API=egisely fitted to the achievement of its goal, I have r.elied,..('" ~ ~~ ~ 
~ ~e-fagtan;: (i) the efficacy of alternative remedies; (ii) the 0 ...t.-t_ 
planned duration of the remedy; (iii) the relationship between · ~ ~- _ • _ ..... .4 : 
the percentage of minority workers to be employed and the ~~ 
percentage of minority group members in the relevant popu-
lation or work force; (iv) the availability of waiver provisions 
if the hiring plan could not be met; and (v) the effect of the 
remedy upon innocent third parties. I d., at --; Fullilove 
v. Klutznick, 448 U. S. 448, 510-511, 514 (opinion of Pow-
ELL, J.). The Court's opinion today makes clear that the af-
firmative action ordered by the District Court and approved 
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by the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit w Qare ~-;--..___.:_ ___ _ 
"" ~~~=="narroWly tatlUI e~ to achieve the al of 
c;-- remedying the proven and continuing discrimination. I 
. ~ will mention only certain aspects of the plan before 
~ us. 
The District Court imposed the one-for-one promotion re-
quirement only on one occasion, when it ordered the promo-
tion of eight blacks and eight whites to the rank of corporal in 
February 1984. Because the Department urgently needed 
at least fifteen additional corporals, see Paradise v. Prescott 
580 F. Supp. 171, 173 (MD Ala. 1983), o a erna 1ve remedy 
would have met the then-existing nee . Given the findings 
·~~'if· ~ discrimination, the Department's long-standing 
resistance to necessary remedies, and the exigent circum-
stances presented to the District Court, the imposition of a 
one-for-one requirement .q(l the particular promotions at 
issue did not violate the Equal Protection Clause. 
~ 
~~hi 
~ ... 0 ~ oL.C ." 
The District Court's order contains significant elements of 
flexibility and fairness. First, the oPee.r""applies only if quali- <-~ 
fied black candidates are available for promotion. Second, 
the ~pi.Qt..,eOurt suspended the order when the Department 
proposed procedures that appeared likely to have no adverse 
impact on minority applicants. It thus appears that the~ 
~iet jtourt's order is based upon "realistic expectations," aJ?-d 
that the one-for-one requirement is likely to be, as the Dts :;Jr 
~ </ourt intended, a "one-time occurrence." Paradise v. 
Prescott, supra, at 75-76. As in Sheet Metal Workers, "(a]n ;;J;,. 
examination of what has occurred in the litigation over the 
years makes plain that the District Court has not enforced 
the goal in [a] rigid manner." --U.S.--,-- (empha-
sis in original). 
Finally, and particularly important, the effectf ofthe order 
on innocent white troopers~,felativeiy diffuse. Unlike 
layoff requirements, the promotiOn requirement at issue in 
this case does not "impose the entire burden of achieving ra-
cial equality on particular individuals," ·and does not disrupt 
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seriously the lives of innocent individuals. See Wygant v. 
Jackson Board of Education, supra, at-- (opinion of Pow-
ELL, J.). Although the burden of a narrowly prescribed pro-
motion goal, as in this case, is not diffused among society gen-
erally, the burden is shared by the nonminority employees 
over a period of time. As noted above, only qualified minor-
ity applicants are eligible for promotion, and qualified nonmi-
nority applicants remain eligible to compete for the available 
promotions. Although some white troopers will have their 
promotions delayed, it is uncertain whether any individual 
trooper, white or black, would have achieved a different 
rank, or would have achieved it at a different time, but for 
the promotion requirement. 
____ , 
c ~-be-Heve that-the--indiscr1mm e of race-
onscious remedies violates t rotection Clause 
heetMetal Wor~'U ra, at--. In this case, however, 
conclu :It the District Court's order was reasonabl 
Jll"~---~sary to remedy longstanding and pervasive discrimin . . 
In view of the purpose and indeed the explicit 
language of the Equal Protection Clause, court ordered or 
government adopted affirmative action plans must be most 
carefully scrutinized. The Court, in its opinion today, 
has done this. I th f · · ere ore JOln the opinion. 
2. 
C"'' d I r r-f-c ~ l._J 
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Sheetmetal workers the District Court had finally cited 
the union for contempt. This difference is of no 
. A importance where, as here, it has been establi~hed beyond 
{UJ.~rJ -- (U.I.)'~~ question that the Department of Public Safety had engaged 
t'" lY c\N_, -( 
lt~ ~' ~ in persistent violation of constitutional rights. In such 
W) J f--C) (5\L..- 1 v-
b I.A.f_ II f \'\u-t. 
\v~ ,lc\ 'IJ 1\.; sufficient to justify the imposition of a racially 
~' ...... "- ;.J... \J ( y, 
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circumstances there is a "compelling governmental interest 
( 
classified remedy". Sheetmetal Workers, supra at 
I therefore agree with the Court that the protracted 
history of this litigation justifies the conclusion that 
the "one for one" promotion to corporal was appropriate. 
It is reasonable to conclude that the District Court would 
have been "powerless to provide an effective remedy" if it 
had lacked authority to establish a benchmark against 
which to measure progress in remedying the effects of the 
discrimination. Id, at __ 
JUSTICE STEVENS's concurring opinion relies primarily on 
school desegregation decisions such as Swann v. Charlotte-
Mecklenberg Board of Education, 402 u.s. 1 (1971). Although 
those cases are broadly relevant, they differ significantly from 
the Court's subsequent affirmative action cases. No 
desegregation decree denied any child the right to attend public 
school. Apart from the inconvenience of being bused, the 
children suffered no detriment. As the Court noted in Swann, 
id. I at 29-301 
Q.e fo ~:-eclZ 2 
/... a..d.-~~ ~ ~busing -wa-s common_r .Ln many tfchool districts -!eflg 
A ( '- U....:... 
~· 
/ 
January 5, 1987 
RIDER6 GINA-POW 
85-999 United States v. Paradise 
Justice Powell, concurring. 
In many respects this case is similar to Local 28 of 
Sheet Metal Workers v. EEOC, u.s. (1986). 
Here, as in that case, racial discrimination had been 
continued for many years in contravention of repeated 
decisions of the District Court. NAACP v. Allen, 340 F. 
Supp. 703, 705 (MD Ala. (1972); Paradise v. Dothard, Civ. 
Action No. 3561-N (MD Ala., Aug 5, 1975); Paradise v. 
Shoemaker, 470 F. Supp. 439, 442 (MD Ala. 1983); Paradise 
v. Prescott, 585 F. Supp. 72, 74 CMD Ala. 1983}. There 
are differences. Sheetmetal Workers involved an action 
under Title VII, and here the courts below found a 
violation of the Equal Protection Clause.GJ ~lso, in 
(9- * Although 
I have not 
and Equal 
identical. 
we need not resolve the question in this case, 
thought the standard of analysis in Title VII 
Protection cases though similar is 
January 5, 1987 
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Justice Powell, concurring. 
INSERT A: 
In many respects this case is similar to Local 28 of 
Sheet Metal Workers v. EEOC, --u.s. (1986). 
Here, as in that case, racial discrimination had been 
continued for many years in contravention of repeated 
decisions of the District Court. NAACP v. Allen, 340 F. 
Supp. 703, 705 (MD Ala. (1972): Paradise v. Dothard, Civ. 
Action No. 3561-N (MD Ala., Aug 5, 1975): Paradise v. 
~ Shoemaker, 470 F. Supp. 439, 442 (MD Ala. 19~ : Paradise 
v. Prescott, 585 F. Supp. 72, 74 (MD Ala. 1983). There 
are differences. Sheetmetal Workers involved an action 
under Title VII, and here the courts below found a 
violation of the Equal Protection Clause.l Also, in 
1 Although 
I have not 
and Equal 
identical. 
we need not resolve the question in this case, 
thought the standard of analysis in Title VII 
Protection cases though similar is 
2. 
Sheetmetal Workers the District Court had finally cited 
the union for contempt. This difference is of no 
importance where, as here, it has been established beyond 
question that the Department of Public Safety had engaged 
in persistent violation of constitutional rights and 
repeatedly failed to carry out court orders. In such 
circumstances there is a "compelling governmental interest 
sufficient to justify the imposition of a racially 
classified remedy". Sheetmetal Workers, supra at 
I therefore agree with the Court that the protracted 
history of this litigation justifies the conclusion that 
the "one for one" promotion to corporal was appropriate. 
It is reasonable to conclude that the District Court would 
have been "powerless to provide an effective remedy" if it 
had lacked authority to establish a benchmark against 
which to measure progress in remedying the effects of the 
discrimination. Id, at __ 
INSERT B: 
1 JUSTICE STEVENS's concurring opinion relies primarily 
on school desegregation decisions such as Swan v. 
Charlotte-Mecklenberg Board of Education, 402 u.s. 1 
(1971). Although these cases are broadly relevant, they 
3. 
differ significantly from the Court's subsequent 
affirmative action decisions. No desegregation decree 
denied any child the right to attend public school. Apart 
from the inconvenience of being bused, the children 
suffered no detriment. As the Court noted in Swann, id., 
at 29-30, busing had been common for years in many school 
districts in this country. 
INSERT C: 
The court's actions indicate that the order will be 
enforced in a constitutional manner if it is reimposed. 
INSERT D: 
In view of the purpose and indeed the explicit 
language of the Equal Protection Clause, court ordered or 
government adopted affirmative action plans must be most 
carefully scrutinized. The Court, in its opinion today, 
has done this. I therefore join the opinion. 
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[January-, 1987] 
JUSTICE POWELL, concurring. 
In many respects this case is similar to Sheet Metal Work-
ers v. EEOC,-- U.S.-- (1986). Here, as in that case, 
racial discrimination had been continued for many years in 
contravention of repeated decisions of the District Court. 
NAACP v. Allen, 340 F. Supp. 703, 705 (MD Ala. (1972); 
Paradise v. Dothard, Civ. Action No. 3561-N (MD Ala., Aug 
5, 1975); Paradise v. Shoemaker, 470 F. Supp. 439, 442 (MD 
Ala. 1979); Paradise v. Prescott, 585 F. Supp. 72, 74 (MD 
Ala. 1983). There are differences. Sheet Metal Workers in-
volved an action under Title VII, and here the courts below 
found a violation of the Equal Protection Clause. 1 Also, in 
Sheet Metal Workers the District Court had finally cited the 
union for contempt. This difference is of no importance 
where, as here, it has been established beyond question that 
the Department of Public Safety had engaged in persistent 
violation of constitutional rights and repeatedly failed to 
carry out court orders. In such circumstances there is a 
"compelling governmental interest sufficient to justify the 
imposition of a racially classified remedy." Sheet Metal 
Workers v. EEOC, supra, at--. 
' Although we need not resolve the question in this case, I have not 
thought the standards of analysis in Title VII and Equal Protection cases-
though similar-are identical. 
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I therefore agree with the Court that the protracted his-
tory of this litigation justifies the conclusion that the "one-
for-one" promotion to corporal was appropriate. It is rea-
sonable to conclude that the District Court would have been 
"powerless to provide an effective remedy" if it had lacked 
authority to establish a benchmark against which to measure 
progress in remedying the effects of the discrimination. I d., 
at--. 
In determining whether an affirmative action remedy is 
narrowly drawn to achieve its goal, I have thought that five 
factors may be relevant: (i) the efficacy of alternative reme-
dies; (ii) the plam1ed duration of the remedy; (iii) the relation-
ship between the percentage of minority workers to be em-
ployed and the percentage of minority group members in the 
relevant population or work force; (iv) the availability of 
waiver provisions if the hiring plan could not be met; and (v) 
the effect of the remedy upon innocent third parties. I d., at 
--; Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U. S. 448, 510-511, 514 
(opinion of POWELL, J.). 2 The Court's opinion today makes 
clear that the affirmative action ordered by the District 
Court and approved by the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh 
Circuit was narrowly drawn to achieve the goal of remedying 
the proven and continuing discrimination. In view of the 
Court's thorough opinion, I will mention only certain aspects 
of the plan before us. 
The District Court imposed the one-for-one promotion re-
quirement only on one occasion, when it ordered the promo-
tion of eight blacks and eight whites to the rank of corporal in 
February 1984. Because the Department urgently needed 
2 JUSTICE STEVEN's concurring opinion relies primarily on school deseg-
regation decisions such as Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenberg Board of Edu-
cation, 402 U. S. 1 (1971). Although these cases are broadly relevant, 
they differ significantly from the Court's subsequent affirmative action de-
cisions. No desegregation decree denied any child the right to attend pub-
lic school. Apart from the inconvenience of being bused, the children suf-
fered no detriment. As the Court noted in Swann, id., at 29-30, busing 
had been common for years in many school districts in this country. 
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at least fifteen additional corporals, see Paradise v. Prescott, 
580 F. Supp. 171, 173 (MD Ala. 1983), there appears to have 
been no alternative remedy that would have met the then-ex-
isting need. Given the findings of persistent discrimination, 
the Department's long-standing resistance to necessary rem-
edies, and the exigent circumstances presented to the Dis-
trict Court, the imposition of a one-for-one requirement for 
the particular promotions at issue did not violate the Equal 
Protection Clause. 
The District Court's order contains significant elements of 
flexibility and fairness. First, it applies only if qualified 
black candidates are available for promotion. Second, the 
court suspended the order when the Department proposed 
procedures that appeared likely to have no adverse impact on 
minority applicants. It thus appears that the court's order is 
based upon "realistic expectations," and that the one-for-one 
requirement is likely to be, as the court intended, a "one-time 
occurrence." Paradise v. Prescott, supra, at 75-76. The 
court's actions indicate that the order will be enforced in a 
constitutional manner if it is reimposed. As in Sheet Metal 
Workers, "[a]n examination of what has occurred in the liti-
gation over the years makes plain that the District Court has 
not enforced the goal in [a] rigid manner." -- U. S. --, 
-- (emphasis in original). 
Finally, and particularly important, the effect of the order 
on innocent white troopers is likely to be relatively diffuse. 
Unlike layoff requirements, the promotion requirement at 
issue in this case does not "impose the entire burden of 
achieving racial equality on particular individuals," and does 
not disrupt seriously the lives of innocent individuals. See 
Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education, --U.S. --, 
--(opinion of POWELL, J.). Although the burden of a nar-
rowly prescribed promotion goal, as in this case, is not dif-
fused among society generally, the burden is shared by the 
nonminority employees over a period of time. As noted 
above, only qualified minority applicants are eligible for pro-
85-999-CONCUR 
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motion, and qualified nonminority applicants remain eligible 
to compete for the available promotions. Although some 
white troopers will have their promotions delayed, it is un-
certain whether any individual trooper, white or black, would 
have achieved a different rank, or would have achieved it at a 
different time, but for the promotion requirement. 
In view of the purpose and indeed the explicit language of 
the Equal Protection Clause, court-ordered or government-
adopted affirmative action plans must be most carefully scru-
tinized. The Court, in its opinion today, has done this. I 
therefore join the opinion. 
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[January-, 1987] 
JUSTICE POWELL, concurring. 
In many respects this case is similar to Sheet Metal Work-
ers v. EEOC,-- U.S.-- (1986). Here, as in that case, 
racial discrimination had been continued for many years in 
contravention of repeated decisions of the District Court. 
NAACP v. Allen, 340 F. Supp. 703, 705 (MD Ala. (1972); 
Paradise v. Dothard, Civ. Action No. 3561-N (MD Ala., Aug 
5, 1975); Paradise v. Shoemaker, 470 F. Supp. 439, 442 (MD 
Ala. 1979); Paradise v. Prescott, 585 F. Supp. 72, 74 (MD 
Ala. 1983). There are differences. Sheet Metal Workers in-
volved an action under Title VII, and here the courts below 
found a violation of the Equal Protection Clause. 1 Also, in 
Sheet Metal Workers the District Court had finally cited the 
union for contempt. This difference is of no importance 
where, as here, it has been established beyond question that 
the Department of Public Safety had engaged in persistent 
violation of constitutional rights and repeatedly failed to 
carry out court orders. In such circumstances there is a 
"compelling governmental interest sufficient to justify the 
imposition of a racially classified remedy." Sheet Metal 
Workers v. EEOC, supra, at--. 
'Although we need not resolve the question in this case, I have not 
thought the standards of analysis in Title VII and Equal Protection cases-
though similar-are identical. 
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I therefore agree with the Court that the protracted his-
tory of this litigation justifies the conclusion that the "one-
for-one" promotion to corporal was appropriate. It is rea-
sonable to conclude that the District Court would have been 
"powerless to provide an effective remedy" if it had lacked 
authority to establish a benchmark against which to measure 
progress in remedying the effects of the discrimination. I d., 
at--. 
In determining whether an affirmative action remedy is 
narrowly drawn to achieve its goal, I have thought that five 
factors may be relevant: (i) the efficacy of alternative reme-
dies; (ii) the planned duration of the remedy; (iii) the relation-
ship between the percentage of minority workers to be em-
ployed and the percentage of minority group members in the 
relevant population or work force; (iv) the availability of 
waiver provisions if the hiring plan could not be met; and (v) 
the effect of the remedy upon innocent third parties. I d., at 
--; Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U. S. 448·, 510-511, 514 
(opinion of POWELL, J.). 2 The Court's opinion today makes 
2 Our decisions make clear that all government-imposed affirmative ac-
tion plans must be closely scrutinized because "[r]acial classifications are 
simply too pernicious to permit any but the most exact connection between 
justification and classification." Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U. S. 448, 537 
(1980) (STEVENS, J., dissenting). Because racial distinctions are inher-
ently suspect whether they are imposed by a legislature or a court, we 
have never measured court-ordered affirmative action remedies against a 
less demanding standard. 
JUSTICE STEVENS's concurring opinion relies primarily on school deseg-
regation decisions such as Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenberg Board of Edu-
cation, 402 U. S. 1 (1972). See post, at--. Although these cases are 
broadly relevant, they differ significantly from the Court's subsequent af-
firmative action decisions. To be sure, a pupil who is bused from a neigh-
borhood school to a comparable school in a different neighborhood m 
inconvenienced. Indeed, I have said a e x ens1ve pup1l transpor-
tation may threaten liberty or privacy interests." Washington v. Seattle 
School Dist. No. 1, 458 U. S. 457, 492 n. 6. But the position of bused pu-
pils is far different from that of employees who are laid off or denied pro-
motion. Court-ordered busing does not deprive students of any race of an 
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clear that the affirmative action ordered by the District 
Court and approved by the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh 
Circuit was narrowly drawn to achieve the goal of remedying 
the proven and continuing discrimination. In 'view of the 
Court's thorough opinion, I will mention only certain aspects 
of the plan before us. 
The District Court imposed the one-for-one promotion re-
quirement only on one occasion, when it ordered the promo-
tion of eight blacks and eight whites to the rank of corporal in 
February 1984. Because the Department urgently needed 
at least fifteen additional corporals, see Paradise v. Prescott, 
580 F. Supp. 171, 173 (MD Ala. 1983), there appears to have 
been no alternative remedy that would have met the then-ex-
isting need. Given the findings of persistent discrimination, 
the Department's long-standing resistance to necessary rem-
edies, and the exigent circumstances presented to the Dis-
trict Court, the imposition of a one-for-one requirement for 
the particular promotions at issue did not violate the Equal 
Protection Clause. 
The District Court's order contains significant elements of 
flexibility and fairness. First, it applies only if qualified 
black candidates are available for promotion. Second, the 
court suspended the order when the Department proposed 
procedures that appeared likely to have no adverse impact on 
minority applicants. It thus appears that the court's order is 
based upon "realistic expectations," and that the one-for-one 
requirement is likely to be, as the court intended, a "one-time 
occurrence." Paradise v. Prescott, supra, at 75-76. The 
court's actions indicate that the order will be enforced in a 
equal opportunity for an education. Cf. University of California Regents 
v. Bakke, 438 U. S. 2f35, 300 n. 39 (1978) (opinion of PowELL, J.) (distin-
guishing bused pupil from applicant denied admission to medical school). 
Moreover, as the Court noted in Swann, busing had been common for 
years in many schools districts throughout the country. 402 U. S., at 
29-30. See also Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, Denver, Colo., 413 U. S. 189, 
243 n. 22 (POWELL, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
-
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constitutional manner if it is reimposed. As in Sheet Metal 
Workers, "[a]n examination of what has occurred in the liti-
gation over the years makes plain that the District Court has 
not enforced the goal in [a] rigid manner." -- U. S. --, 
--(emphasis in original). 
Finally, and particularly important, the effect of the order 
on innocent white troopers is likely to be relatively diffuse. 
Unlike layoff requirements, the promotion requirement at 
issue in this case does not "impose the entire burden of 
achieving racial equality on particular individuals," and does 
not disrupt seriously the lives of innocent individuals. See 
Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education, --U.S. --, 
-- (opinion of POWELL, J. ). Although the burden of a nar-
rowly prescribed promotion goal, as in this case, is not dif-
fused among society generally, the burden is shared by the 
nonminority employees over a period of time. As noted 
above, only qualified minority applicants are eligible for pro-
motion, and qualified nonminority applicants remain eligible 
to compete for the available promotions. Although some 
white troopers will have their promotions delayed, it is un-
certain whether any individual trooper, white or black, would 
have achieved a different rank, or would have achieved it at a 
different time, but for the promotion requirement. 
In view of the purpose and indeed the explicit language of 
the Equal Protection Clause, court-ordered or government-
adopted affirmative action plans must be most carefully scru-
tinized. The Court, in its opinion today, has done this. I 
therefore join the opinion. 
Substitute for note 2: 
~ 
~, ~ # -4.J 1\ 
plans must 
be closely scrutinized because "[r]acial classifications 
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Although these cases are broadly relevant, they differ 
significantly from the Court's subsequent affirmative 
action decisions. To be sure, a pupil who is bused from a 
neighborhood school to a comparable school in a different 
neighborhood may be inconvenienced. Indeed, I have said 
that under some busing decrees "[e]xtensive pupil 
transportation may threaten liberty or privacy interests," 
washington v. Seattle School District No.1, 458 u.s. 457, 
~ 
492, n. 6. But pupils bused~ not remotely in a 
comparable position to employees who are laid off or 
denied promotion. Court ordered busing does not deprive 
students of any race of an equal opportunity for an 
education. Moreover, as the Court noted in Swann, busing 
has been common for years in many school districts 
' ' .. 
2. 
throughout the country. 402 u.s., at 29-30. See also 
Keyes v. School District No.1, Denver, Colorado, 413 u.s. 
189, 243, n. 22 (Powell, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) • 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 85-999 
UNITED STATES, PETITIONER v. PHILLIP PARA-
DISE, JR., ET AL. 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT 
[February -, 1987] 
JUSTICE POWELL, concurring. 
In many respects this case is similar to Sheet Metal Work-
ers v. EEOC, 478 U. S. -- (1986). Here, as in that case, 
racial discrimination had been continued for many years in 
contravention of repeated decisions of the District Court. 
NAACP v. Allen, 340 F. Supp. 703,705 (MD Ala. 1972); Par-
adise v. Dothard, Civ. Action No. 3561-N (MD Ala., Aug 5, 
1975); Paradise v. Shoemaker, 470 F. Supp. 439, 442 (MD 
Ala. 1979); Paradise v. Prescott, 585 F. Supp. 72, 74 (MD 
Ala. 1983). There are differences. Sheet Metal Workers in-
volved an action under Title VII, and here the courts below 
found a violation of the Equal Protection Clause. 1 Also, in 
Sheet Metal Workers the District Court had finally cited the 
union for contempt. This difference is of no importance 
where, as here, it has been established beyond question that 
the Department of Public Safety had engaged in persistent 
violation of constitutional rights and repeatedly failed to 
carry out court orders. In such circumstances there is a 
"compelling governmental interest sufficient to justify the 
imposition of a racially classified remedy." Sheet Metal 
Workers v. EEOC, supra, at--. 
1 Although we need not resolve the question in this case, I have not 
thought the standards of analysis in Title VII and Equal Protection cases-
though similar-are identical. 
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I therefore agree with the Court that the protracted his-
tory of this litigation justifies the conclusion that the "one-
for-one" promotion to corporal was appropriate. It is rea-
sonable to conclude that the District Court would have been 
"powerless to provide an effective remedy'' if it had lacked 
authority to establish a benchmark against which to measure 
progress in remedying the effects of the discrimination. I d., 
at--. 
In determining whether an affirmative action remedy is 
narrowly drawn to achieve its goal, I have thought that five 
factors may be relevant: (i) the efficacy of alternative reme-
dies; (ii) the planned duration of the remedy; (iii) the relation-
ship between the percentage of minority workers to be em-
ployed and the percentage of minority group members in the 
relevant population or work force; (iv) the availability of 
waiver provisions if the hiring plan could not be met; and (v) 
the effect of the remedy upon innocent third parties. I d., at 
--; Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U. S. 448, 510-511, 514 
(1980) (opinion of PoWELL, J.). 2 The Court's opinion today 
2 Our decisions make clear that all government-imposed affirmative ac-
tion plans must be closely scrutinized because "[r ]acial classifications are 
simply too pernicious to permit any but the most exact connection between 
justification and classification." Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U. S. 448, 537 
(1980) (STEVENS, J., dissenting). Because racial distinctions are inher-
ently suspect whether they are imposed by a legislature or a court, we 
have never measured court-ordered affirmative action remedies against a 
less demanding standard. 
JUSTICE STEVENS' concurring opinion relies primarily on school deseg-
regation decisions such as Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenberg Board of Edu-
cation, 402 U. S. 1 (1972). See post, at -. Although these cases are 
broadly relevant, they differ significantly from the Court's subsequent af-
firmative action decisions. To be sure, a pupil who is bused from a neigh-
borhood school to a comparable school in a different neighborhood may be 
inconvenienced. Indeed, I have said that "[e]xtensive pupil transporta-
tion may threaten liberty or privacy interests." Washington v. Seattle 
School District No. 1, 458 U. S. 457, 492 n. 6 (1982). But the position of 
bused pupils is far different from that of employees who are laid off or de-
nied promotion. Court-ordered busing does not deprive students of any 
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makes clear that the affirmative action ordered by the Dis-
trict Court and approved by the Court of Appeals for the 
Eleventh Circuit was narrowly drawn to achieve the goal of 
remedying the proven and continuing discrimination. In 
view of the Court's thorough opinion, I will mention only cer-
tain aspects of the plan before us. 
The District Court imposed the one-for-one promotion re-
quirement only on one occasion, when it ordered the promo-
tion of eight blacks and eight whites to the rank of corporal in 
February 1984. Because the Department urgently needed 
at least fifteen additional corporals, see Paradise v. Prescott, 
580 F. Supp. 171, 173 (MD Ala. 1983), there appears to have 
been no alternative remedy that would have met the then-ex-
isting need. Given the findings of persistent discrimination, 
the Department's longstanding resistance to necessary reme-
dies, and the exigent circumstances presented to the District 
Court, the imposition of a one-for-one requirement for the 
particular promotions at issue did not violate the Equal Pro-
tection Clause. 
The District Court's order contains significant elements of 
flexibility and fairness. First, it applies only if qualified 
black candidates are available for promotion. Second, the 
court suspended the order when the Department proposed 
procedures that appeared likely to have no adverse impact on 
minority applicants. It 'thus appears that the court's order is 
based upon "realistic expectations," and that the one-for-one 
requirement is likely to be, as the court intended, a "one-time 
occurrence." Paradise v. Prescott, supra, at 75-76. The 
court's actions indicate that the order will be enforced in a 
race of an equal opportunity for an education. Cf. University of Califor-
nia Regents v. Bakke, 438 U. S. 265, 300 n. 39 (1978) (opinion of POWELL, 
J.) (distinguishing bused pupil from applicant denied admission to medical 
school). Moreover, as the Court noted in Swann, busing had been com-
mon for years in many schools districts throughout the country. 402 
U. S., at 29-30. See also Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, Denver, Colo., 413 
U. S. 189, 243 n. 22 (1973) (POWELL, J., concurring in part and dissenting 
in part). 
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constitutional manner if it is reimposed. As in Sheet Metal 
Workers, "[a]n examination of what has occurred in this liti-
gation over the years makes plain that the District Court has 
not enforced the goal in [a] rigid manner." 478 U. S. --· , 
--(emphasis in original). 
Finally, and particularly important, the effect of the order 
on innocent white troopers is likely to be relatively diffuse. 
Unlike layoff requirements, the promotion requirement at 
issue in this case does not "impose the entire burden of 
achieving racial equality on particular individuals," and does 
not disrupt seriously the lives of innocent individuals. See 
Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education, 476 U. S. --, --
(1986) (opinion of POWELL, J.). 3 Although the burden of a 
narrowly prescribed promotion goal, as in this case, is not 
diffused among society generally, the burden is shared by the 
nonminority employees over a period of time. As noted 
above, only qualified minority applicants are eligible for pro-
motion, and qualified nonminority applicants remain eligible 
to compete for the available promotions. Although some 
white troopers will have their promotions delayed, it is un-
certain whether any individual trooper, white or black, would 
have achieved a different rank, or would have achieved it at a 
different time, but for the promotion requirement. 
In view. of the purpose and indeed the explicit language of 
the Equal Protection Clause, court-ordered or government-
adopted affirmative action plans must be most carefully scru-
tinized. The Court, in its opinion today, has done this. I 
therefore join the opinion. 
\ 
3 See generally Fallon and Weiler, Firefighters v. Stotts: Conflicting 
Models of Racial Justice,l984 S. Ct. Rev. 1, 28-32 (contending that allo-
cating the costs of affirmative action remedies raises separate issues of 
fairness). 
